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CONTROL OF HIV-POSITIVE WOMEN
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the government's purposes are beneficent... The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but
without understanding.'
INTRODUCTION
T he human immunodeficiency virus (HIIV)2 can be transmitted
from a pregnant woman to her fetus during pregnancy and
childbirth. In fact, up to one-third of all children born to HIV-posi-
five women will themselves be infected. Currently, in the United
States, the incidence of AIDS by population group is growing fastest
among women, and as a direct result, is also rapidly accelerating
among children.4 Alarmed by the increase in AIDS among children,
some sectors of the public and, more significantly, a vocal minority
of influential medical experts,5 are calling for measures to prevent
perinatal transmission. Among the recommended measures are
some which intrude upon the rights of women in ways which are at
the least inappropriate, and are most likely unconstitutional. Such
measures include mandatory HIV testing of all pregnant women and
directive counseling or compulsion of HIV-positive women to "post-
pone pregnancy" by accepting contraception,6 abortion, or steriliza-
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
2. To receive a diagnosis of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), one must
be infected with HIV and have a T-Cell count of less than 200 and/or exhibit one of a list
of symptoms determined by the federal Centers for Disease Control (CDC). See Centers
for Disease Control, 1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded
AIDS Surveillance Case Definition for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41(RR-17)
MORBEDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1 (Dec. 18, 1992).
3. There are conflicting data on the rate of perinatal transmission. See infra note 94.
Briefly, early studies indicated relatively high transmission rates, generally 30% to 50%.
As more data has been collected, this figure has declined. Current estimates indicate that
the rate is 25% to 30%, although some studies of isolated groups have yielded rates as low
as 12.9%. Id. For the purposes of this Article, the actual rate is important only in relation
to weighing any state interest associated with the risk of transmission. This paper will
therefore utilize a one-third transmission rate, referred- to interchangeably as a 30%
transmission rate, which is slightly higher than the most widely accepted rate. See John
Modlin & Alfred Saah, Public Health and Clinical Aspects of HIV Infection and Disease in
Women and Children in the United States, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION
29 (Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991).
4. See Centers for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
United States, 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALi'T WKLY. REP. 463, 466-67 (1992); Centers
for Disease Control, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome United States, 1982-
1990, 40 MORBMITr & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 358 (1991).
5. See Nancy E. Kass, Reproductive Decisionmaking in the Context of HIV: The Case
for Nondirective Counseling, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 3,
at 308, 313-20.
6. An HIV-positive woman could be ordered to ingest birth control pills, to utilize
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tion. In addition, prosecutors and public health authorities have
begun to consider applying civil and criminal HIV containment laws
against HIV-positive women. Containment laws generally target
behaviors presenting risk of disease transmission. Thus, the mere
fact of pregnancy might be used as evidence of either risking trans-
mission to the fetus, or of exposing the impregnating male to the
virus.
This Article presents an overview of state laws, enacted as of
April 19, 1993, that have the potential to be applied to HIV-positive
women. Although most of these laws have not been so applied, the
danger that some may be directed toward pregnant women is very
real. In fact, one such law has already been used against a pregnant,
HIV-positive woman. This Article is intended as a preemptive
condoms or a diaphragm in conjunction with contraceptive cream or jelly, or to utilize
contraceptive sponges. In fact, some state health departments have already employed
these methods against HIV-positive women. E.g., State v. McLellan, No. 92 CR 05684
(Gen. Ct. Justice Cumberland County, N.C. Mar. 25, 1992), affd, No. 92 CR 05684 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1993). An HIV-positive woman could also simply be ordered not to
become pregnant. The possibility that a court would issue such an order is very real. In
analogous situations, where courts have desired to prevent individuals from bearing
children out of wedlock, many courts have ordered women not to become pregnant unless
they are married. See, e.g., People v. Dominquez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(invalidating condition of-probation imposed by trial court that defendant refrain from be-
coming pregnant unless she first married as not reasonably related to conviction or to de-
terring future criminality); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App, 1979)
(invalidating, as not reasonably related to rehabilitation, conditions to ten year probation
on a robbery plea, that defendant refrain from becoming pregnant, and marry only with
the court's permission); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(striking condition of probation on conviction for grand theft and battery that defendant
not become pregnant unless she married, finding condition "grossly erroneous" as it re-
lated to noncriminal conduct and was unrelated to rehabilitation); State v. Norman, 484
So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (invalidating condition of forgery conviction probation that
defendant "not give birth to any children out of wedlock" as unrelated to criminal
rehabilitation and forbidding noncriminal conduct); see also Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d
46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (invalidating condition on forgery and stealing probation that
defendants refrain from out-of-wedlock sexual intercourse as not reasonably related to
rehabilitation); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (striking condition of
probation on a child abandonment charge that defendant refrain from becoming pregnant
because the condition unduly intrudes upon right to childbearing); People v. Pointer, 199
Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating a condition of probation on conviction for
child abuse that defendant refrain from becoming pregnant because it infringed upon a
fundamental right and was not the least restrictive way of protecting potential fetuses
and children; criminal sanctions on pregnancy would discourage prenatal care); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1976) (striking as unconstitutional infringement of
right to childbearing a condition of probation for conviction of felony child abuse that de-
fendant refrain from giving birth for five years).
7. State v. McLellan, No. 92 CR 05684 (Gen. Ct. Justice Cumberland County, N.C.
Mar. 25, 1992), affd, No. 92 CR 05684 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1993) (transcript of bench
trial, judge's order of conviction and sentencing, and oral notice of appeal on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
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strike against any escalation in the use of the law to coerce HIV-
positive women in their childbearing decisions. This Article also
reviews evidence that when treating IHV-positive women, health
care professionals may be relaxing the standards of informed con-
sent traditionally required for reproductive health care delivery, and
argues that such relaxation is unjustified and improper.
Although the goal of preventing pediatric AIDS is laudable,
policies advocating involuntary control of childbearing by HIV-posi-
tive women are modern examples of the historical illegal coercion of
childbearing choices by women who are poor, disabled, and/or of
color. Such policies contravene constitutional and medical consent
law. Additionally, they are unlikely to succeed in their preventive
goals.
Admittedly, control measures may often seem necessary and
compelling. Media images of HIV-infected babies garner practically
universal sympathy; these children suffer intensely during their
short lives8 and their mothers frequently appear morally oblivious.9
Unfortunately, the alternative to oppressive control measures, effec-
tive preventive education, has been virtually paralyzed by the politi-
cal force of conservative sexual views. 10 Meanwhile, the incidence of
8. There appear to be two types of children born with HIV infection. Some children
are very sick at birth and die before they reach the age of 15 months. Children in the sec-
ond group, however, become ill later and live longer, often into their eighth year of life.
Written comments to the Author from Sarmistha H. Hauger, M.D., Columbia University
Medical Center (Oct. 27, 1992) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
9. HIV infected mothers are frequently condemned as immoral for choosing to bear
children who are at risk for developing HIV themselves. See, e.g., John D. Arras, AIDS
and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353,
370-71 (1990) (expressing the opinion that it is "seriously irresponsible and wrong" to
have a child, if one is a homeless drug-addicted woman whose HIV disease is quite ad-
vanced, and who has no family support structure); Judith Grad, Ethics and AIDS, in HIV
POSITIVE PERSPECTIVES ON COUNSELING 37, 39 (Margot Tallmer et al. eds., 1991) ("Some
people believe, as I do, that it is morally wrong to risk bearing a child who has so high a
likelihood of living a short life that will end in excruciating pain."); A-M. Rosenthal, Suffer
Little Children, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1989, at A27 (unsympathetically reporting that an
mother had second AIDS baby despite being warned after her first AIDS baby that there
was a 50 to 70% chance that any subsequent child she chose to have would also be born
with the AIDS virus).
10. For example, historically, the CDC has restricted AIDS educational programs
and prevented use of many of the materials shown to be most effective among gay men
and intravenous drug users. In 1986, the CDC announced an AIDS education funding
program disallowing funds for programs which utilized materials which would be
reasonably judged to be offensive to most educated adults outside the intended audience.
51 Fed. Reg. 3427, 3431 (1986). However, these regulations were initially quite success-
fully challenged by one AIDS educator. See Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 733 F.
Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Interim revisions by the CDC provided that the CDC Program
Review Panel could approve potentially offensive material if it determined that the
probable "effectiveness in communicating an important HIV prevention message"
outweighed the possible offensiveness. 55 Fed. Reg. 23,414, 23,416 (1990). Subsequently,
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HIV infection in babies grows at an alarming rate." However, not all
babies born with IHV antibodies actually have HIV themselves-only
one third of these children will develop HIV infection.12 Moreover,
because the vast majority of HIV-infected women are poor,'3 HIV-
positive babies present a tremendous economic burden to the state.1 4
even the modified regulations were ultimately invalidated as beyond the agency's scope
and as unconstitutionally vague, and thus violative of the First Amendment. Gay Men's
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In response to the 1992
Southern District Court order, the restrictions were further revised and made more lib-
eral, but still require emphasis on abstinence, monogamous sexual relationships, and the
danger of intravenous drug use and promiscuity. 57 Fed. Reg. 26,742 (1992).
Commentators have noted that the public response to AIDS would have been more
compassionate and effective had the disease not first infected groups stigmatized by con-
servative morality. See, e.g., David E. Rogers, Report Card on Our National Response to
the AIDS Epidemic-Some A's, Too Many D's, 82 AMi. J. PUB. HEALTH 522, 523 (1992);
Ronald Bayer, AIDS Privacy, and Responsibility, DAEDALUS, Summer 1989, at 79, 92-94
[hereinafter Bayer, AIDS]; Ronald Bayer, The Kid Who Has It, 251 NATION 324 (1989)
(book review) [hereinafter Bayer, Kid] ("Thus the historical accident that HIV first estab-
lished itself among gay men and intravenous drug users in the United States marked the
epidemic's course not only in terms of who would bear the burden of disease and death
but of the social reaction it would engender.").
It has also been asserted that the spread of AIDS to other groups makes the control
of the disease more urgent. William Bennet has stated:
Already AIDS has spread from its primary risk groups, homosexuals and intra-
venous drug users, to heterosexuals; now it is attacking the unborn and the
newborn as well. Furthermore, as the disease spreads, children will become in-
creasingly at risk. This danger to our children makes it all the more urgent that
we do everything in our power to protect the uninfected members of our society.
William J. Bennett, AIDS: Education and Public Policy, 7 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 5
(1988).
11. One study, concluded in September of 1990, estimated that nationally, 1800
newborns acquired HIV infection perinatally over a 12-month period. Marta Gwinn et al.,
Prevalence of HIVInfection in Childbearing Women in the United States, 265 JAMA 1704,
1706 (1991). This figure exceeded the total of 1614 children with perinatally acquired
AIDS reported to the CDC from 1981-1989. Id.; see also Database, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Feb. 22, 1993, at 8 (estimating that five to ten million babies will be born infected
with HIV by the year 2000, and that the rank of HIV as a cause of death among children
ages one to four will increase from ninth to within the top five by that time). In New York
State during 1988, AIDS was the leading cause of death for Hispanic children one to four
years of age and the second leading cause of death for Black children in that age group.
Centers for Disease Control, Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS - United
States, 1981-1990, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 41, 44 (1991). In New York
City, one in thirty-two African-American babies have HIV antibodies at birth. Celia W.
Dugger, HIV Incidence Rises Among Black Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992 at B3
(indicating that 356 of the 11,395 babies born to New York City Black women between the
ages of 25 and 29 in 1991 tested positive for the HIV antibody).
12. Gwinn; supra note 11; see infra note 94.
13. See infra note 16.
14. Ruth R. Faden et al., HIV Infection, Pregnant Women and Newborns: A Policy
Proposal for Information and Testing in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra
note 3, at 331, 343. In 1989, the annual cost of caring for HIV-infected infants was
estimated to be 1 billion dollars. Howard L. Minkoff, AIDS in Obstetrics, 32 CLINIcAL
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This burden is intolerable in these times of scarce resources and
particularly restricted medical resources for the poor. Based on
these facts and statistics and, in the absence of alternatives, the
harms to be prevented-the suffering of infants and the social costs
incurred in caring for IV-infected infants-may initially seem to be
much greater than the harm of controlling HIV-positive women.
Upon a close evaluation of the implications of controlling women's
childbearing decisions, however, this balance shifts in the opposite
direction.
The likelihood that control measures ranging from mandatory
testing and directive counseling to prosecution for pregnancy will
soon be widely adopted must not be discussed ahistorically or in
isolation. The overwhelming majority of HIV-infected women are in
their childbearing years,15 poor,16 and African- or Latin-American" 7-
groups which repeatedly have suffered from illegal reproductive
control in the past. Part I of this Article discusses this history to
provide a perspective on the impulse to control childbearing by HIV-
positive women. The history of illegal reproductive coercion is a
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 421 (1989).
As ethicist John D. Arras notes, the cost of care for the children of the HIV-infected
adults often falls to the state. The majority of children with HIV are poor and thus, un-
likely to be covered by private health insurance. In addition, because their parents are
also likely to be infected or to have died, even healthy offspring are often abandoned in
hospitals or turned over to foster care. Arras, supra note 9, at 356-57; see also Kathleen
Nolan, Ethical Issues in Caring for Pregnant Women and Newborns at Risk for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 13 SEMINARS PERINATOLOGY 55, 63 (1989) ("The major
grounds for societal objection [to HIV-positive women bearing children] appear, strictly
speaking, to be economic rather than moral.").
15. Centers for Disease Control, AIDS in Women - United States, 39 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY REP. 845, 846 (1990) (stating that 85% of all women with AIDS are of
childbearing age); Joan I. Listernick, The Case Against Mandatory Prenatal Testing for
H!V, 32 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 506, 506 (1989) (citing Mary E. Guinan &
Ann Hardy, Epidemiology of AIDS in Women in the United States, 1981 Through 1986,
257 JAMA 2039 (1987)).
16. See Stephen W. Nicholas et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
Childhood, Adolescence and Pregnancy: A Status Report and National Research Agenda,
83 PEDIATRICS 293, 304 (1989) (reporting that the profile of an HIV-infected child includes
"poverty, poor education, unemployment, single-parent households .... and often drug
use by one or both parents").
17. Over 72% of U.S. women with HIV are Black and or Hispanic. Centers for
Disease Control, AIDS in Women - United States, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 845, 845-46 (1990); see also Gwinn et al., supra note 11, at 1705 (noting that
seroprevalence rates in Black women are five to 15 times higher than in White women in
the same states); Jacob A. Gayle et al., Surveillance for AIDS and HIV Infection Among
Black and Hispanic Children and Women of Childbearing Age, 1981-1989, 39 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP., CDC SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIEs, July 1990, at 23, 25; Richard
M. Selik et al., Epidemiology of AIDS and HIV Infection in Women in the United States,
in AIDS IN GYNECOLOGY: CLINICAL PRACTICE OF GYNECOLOGY 33 (Newton G. Osborn ed.,
1989).
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powerful indication that the potential for using criminal transmis-
sion and civil disease containment laws against pregnant HIV-posi-
live women will indeed be realized.
Part II provides an overview of HIV criminal transmission and
civil disease containment laws and analyzes their potential applica-
tion to HIV-positive women. In misguided attempts to prevent the
spread of HIV, prosecutors and public health authorities may soon
use transmission and containment laws to target pregnant HIV-
positive women. Such use of these laws is theoretically possible be-
cause many of these laws are vaguely-worded. Additionally, law
enforcement authorities may be willing to stretch the law to demon-
strate they are acting to prevent the spread of HIV. Under transmis-
sion and containment laws, a woman's pregnancy could represent
the commission of the offense of risking transmission either to her
fetus or to her sex partner. Law enforcement officials may seek to
invoke criminal transmission and civil disease control laws in order
to punish or prevent such "offenses" with compulsory contraception,
abortion, sterilization, civil detention, or criminal prosecution. This
part also discusses the first prosecution of an HIV-positive woman
for becoming pregnant."
Prior to examining IV criminal transmission and civil disease
containment laws, Part II of the Article reviews the medical litera-
ture calling for reproductive control of HIV-positive women. This
literature has provided the medical backdrop for legislative and
prosecutorial action despite the fact that the medical experts favor-
ing such coercion are a minority. Most AIDS experts advocate using
voluntary measures in the fight to eradicate the disease. 19 Despite
their relatively small numbers, however, doctors who advocate coer-
cive tactics are a vocal minority with potential for both great public
appeal and influence in current medical practice. Additionally, while
only three states permit or mandate HIV testing for childbearing
women without consent, there are indications that even in the ab-
sence of legal authority, some health care providers routinely test
pregnant.women for NIV without consent and sometimes even co-
erce HV-positive women into having abortions. 0
The next three parts of the Article discuss how the exercise of
coercive control over childbearing and NRV testing infringes upon
various basic individual rights. Specifically, parts 111, IV, and V of this
Article argue that control measures contravene legally established
norms of informed consent, civil rights protections for the disabled, and
18. State v. McLellan, No. 92 CR 05684 (Gen. Ct. Justice Cumberland County, N.C.
Mar. 25, 1992), affd, No. 92 CR 05684 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1993).
19. See discussion infra part II.B.
20. See infra notes 120-31.
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constitutional protections of childbearing and bodily integrity.
Part III argues that absent statutory authority, HIV testing of
a woman, her umbilical cord, or her newborn child, without the
woman's specific informed consent, violates the woman's right to
informed medical consent. Compulsory abortion, sterilization, or
contraception would likewise violate the norms of informed consent
law. Such violations could be redressed through medical malpractice
actions. Part II also reviews the doctrine used to override parental
refusal to authorize low risk health care procedures necessary to
save the life of a child or to greatly alleviate the child's suffering; it
then reviews the doctrine used to disregard informed consent in the
name of protecting public health. Although these doctrines have
been asserted to justify the exercise of control over the pregnancy
decisions of HIV-positive women, this part concludes that neither
theory justifies such intrusions upon a woman's rights.
Part IV argues that while state-imposed anonymous HIV test-
ing of pregnant women may possibly pass constitutional muster, all
of the following government-imposed actions would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment right to bear children: directed or compul-
sory HiV testing linked to names and/or publicly reported; directed
or forced contraception, abortion, or sterilization; and criminal
prosecution for becoming pregnant. Despite recent Supreme Court
rulings, and even if the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade, the
right to bear children remains, and is likely to remain, a fundamen-
tal constitutional right. Accordingly, there must be a compelling
state interest to justify government interference with childbearing.
No such compelling state interest exists. Certainly, preventing the
birth of disabled children is not a valid state purpose. Nor could a
state argue that it had a compelling interest in either preventing
children from being born into inadequate homes or preventing the
birth of children that the state may be called upon to support. A
state simply cannot presume that all HIV-positive mothers will be
incapable of providing adequate homes for their children. Indeed,
this part argues that the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans
With Disabilities Act (ADA),2 and local civil rights protections for
disabled people explicitly prohibit differential treatment on the
basis of HIV status. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment and civil
rights laws will effectively invalidate government control of HIV-
positive women's childbearing.
21.42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. III 1991). Protections against disability
discrimination also apply to private delivery of health care services. See 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7)(F) (Supp. III 1991) (defining public accommodation to mean a facility, operated
by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce, and which may include the
"professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment).
1993]
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Part V argues that compulsory contraception, abortion, and
sterilization of HIV-positive women to prevent their childbearing
constitute bodily intrusions which would be prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment under all circumstances because such intru-
sions "shock the conscience"22 of a civilized society and will therefore,
always outweigh a compelling governmental interest. Additionally,
Part V explores the theory that compulsory testing of women carried
out pursuant to governmental statute, regulation, or policy, and gov-
ernment encouraged unconsented testing are prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment. This part argues in the alternative that if a
government interest in forced testing is found to outweigh a
woman's privacy rights, testing would be permissible only if per-
formed pursuant to a warrant. This warrant must be based upon
probable cause or individualized suspicion that the woman is HIV-
positive and pregnant, and that confirmed knowledge of her HIV
status will fulfill the government interest.
In conclusion, this Article argues that attempts to control HIV-
positive women's childbearing are not only prohibited by law, but
are also misguided public policy. Policy arguments calculating that
the benefits of preventing the birth of HIV-infected infants outweigh
the dangers of violating the medical and constitutional rights of
1IV-positive women are incorrect. Additionally, reproductive control
of HJV-infected pregnant women will not achieve its primary pur-
ported goal of lessening children's suffering. Such control will
merely make examples of a few, and force the many who flee such
control farther from the preventive counseling, drug treatment,
prenatal care, and the general health care services they so desper-
ately need. The ultimate effect of coercing HIV-positive women not
to bear children, or punishing them for doing so, will be not only to
increase the suffering of IV-infected women, but also to jeopardize
the lives of their children, two thirds of whom will not have HIV.
Even in purely economic terms, a cost-benefit analysis does not
justify exercise of coercive control. When HIV-positive pregnant
women forego institutional support and medical care in order to
avoid either private or state-imposed reproductive control, ulti-
mately the state will have to absorb a higher cost. It will have to
provide the expensive medical care, education, and perhaps, disabil-
ity support, to the resulting population of children who might have
been born healthier and less needy of public support had their moth-
ers obtained prenatal care, drug treatment, and other health serv-
ices.
It is important to anticipate the likely coercive responses to the
growing incidence of perinatal transmission of HIV. With careful
22. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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forethought, we can learn from history and avoid repeating the mis-
takes of past attempts to forcibly control childbearing in other con-
texts. This Article attempts to contribute to this forethought by both
anticipating avenues for reproductive control of HIV-positive women
and by evaluating several legal theories which may be used to de-
fend women from such attempts. The delineation of these theories
may influence the public policy debate against use of the law to
coerce HlV-positive women.
The inefficacy of reproductive control of HIV-positive women in
the campaign to curb perinatal transmission of HIV should prove
dispositive to health care providers, legislatures, health boards,
prosecutors, and all those who fashion and carry out health policy.
Moreover, the probability that such measures will be challenged
successfully or redressed through litigation further supports argu-
ments against reproductive control.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF CONTROLLING WOMEN'S
CHILDBEARING
While reproductive coercion of HIV-positive women may per-
suasively appear to present the best short-term option for contend-
ing with the heart-wrenching problem of HIV-infected babies, the
history of efforts to control childbearing by women who are poor,
disabled,3 or of color' suggests coercion will produce only odious
results.
The passage and implementation of eugenic sterilization laws
throughout the United States, principally from the 1920s through
the 1940s, is a dramatic example of the odious results that repro-
ductive coercion creates. The revelation of sterilization abuse in the
1970s is another such example. The government has also sought to
exert control over childbearing through welfare and medicaid fund-
ing schemes that shape the reproductive choices of poor women, a
class which is disproportionately comprised of women of color and
disabled women.' Unfortunately, government impulses to control
23. See generally Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s 69 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989);
MENTAL RETARDATION AND STERILIZATION (Ruth Macklin & Williard Gaylin eds., 1981).
24. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1437-44
(1991) (describing control of African-American women's childbearing from slavery to the
present); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHERE AND WHEN I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 46 (1984); MIMI ABRAMOvrIz, REGULATING THE LIVES OF
WOMEN, SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1989).
25. See HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR., POOR WOMEN, POOR FAMILIES 10-11 (1986)
(noting that while 34.5% of all female-headed families live in poverty, the poverty rate for
white female-headed. families is 27% and for Black or Spanish-origin female-headed fami-
19931 319
320 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
childbearing remain strong and have recently resulted in efforts to
control childbearing by drug-addicted women.
A. Early Twentieth Century Eugenics
In the early twentieth century, eugenicist ideology took hold in
this country and throughout Western Europe. 26 States enacted com-
pulsory sterilization laws based on the assumption that a host of
social ills, from crime to poverty to physical disability and disease,27
could be cured with minimal expense by preventing certain people
from reproducing.21
Originally, some states attempted to control the reproduction of
"defective" populations by "segregating" them in institutions pursu-
ant to the state's public health police powers.29 But as the costs of
lies the poverty rate is over 50%). "In 1984, fifty percent of all adults with disabilities had
household incomes of $15,000 or less. Among non-disabled persons, only twenty-five per-
cent had household incomes in this wage bracket." H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. In fact, President Bush,
upon signing the Americans With Disabilities Act on March 31, 1988, stated that "[tihe
statistics consistently demonstrate that disabled people are the poorest, least educated
and largest minority in America." Id.
26. Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. BellR 'Felt Necessities' v. Fundamental Values?, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1418,.1420-35 (1981). See generally MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS, 40-75
(1984).
27. The conditions subject to compulsory sterilization under eugenics laws across the
United States ran the gamut from homelessness to epilepsy, mental retardation, mental
illness, drug addiction including alcoholism, blindness or seriously impaired vision, deaf-
ness, and syphilis. Helen Rodrigues-Triaz, Sterilization Abuse, in BIOLOGICAL WOMAN THE
CONVENIENT MiYTH 147-48 (Ruth Hubbard et al. eds., 1982); see also HARRY H. LAUGHLIN,
THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 65 (1929).
The socially inadequate classes, regardless of etiology or prognosis, are the fol-
lowing: (1) feeble-minded; (2) insane (including the psychopathic); (3) criminal-
istic (including the delinquent and wayward); (4) epileptic; (5) inebriate
(including drug habitues); (6) diseased (including the tuberculous, the syphilitic,
the leprous, and others with chronic, infectious, and legally segregable dis-
eases); (7) blind (including those with seriously impaired vision); (8) deaf
(including those with seriously impaired hearing); (9) deformed (including the
crippled); and (10) dependent (including orphans, neer-do-wells, the homeless,
tramps and paupers).
Id.
28. Concerted legislative campaigns in the 1920s resulted in the enactments of
eugenics laws in more than 30 states by 1935. ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIvE FREEDOM 86 (2d. ed. 1990);
see also RICHARD LINDGREN & NADINE TAUB, THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 412 (1988).
29. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (crediting in dicta trial testimony that in the recent past
mentally retarded women of childbearing age were institutionalized to prevent them from
having children and were also subject to compulsory sterilization). Robert Cynkar states
that "the majority of eugenists... concentrated on organizing programs to segregate the
feebleminded during their reproductive period." Cynkar, supra note 26, at 1429.
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maintaining these ever-expanding institutionalized populations
increased, legislatures proposed laws authorizing sterilization as a
cost-cutting measure which would permit the release of inmates
without fear that they would have children.30 Some laws mandated
sterilization for anyone in a mental institution or diagnosed with
syphilis, while others specified sterilization as punishment for cer-
tain non-white collar crimes, including prostitution.31 As one histo-
rian has noted, "[tihe systematic character of sterilization proce-
dures reached the point where 'many mentally retarded or unstable
persons were being admitted to the institutions merely to be steril-
ized and then released."3 2
In the past, poor women were often institutionalized and steril-
ized for bearing children out of wedlock.3 Such was the case of
Carrie Buck, the appellant in the infamous case Buck v. Bell.' Buck
was institutionalized in the Virginia Colony for Epileptics and
Feebleminded. Born to an uneducated mother, who was herself later
30. For example, from its inception in 1910, the Virginia Colony for Epileptics was
concerned with limiting the state's costs. One of the Superintendents first reports on the
Colony declared that "it is reasonable to anticipate a rapid increase in epileptics and men-
tal defectives ... and to infer that the State of Virginia is rapidly accumulating a greater
population of these defectives and dependents than her resources will permit the
comfortable care and support of." Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles:
New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 35 n.25 (1985) (quoting Report of the
Virginia Epileptic Colony 10 (1911)). Legislation passed in 1912 appropriated funds for
the expansion of the Colony to "include residential space for people suffering from the ill-
defined malady of 'feeblemindedness'." Id. at 36. This legislation specifically directed that
"women of child-bearing age, from twelve to forty-five years of age" be given priority. This
emphasis on segregating women of child-bearing age exemplifies the belief that
feeblemindedness was hereditary. Id.; see Cynkar, supra note 26, at 1430 (noting that
Margaret Sanger has maintained that the public perceived that they were being
overtaxed in order to support a growing class of morons, and hence supported steriliza-
tion as a means to lower taxes).
The desire to deinstitutionalize mentally retarded people is now used to justify
involuntary sterilization. See Sandra S. Coleman, Comment, Involuntary Sterilization of
the Mentally Retarded: Blessing or Burden?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 55, 56 (1980). As recently as
1975, the laws of 11 states continued to authorize the involuntary sterilization of the
mentally retarded, despite the fact that less than five percent of all mental retardation
stems from abnormal genes or chromosomes. Id. at 58. Today only three states continue
to permit eugenic considerations in determinations of whether to sterilize mentally
retarded persons. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
31. Petchesky, supra note 28, at 85.
32. Id. at 87 (quoting MARK HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT 138 (1963)).
33. It was not until 1967 that a legal finding was made in North Carolina prohibiting
sterilization on the grounds of promiscuity. 2540 Op. Att'y Gen. 233 (1967-68); see also
Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights and
Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 810 n.14 (noting that sterilization was perceived as
a means to achieve social control of the poor).
34. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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committed to the same institution, Carrie had been raped and im-
pregnated by a relative of her foster parents.35 In a lawsuit seeking
judicial validation of Virginia's recently enacted eugenic sterilization
law,36 the respondents argued that Carrie Buck should be sterilized,
relying heavily on questionable expert testimony that she was "a
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring."37 In upholding
Virginia's compulsory sterilization law, the United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion authored by Oliver Wendell Holmes, concluded:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the
best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon
those who already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacri-
fices,... in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring of crime, or to let them starve of their own imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.38
Thus, the Court reasoned that coerced sterilizations were justified
both for the general good of preventing the resources of the state
from being sapped or overwhelmed by taking care of people deemed
worthless, and for the good of the potential offspring whose lives
would not be worth living. These same rationales surface today re-
garding HIV-positive women. 9
Between the years 1907, when the first compulsory sterilization
35. The following account of Buck v. Bell relies heavily on the excellent primary
source research conducted by Paul A. Lombardo. See Lombardo, supra note 30; see also
Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 93 NAT. HIST. 14 (1984).
36. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Though never explicitly overruled, revelations
of the litigation's collusive nature have discredited the decision. Moreover, the
development of constitutional protections for individual rights has effectively overruled it.
See discussion infra part IIIF. The Colony's Board of Directors financed the litigation for
both sides all the way to the Supreme Court. At trial, despite ample opportunity to do so,
Buck's attorney neither presented witnesses or documentary evidence, nor attempted to
conduct effective cross-examination of the numerous Colony witnesses. Lombardo, supra
note 30, at 50-55. Moreover, Lombardo has documented that most of the key reasons
given to justify Buck's sterilization were demonstrably untrue. She was not illegitimate
since her parents were married when she was born; they later divorced. A review of the
records of her education through the sixth grade indicates she was of average intelli-
gence. She left school in the sixth grade, as did many other poor children in the early
twentieth century. Additionally she could not even be considered "immoral" according to
the prevailing standards of the day, because her pregnancy was the result of rape. She
also attended church and church school, and sang in two church choirs. Id.; see Cynkar,
supra note 26, at 1457. Commentators have asserted that the trial distinctly lacked the
adversarial nature that is inherently characteristic of trials and upon which our legal sys-
tem is premised. CLEMENT VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND
SUPREME COURT LITIGATION SINCE 1900, at 16 (1972).
37. Cynkar, supra note 26, at 1439 (citing Record at 34-35, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927)).
38. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
39. See discussion infra part IIJ.A
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law was passed in the United States, and 1945, over 45,000 people
were involuntarily sterilized in the United States.40 The great major-
ity of these people were poor women.41 With the development of in-
formed consent law in the latter part of the twentieth century, as
well as the development of constitutional protections for reproduc-
tive choice and bodily integrity, eugenic sterilization laws fell into
disuse,42 were judicially invalidated,43 or were legislatively re-
pealed.44
B. Post-Eugenics Reproductive Coercion
After World War II, other forms of control over poor women
replaced legally compelled sterilizations. In the late 1950s and
1960s, several states proposed laws which required sterilization of
unwed welfare mothers with more than two or three children be-
cause they were not "fit to parent."45 None of these laws were
passed.46 In the early 1970s, similar laws calling for compulsory
sterilization of welfare recipients were proposed but rejected in ten
different states.47 Though this legislation was not enacted, adminis-
40. PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 87.
41. Id.
42. Julius Paul, Return of Punitive Sterilization Proposals: Current Attacks on
Illegitimacy and the AFDC Program, 3 L. & SOC. REV. 77, 78 (1968) ("From the peak pe-
riod of the 1930s, when nearly 25,000 operations were performed for eugenic or other
considerations... the present annual rate of reported state sterilizations has been
running close to 400 or less, with nearly half these coming from one state, North
Carolina.").
43. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Motes v. Hall County Dep't of
Family and Children Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1983).
44. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-47-10 to -100 (repealed 1986) (Law. Co-op. 1991); OR.
REV. STAT. 436.070 (repealed 1983) (1987); CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 7254 (repealed
1979) (West 1984); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 24 § 205-219 (repealed 1960) (1979); Coleman, su-
pra note 30, at 57 n.23. See generally Richard K. Sherlock & Robert D. Sherlock,
Sterilizing the Retarded Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C. L.
REV. 943, 950 (1982); William T. Vukowich, The Dawn of the Brave New World-Legal,
Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 189, 219.
45. See Paul, supra note 42, at 78-99 (noting that such laws were proposed in
Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Wisconsin).
46. Id. at 79.
47. ALLAN CHASE, THE LEGACY OF MALTHUS: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NEW
SCIENTMIC RACISM 15-16 (1977). The fact that such legislation always failed is remark-
able given the widespread support for such measures among the public and the medical
profession. See id. at 22 (reporting that a 1965 Gallup poll indicated:that approximately
20% of people surveyed favored compulsory sterilization for unwed women on welfare);
Morton A. Silver, Birth Control and the Private Physician, 4 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 42, 44
(1972) (noting that a survey of private physicians showed that 34% favored withholding
public assistance when women gave birth to illegitimate children and 30% favored
denying women welfare if they refused sterilization); Note, Coerced Sterilizations Under
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trative practice and private initiative often effectuated the intent
behind these proposed laws by placing economic pressure on poor
women.4" Widespread sterilization abuse against poor women came
to light in the seventies. In 1974, Federal District Judge Gesell
found in Relf v. Weinberger:
Over the past few years, an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 low-income per-
sons have been sterilized annually under federally funded programs....
[Mlinors and other incompetents have been sterilized with federal funds
and... an indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced
into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various fed-
erally supported welfare benefits would be withdrawn unless they submit-
ted to irreversible sterilization.49
Other documented practices of reproductive coercion in the
1970s include Southern doctors who required poor black patients to
submit to sterilization if they had the sickle cell trait 0 or as a condi-
tion of receiving medical assistance for pregnancy and childbirth.5 '
Federally Funded Family Planning Programs, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 595 (1976) (noting
that 85% of doctors were found to favor sterilization for welfare mothers with three or
more children).
This era also spawned consideration of compulsory implantation of IUD's for unwed
mothers. See e.g., Don J. Young et al., Court-Ordered Contraception, 55 A.B.A. J. 223, 226
(1969); Note, Court-Ordered Contraception-A Reasonable Alternative to Institutionaliza-
tion for Juvenile Unwed Mothers? 1970 Wis. L. REV. 899; Michael A. Lotman, Note,
Court-Ordered Contraception in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1505 (1972).
48. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1442-44; see also Nanette Dembitz, Should Public
Policy Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of Their Children?, 4 FAMI.
L. Q. 131, 132-38, 142-43 (1970) (discussing the use of financial incentives to encourage
women on welfare to stop having children). See generally Edgar R. Chasteen, The Case
for Compulsory Birth Control (1971); Edward H. Rabin, Population Control Through
Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 n.42 (1972); Johnson C. Montgomery,
Population Explosion and United States Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 629 (1971).
49. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199 (D.D.C. 1974); see Cox v. Stanton,
529 F.2d 47, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that statute of limitations did not bar
complaint by unmarried, 18 year-old, black woman who was permanently sterilized after
a social worker threatened to cut her family's welfare grant unless she was "temporarily"
sterilized).
50. Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 114-15 (4th Cir. 1981) (denying sum-
mary judgment when black woman alleged that she was forced to be sterilized because
county nurses and social workers believed she had sickle cell trait).
51. See, e.g., Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1075 (1978). The court held that the plaintiff, a black welfare recipient, failed to establish
requisite state action in her claim that her constitutional rights were violated when her
doctor refused to deliver her baby unless she consented to sterilization. Id. at 613. Her
physician, Dr. Pierce, publicly pursued a policy of refusing medical care to women who
were "unable to financially support themselves, whether they be on Medicaid or just un-
able to pay their own bills, if they were having a third child," unless they agreed to be
surgically sterilized. Id. at 611. Dr. Pierce performed 17 of the 18 Medicaid sterilizations
performed at one hospital during the period considered by the court. Of the 18
sterilizations, all but one were performed on black women. Id. at 612 n.4.
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In California, public hospitals obtained Mexican-American patients'
"consent" to sterilization while they were in labor.2 In Alabama,
welfare workers threatened to terminate the benefits of an illiterate
public assistance recipient unless she authorized the sterilization of
her daughters."
Additionally, beginning in the late 1960s, 5'the federal govern-
ment began funding family planning services, including steriliza-
tions, for poor people.5 Sterilization quickly became one of the main
forms of contraception for poor people. During the first ten years of
Medicaid funding of tubal ligations, the number performed on poor
women increased tenfold. The overall sterilization rate in the United
States increased three-fold in the seventies, the largest increase of
any method of contraception. 6 Female sterilizations were performed
disproportionately on poor women and women of color, particularly
Native-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and African-Americans.57
52. LINDGREN & TAUB, supra note 28, at 415.
53.Id.
54. At this time abortion was still criminalized in most states and the availability of
contraception was severely restricted for poor people and teenagers. Joy G. Dryfoos,
Family Planning Clinics-A Story of Growth and Conflict, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 282, 282-
83 (1988); Harriet Pilpel, A Dissenting Viewpoint: Should Public Policy Give Incentives to
Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of Their Children?, 4 FAII. L. Q. 146, 146-47 (1970)
(noting that the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Law directing welfare
departments to inform recipients of public assistance about family planning had not been
implemented, and that contraceptive devices were not widely available to poor women
and were completely inaccessible to teenagers); Clyde Spillenger, Reproduction and
Medical Interventionism: An Historical Comment, 13 NOVA L. REV. 385, 390 (1989);
Robert P. Kavanaugh, Note, Minors and Contraceptives: The Physician's Right to Assist
Unmarried Minors in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1486 (1972).
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that states could not permissibly
criminalize the distribution of contraception to married couples. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). It
was not until 1972 in Eisenstadt v. Baird, that the United States Supreme Court
extended prohibitions on criminalization of contraception to single people. 405 U.S. 438
(1972). The criminalization of the mailing, transporting, or importing of information
about contraception was not repealed until 1971 when the federal Comstock Act was
amended. Ch. 258 § 1, 17 Stat. 598 (1873), amended Pub. L. 91-662, 84 Stat. 1973 (1971)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62).
55. Jeannie I. Rosoff, The Politics of Birth Control, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 312, 317
(1988). The federal government pays 90% of the cost of sterilization, when the state
agrees to pay the remaining 10% of the cost. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(1O)(A) (1988).
56. Malcolm Potts, Birth Control Methods in the United States, 20 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 288, 293 (1988); Rosalind Petchesky, "Reproductive Choice" in the Contemporary
United States: A Social Analysis of Female Sterilization, in AND THE POOR GET CHILDREN
50, 51 (Karen L. Michaelson ed., 1981).
.57. Roberts, supra note 24, at 1442-43 n.125 (citing sources which state that 43% of
the women sterilized in 1973 under federally financed family programs were African-
American, despite the fact that African-Americans represented only 33% of the patients,
and that Spanish-speaking women were twice as likely to be sterilized as English-
speaking women); Rodriques-Triaz, supra note 27, at 158 (citing estimates that as many
as 42% of Native American women of child-bearing age have been surgically sterilized);
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To date, economic coercion has been an important factor in the
incidence of sterilization among the poor. The federal government
has effectively limited poor women's access to abortion while making
sterilization readily available. Once legalized in 1973, abortion was
reimbursed by the federal government through Medicaid at only
fifty percent of its cost. The passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1976
discontinued all federal reimbursement for abortion except "where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried
to term."5 8 This resulted in most states cutting Medicaid coverage of
abortion. In contrast, full federal Medicaid coverage of sterilization
continues to the present. For many women, Medicaid coverage pro-
vides the only access to health services.59 For poor women, the right
to freely choose a method of controlling fertility means nothing
without guaranteed access to the means to effectuate their choices.6"
C. "Fetal Protection" as a Form of Control
The national trend toward curtailing pregnant women's rights
of informed consent and reproductive autonomy indicates the likeli-
hood that laws will be used, absent legislative intent, to punish or
prevent childbearing by HIV-positive women."' Recently, under the
see also Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 15 (1989)
(citing abuse by Indian Health Services in subjecting Native American women under 21-
years-old to radical hysterectomies absent informed consent).
58. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1980)). The Hyde Amendment was immediately challenged and became
subject to a nationwide injunction until 1980, when the Supreme Court validated it in
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
59. Female Medicaid recipients are between two and four times more likely
(depending on geographic region) to be sterilized than are women not dependent on
Medicaid. PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 180. This may be explained, in part, because the
only way that Medicaid will pay for abortion in most states is by the patient agreeing to
be sterilized through hysterectomy or tubal ligation at the same time the abortion is per-
formed. Rodriques-Triaz, supra note 27, at 152.
60. Sylvia Law & Rachael Pine, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Rights:
Strategies for Making the Dream Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1992); Roberts, su-
pra note 24, at 1443-44.
61. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1431-32 ("Creative statutory interpretations that
once seemed little more than the outlandish concoctions of conservative scholars are now
used to punish woman."); see generally COMMITTEE FOR ABORTION RIGHTS AND AGAINST
STERILIZATION ABUSE, WOMEN UNDER ATrAcK VICTORIES, BACKLASH AND THE FIGHT FOR
REPRODUCTiVE FREEDOM (Susan E. Davis ed., 1988); Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and
Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J. L. &
FEINISM 239 (1990); Dawn E. Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental
Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179 (1989)
[hereinafter Johnsen, Driving to Drugs]; Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal
Rights: Conflict with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986); Janet Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, in REPRODUCTIVE
LAWS FOR THE 1990'S, supra note 23, at 185 [hereinafter Gallagher, Fetus hs Patient];
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guise of protecting children, pregnant women have been prosecuted
pursuant to controlled substance laws never intended to apply to the
woman-fetus relationship. These drug-related prosecutions are di-
rectly analogous to potential prosecutions of HIV-positive women. The
vast majority of these drug prosecutions target drug-dependent women
of color,6 2 a population which also has high incidence of HIV infection.
A resounding theme among current advocates of reproductive
coercion of HIV-positive women is that pregnant women are adver-
saries of their fetuses; that women's "culpable" conduct causes
"innocent" suffering and must be stopped. 3 This theme is also preva-
lent in descriptions of childbearing by women addicted to drugs. Dr.
Jan Bays, Director of Child Abuse Programs at Emanuel Hospital in
Portland, Oregon, articulated this view:
We must up the ante to criminalize or impose reproductive controls on
people who are out of control.... We thought we were getting in touch
when we tried voluntary contracts that required the parents to go into
drug treatment, gave the state legal custody or allowed it to monitor the
child. But it doesn't work. In a few weeks, the family disappears from the
system and the child protection agencies are too overwhelmed to follow
through. In a year, the family shows up again with another drug-affected
baby.... But we can't force people into treatment, even if they're in jail.
She can go out and have more children. So, people are talking about ster-
ilization and that gets into reproductive rights. Eventually society will get
fed up with the huge burden of drug-affected babies. We can't say forever
that people have unlimited rights to have a child .... 's,
Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987) [hereinafter, Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions]; Susan L.
Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision Is it Anyway?, 41 RUTGERS
L. REV. 591 (1989); Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 277 (1988); Lynn M. Paltrow, When Becoming Pregnant Is a Crime, 9
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 41 (1990); Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Note, The Problem of the Drug-
Exposed Newborn: A Return to Principled Intervention, 42 STAN. L. REV. 745 (1990); LYNN
M. PALTRaOw, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN (1992) [hereinafter PALTROW, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS] (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review); NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, COURT-
IMPOSED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN, FACTS ON REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
15 (1989) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
62. See infra notes 77-79.
63. See Bayer, Kid, supra note 10, at 324 (arguing that the most ardent victim-
blaners cannot "in conscience blame the children who were infected").
It is no accident that the theme that women are adversaries to their fetuses pres-
ently carries great currency and power in our society-its predominance is one of the
greatest successes of the anti-abortion movement. See Nan D. Hunter, Time Limits on
Abortion, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S, supra note 23, at 131, 146-47.
64. Punishing Pregnant Addicts: Debate, Dismay, No Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1989, at E5.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a wave of prosecutions and
incarcerations of pregnant women addicted to drugs occurred for the
asserted purpose of protecting children.65 This type of prosecution
was pursued and continues to be initiated, despite the fact that
many addicted women would voluntarily attempt to stop using
drugs if they had access to treatment. However, drug treatment pro-
grams for poor people, generally, and for pregnant women and pri-
mary parents in particular, are woefully unavailable. 6  Additionally,
65. See PALTROW, CRIMINAL PROSEcUTIONS, supra note 61, at i, ii. Paltrow canvasses
96 cases in 24 states involving prosecutions of pregnant women during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Of the 96 cases, 73 involved charges under statutes intended to protect chil-
dren. In 33 cases, charges were brought under child endangerment or abuse laws, and in
39 cases, charges of dealing a controlled substance to a minor were brought. Although
many of the charges were subsequently dropped, the cases provide an indication of how
local authorities have attempted to use existing laws to prosecute expectant mothers. Id.;
see also Lynn M. Paltrow & Suzanne Shende, Memorandum: State by State Case
Summary of Criminal Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women and Appendix of Public
Health and Public Interest Groups Opposed to These Prosecutions (ACLU/Reprod.
Freedom Project), Oct. 29, 1990, reprinted in Laurie Rubenstein, Prosecuting Maternal
Substance Abusers: An Unjustified and Ineffective Policy, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130,
157-60 (1991).
The ground-breaking defenses carried out by Lynn M. Paltrow, an attorney of the
Center on Reproductive Law and Policy in New York, beginning with her defense of
Pamela Rae Stewart in 1986 and culminating with her defense of Jennifer Johnson, has
spawned much of the scholarship in this area. See, e.g., Dwight L. Greene, Abusive
Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted
Mothers, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 737 (1991); Kary Moss, Legal Issues: Drug Testing of
Postpartum Women and Newborns as the Basis for Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 25
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1406 (1991); Roberts, supra note 24; Rubenstein, supra.
66. Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 A. J.
PUB. HEALTH 483, 485 (1990) (citing a 1979 national survey which found only 25 drug
treatment programs that described themselves as specifically geared toward female ad-
dicts).
One commentator summarized the studies relevant to this issue as follows:
The lack of facilities for pregnant addicts in two cities illustrates the problem. A
recent survey of 78 drug treatment programs in New York City revealed that
54% denied treatment to pregnant women, 67% refused to treat pregnant ad-
dicts on Medicaid, and 87% excluded pregnant women on Medicaid specifically
addicted to crack. Less than half of those programs that did accept pregnant ad-
dicts provided prenatal care, and only two provided child care.... Similarly,
drug-addicted mothers in San Diego must wait up to six months to obtain one of
just 26 places in residential treatment programs that allow them to live with
their children.... Furthermore, because Medicaid covers only 17 days of a
typical 28-day program, poor women may not be able to afford full treatment
even at centers that will accept them.
Roberts, supra note 24, at 1448 n.147.
A congressional survey found that 12 out of 18 hospitals reported they have no place
to refer pregnant women for drug treatment. Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of
Perinatal Substance Abuse Hearings Before the Select Committee on Children, Youth and
Families, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989); see How to Protect Babies from Crack, N.Y.
TfIEs, March 11, 1991, at A16 (recommending that Medicaid make an exception for
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prosecutors often seek to jail pregnant drug addicted women for the
sake of their fetuses despite the inadequacy of prenatal care in
women's prisons." The law enforcement option has been chosen de-
spite the opposition of major medical associations to the use of
criminal sanctions to address problems of addiction and pregnancy. 8
To accomplish these misguided prosecutions, overzealous
prosecutors69 have utilized statutes intended to regulate drug traf-
ficking, laws on child neglect and abuse, and other statutes never
intended to apply to prenatal behavior. 0 To date, every defendant
who has challenged the application of these laws to prenatal behav-
ior has succeeded in invalidating her prosecution.7
The Florida Supreme Court, the highest court to address this
issue, reversed the conviction of Jennifer Johnson, a young Florida
woman addicted to crack. Johnson was convicted on two counts of
delivery of a controlled substance to a minor, a crime meant to deter
drug dealers from selling drugs to children or using children as drug
pregnant addicts and pay for residential drug treatment which it does not currently
cover).
67. Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, No. 82-1934 (D.N.J.
March 11, 1985) (ordering by consent judgment the provision of prenatal care and
adequate living conditions for pregnant inmates); Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?:
Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA
L. REV. 405, 441-443 (1989) (referring to numerous prison cases alleging inadequate
prenatal care, as well as one study showing that one jail in California had infant
mortality rates 50 times greater than the state as a whole).
68. These groups include the American Medical Association and the American Public
Health Association. Johnson v. State, No. 77,831, slip op. at 14 (Fla., July 23, 1992).
69. See generally Greene, supra note 65 Cf PALTROW, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, su-
pra note 61 (reporting that of 167 arrests of women for behavior during pregnancy, 24
were in Escambia County, Florida and more than 87 were in Greenville and Charleston,
South Carolina).
70. PALTROW, CRIMUNAL PROSECUTIONS, supra note 61, at i-it.
71. E.g., State v. Johnson, No. E89-890 CFA (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 13, 1989), affd, 578
So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, No. 77, 831, (Fla. July 23, 1992). See cases cited
supra note 65.
It is important to note that several women have been convicted of such offenses after
either pleading guilty or losing at trial on defenses which did not challenge the validity of
applying the prosecuting statute to pregnancy. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1420
(citations omitted).
The fact that all challenged prosecutions have been invalidated has not prevented
individual prosecutors from continuing to initiate new prosecutions for child abuse
against women who use drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. E.g., Complaint for Child
Abuse, State v. Deborah Arandus, CR92-05-557 (Adams County Ct., Neb. May 1, 1992)
(charging woman with child abuse for using alcohol while pregnant); see also Laurie
Casady, Mother Charged with Passing Cocciine to Newborns, TULSA TRIB., May 8, 1992, at
A3 (stating that a mother was charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled drug to a
minor after using crack cocaine while pregnant and transmitting the drug via the
placenta). See generally Barbara Kantrowitz et al., The Pregnancy Police, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 52.
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couriers. The state acknowledged that under the law, a fetus is not a
child, but argued that Johnson had "delivered" a metabolite of co-
caine to her child in the seconds after birth when the umbilical cord
was still attached.72 Johnson received a sentence of one year in a
drug treatment program, fourteen years of probation, and 200 hours
of community service.73 This contorted application of the statute was
validated by both the trial and intermediate appellate courts before
the state's highest court reversed her conviction as contrary to legis-
lative intent.74
Consistent with this nation's history of reproductive coercion,
the prosecutions of pregnant drug-addicted women have targeted
women of color, despite the prevalence of drug addiction among
white women.75 One survey reports that thirty-eight of fifty-two
prosecutions involved women of color.7" Another review found that of
sixty women charged, eighty percent were minorities.77
Judges have also utilized their sentencing powers in attempts
to control drug use by pregnant women.78 In 1988, District of
Columbia Superior Court Judge Peter Wolf sentenced Brenda
Vaughan to incarceration for the duration of her pregnancy after she
pled guilty to forging checks, reasoning that such a sentence could
protect her fetus from maternal drug use. Normally her plea would
not have incurred any jail time.79
72. State v. Johnson, No. 77,831, slip op. at 2 (Fla. Sup. Ct. July 23, 1992).
73. In addition, the court imposed restrictions on her behavior including court super-
vised prenatal care in the event that she becomes pregnant again, and prohibitions on the
use of alcohol or other drugs, visiting bars, and associating with people who use drugs or
alcohol. PALTROW, CRnHNAL PROSECUTIONS, supra note 61, at 3.
74. State v. Johnson, No. 77,831, slip op. at 3.
75. See generally Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, supra note 61, at 185-235; Veronika
Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987);
Roberts, supra note 24.
76. Paltrow & Shende, supra note 65.
77. Gina Kolata, Bias Seen Against Prenatal Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at
A13.
78. See, e.g., People v. Moore, No. 90CF1931 (Winnebago County Court, Illinois Dec.,
1990) (holding a pregnant woman on $10,000 bond for alleged violation of conditions of
probation resulting from prostitution conviction; the alleged violation was that she was a
drug addict and decided to continue her pregnancy).
79. PALTROWCRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, supra note 61, at 3 (citing United States v.
Vaughan, Crim. No. F-2172-88B (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988)); Kary Moss, Pregnant?
Go Directly to Jail, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1988, at 20 (noting that at sentencing, Judge Wolf
stated: Tm going to keep her locked up until the baby is born because she's tested
positive for cocaine when she came before me ... and I'll be darned if I'm going to have a
baby born that way."); see also Roberts, supra note 24, at 1431 n.54 (citing Cox v. Court,
537 N.E.2d 721, 723 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (reversing juvenile court order placing a
pregnant woman in a "secure drug facility" to protect the fetus from the woman's cocaine
use)).
Four judges have used their sentencing powers to attempt to control women's child-
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The circumvention of the rights of drug dependent women oc-
curs not only in the name of protecting children, but also is some-
times asserted as a way to save tax-payers from the burdens of sup-
porting poor women's children.80 Both justifications recall those used
to require eugenic sterilization. Purportedly beneficial to children
and society, such measures are seriously damaging to the women
involved. Many women have not been able to challenge the basis of
their prosecutions and have been convicted and served lengthy
prison terms." Even women who are successful in having charges
against them dropped can suffer greatly from prosecution.8 2 As a
result of the publicity surrounding these prosecutions, many women
will avoid health care and drug treatment facilities out of fear.
Consequently, these measures do not fulfill their goals.3
bearing through Norplant insertion. They imposed Norplant insertion as a condition of
probation for women pleading guilty to child abuse or manslaughter. See, e.g., Darlene
Johnson v. California, No. 29390, appeal dismissed (5th Dist. Court of Appeals Apr. 13,
1992). A judge in Austin, Texas ordered a woman pleading guilty to child abuse to have
Norplant inserted as a condition of probation. When she suffered an adverse reaction, she
had the Norplant removed and had a tubal ligation. She did not appeal her sentence.
Women's Legal Defense Fund, Legislation and Litigation Involving Norplant 5 (June
1992) (unpublished document on file with the Buffalo Law Review). Another judge in
Jacksonville, Florida sentenced a woman convicted of manslaughter to two years in
prison, and ten years of probation, with Norplant insertion a condition of probation.
Again, no appeal was taken. Id. In March, 1992, Texas District Judge Pat Lykos
sentenced Ida Jean Tovar to ten years of probation on the condition that she use
Norplant. Tovar was convicted on charges relating to the violent shaking of her two year
old son who suffered brain damage. Reproductive Freedom Project, ACLU, Update vol. 4,
no. 2, Mar. 27, 1992, at 5.
80. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 71.
82. Consider the ordeal of Pamela Rae Stewart, prosecuted for refusing to follow her
doctor's orders pursuant to a statute intended to obligate absentee fathers to provide sup-
port to women they impregnated. Though the court dismissed the prosecution as an im-
proper use of the statute five months after the charges were filed, Stewart had already
suffered considerable damage. As one commentator observed, she not only spent six days
in jail before she could make bail, but "the most intimate details of her personal life be-
came a staple for the national press .... the media 'held back nothing, not even the
details of her last sex act before the baby was delivered.' Johnsen, Driving to Drugs, su-
pra note 61, at 208-09 (citation omitted).
83. Publicity about these prosecutions evokes a strong deterrent effect on pregnant
addicts and low-income women of color who are pregnant; they become dissuaded from
seeking prenatal care and drug treatment for fear of prosecution. Thus, tragically and
paradoxically, the women and fetuses most at risk are driven from the reaches of the
services they desperately need. See Johnson v. Florida, No. 77,831, slip op. at 14-16 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. July 23, 1992); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG EXPOSED INFAIT., A
GENERATION AT RISK, REPORT TO THE CHAIPmAN, COMhMrTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE 9
(1990) (identifying "[t]he increasing fear of incarceration and losing children to foster
care" as a deterrent to pregnant women needing drug treatment, because "[wiomen are
reluctant to seek treatment if there is a possibility of punishment"); Roberts, supra note 24,
at 1449-50.
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The long history of reproductive coercion of poor women,
women of color and disabled women-groups currently dispropor-
tionately affected by HIV-is perhaps the most powerful indication
that HIV-positive women are likely targets for control. The history of
eugenics demonstrates that a committed, vocal minority of medical
experts can galvanize sufficient public concern about childbearing by
poor women to support repressive legislation. The scientific commu-
nity was never united in support of eugenic theory. There were al-
ways outspoken, respectable opponents.' However, the eugenists
successfully marshalled public outrage that "socially undesirable"
women were having babies and successfully converted this public
support into political power. As a result, the fact that most public
health officials today oppose the use of coercive measures against
those infected with HIV does not preclude the growth of control over
childbearing by HIV-positive women.8 The virtually unanimous
voice of the medical community opposing coercion is fissured by a
minority of experts advocating coercion as a means to curtail perina-
tal transmission." These few influential authorities have the poten-
tial to galvanize public support and political power to effectuate and
institutionalize measures to control childbearing by HIV-positive
women.
Doubt is cast on the professed altruism and wisdom of involun-
tary control of IIV-positive women when such potential control is
viewed in light of the history of eugenics and the more recent co-
erced sterilization of poor women, disabled women, and women of
color. 7 Given this history, it is little wonder that coercive measures
against these populations can cause widespread avoidance of insti-
tutional health care."5 In addition, because respect for the childbear-
ing rights of the groups of women most likely to be HIV-infected has
historically been weak and subject to the variability of public senti-
84. Scott, supra note 33, at 811 & nn.15-16.
85. This is so because policy makers who currently favor coercion are most often
responding to political pressures and usually do not consult health officials. See Scott H.
Isaacman, Are We Outlawing Motherhood for HIV-Infected Women?, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
479 (1991). Although numerous public health organizations do oppose mandatory testing,
several states have enacted mandatory testing statutes. See infra notes 203-04; see also
Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and Civil
Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1017 (1989).
86. See discussion infra Part II.A.
87. See Hortensia Amaro, Women's Reproductive Rights in the Age of AIDS: New
Threats to Informed Choice, in FROM ABORTION TO REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM:
TRANSFORJINGAMOVEMiENT 245, 253 (Marlene Gerber-Fried ed., 1990); Spillenger, supra
note 54; John S. Haller Jr., The Role of Physicians in America's Sterilization Movement,
1894-1925, 89 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 169 (1989).
88. See Harlon L. Dalton, AIDS in Blackface, DAEDALUS, Summer 1989, at 205.
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ment, 9 the alarm evoked by the rising incidence of AIDS in infants
is likely once again to undermine that concern.
Part H presents evidence of the emergence and the potential
risk of growth of the reproductive control of HIV-positive women in a
vocal minority of medical experts, in legislation, and in incipient
prosecutorial practice.
II. OUTLAWING PREGNANCY FOR HIV-PosrriWE WOMEN
Following the first reported case of HIV in an infant born to an
infected mother," medical attention began to focus on perinatal
transmission as a mode of spreading the virus. The fact that the
large majority of HI V-positive women are in their childbearing
years,9' coupled with preliminary information indicating that
women's awareness of HIV infection apparently does not affect their
childbearing decisions,92 understandably creates grave concerns for
prevention of pediatric AIDS. Though medical knowledge about
89. This country is currently experiencing a resurgence of efforts to prevent certain
women from bearing children at all. For example, New Jersey is attempting to discourage
poor women from procreating through its recently-enacted limitation on welfare funds.
The new law prevents parents from obtaining increases in grants based on family size for
any child born while the family was on welfare. N.J. STAT. ANN. §44:10-3.5 to -3.6 (West
Supp. 1992); see Letter from Julius Chambers, NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund, et al., to Secretary Louis Sullivan, Department of Health and Human Services et
al. (June 26, 1992) (challenging proposed legislation) (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review). A Kansas legislator recently proposed that the state pay five hundred dollars to
any mother on welfare who submits to the insertion of Norplant. Tamar Lewin, A Plan to
Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1991, at A9.
Bills to provide financial incentives to encourage women on public assistance to
accept Norplant implants were also introduced in 1991 in Louisiana, and in 1992 in
Tennessee. A 1992 bill was introduced in Mississippi which would require women to have
Norplant implanted if they are found to have exposed their fetuses to controlled
substances or alcohol. Similar bills were introduced in Ohio, in 1991 and 1992, in South
Carolina in 1991, and in Washington in 1992. To date, all such legislative efforts have
been defeated. Women's Legal Defense Fund, supra note 79. See generally Changes in
State Welfare Reform Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security and
Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992) (prepared
statement of Douglas J. Besharov, Scholar in Residence, American Enterprise Institute).
90. MK Grossman, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in Children: Public
Health and Public Policy Issues, 6 PEDIATRIC INFECTIOUS DISEASE J. 113, 113 (1987).
91. Gwinn et al., supra note 11, at 1704.
92. See, e.g., Frank D. Johnstone et al., Women's Knowledge of their H1V Antibody
Status: Its Effect on Their Decision Whether to Continue the Pregnancy, 300 BRrr. MED. J.
23, 24 (1990) (noting that among HIV-positive women in Edinburgh, Scotland, "[w]hen
the pregnancy was wanted the desire to have the baby overrode all other considera-
tions."); Peter A. Selwyn et al., Knowledge of HIV Antibody Status and Decisions to
Continue or Terminate Pregnancy Among Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 3567
(1989); Mary E. Guinan, Reply to Letter to the Editor, 258 JAMA 2693-94 (1987).
93. HIV infection is currently a leading cause of death in children ages one through
four in some locations in the United States. Centers for Disease Control, Mortality
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perinatal transmission is still severely limited, 4" debate has mush-
Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 1981-1990, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WELY. REP. 41, 44 (1991). During 1990 and 1991, approximately 87% of all
children with AIDS were born to women with or at risk for HIV infection. Centers for
Disease Control, The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome .
United States, June 1981 - December 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 28, 29
(1992); see also John T. Repke & Timothy R. B. Johnson, H1V Infection and Obstetric
Care, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra note 3, at 40 ("Now that the
risk of HIV infection from transfused blood or blood products is extraordinarily low, it is
probable that virtually all newly acquired pediatric HIV infections will occur via vertical
transmission.").
94. There is some dispute about the HIV transmission rate from woman to fetus.
However, through the passage of time and the increase in knowledge about perinatal
transmission, the estimates of transmission rates have markedly decreased. In 1985, the
CDC estimated that "ofwomen seropositive for the HIV virus, about 30 to 50% of the chil-
dren will be born infected." Listernick, supra note 15, at 509. "However, this estimate...
was based on a small number of studies," thereby leaving much uncertainty. Id. A 1988
survey of studies concerning transmission rates also warned that this rate had not been
accurately determined, and summarized the demonstrated risks as "33% to 46%." Vertical
Transmission ofHIV, 2 LANCET 1057, 1058 (1988). The most recent estimates set the rate
of perinatal transmission in Western industrialized countries at 30%, with the individual
transmission rates ranging from 7% to 33%. Modlin & Saah, supra note 3, at 41; Phillip
A. Pizzo & Karina M. Butler, In the Vertical Transmission of HIV, Timing May be
Everything, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652, 652 (1991) (reporting that there is a range of
findings on perinatal transmission with a high rate of 45% from Nairobi, Kenya, and a
low of 12.9% reported by the European Collaborative Study Group); Susanne Lindgren et
al., HIV and Child-Bearing: Clinical Outcome and Aspects of Mother-to-Infant
Transmission, 5 AIDS 1111 (1991) (stating that studies indicate a range of 15 to 40% for
perinatal transmission); see also European Collaborative Study, Children Born to Women
with HIV-1 Infection: Natural History and Risk of Transmission, 337 LANCET 253 (1991).
Medical uncertainty concerning how HIV is transmitted from women to children
adds to the general gap in understanding perinatal infection. For example, some
investigators suggest that the perinatal transmission rates may be greater during a
woman's primary infection-when she is first infected with HIV. Pizzo & Butler, supra, at
653. Others have hypothesized that the rate increases in mothers who have more
advanced HIV disease. Id. (citing David D. Ho et al., Quantitation of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1621 (1989)). See generally, Marie-Louise Newell et al., HIV-Infection in Pregnancy:
Implications for Women and Children 4 AIDS S111 (1990).
The exact time during pregnancy or delivery when HIV transmission occurs is also
unknown, though some authorities believe that like hepatitis B, HIV is transmitted pri-
marily during childbirth. Modlin & Saah, supra note 3, at 41; Repke & Johnson, supra
note 93, at 94; Joseph Palca, HIVRisk Higher for First-Born Twins, 254 SC. 1729 (1991).
Part of the difficulty in determining the perinatal transmission rate also stems from
the difficulty of diagnosing HIV infection in infants. All babies born to HIV-infected
women will test positive for the HIV antibody, although most of them are not infected.
"Because passively acquired maternal antibody may persist in the uninfected infant of an
HIV-seropositive mother, serologic tests are not considered diagnostic of HIV infection
until the infant reaches 15 months of age." Modlin & Saah, supra note 3, at 38. Earlier in-
fant diagnosis relies upon identification of an AIDS-defining illness or the presence of signs or
symptoms suggestive of HIV infection. Id. Other tests which identify the HIV antigen or viral
genome are unreliable for infants less than 6 months of age, are extremely expensive and labor
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roomed among medical policy theorists concerning the necessity,
efficacy, and ethics of using coercive measures to prevent HIV-posi-
live women from bearing children. 5 As unlikely as such policies may
initially appear, most of them have already been seriously proposed.
Mandatory HIV testing has been incorporated into law in three
states. There is anecdotal evidence that directive counseling, if not
coercion, has become the medical practice for obtaining consent for
HIV-testing and for abortion for women testing HIV-positive.
Indeed, given our society's long history of coercive medical interven-
tion into women's reproductive biology, and given the current vogue
of distrust of women's moral agency with regard to reproduction,
these HIV policy proposals are not surprising.' These practices,
however, have serious ramifications for the ability of medicine to
alleviate the human suffering imposed by the AIDS epidemic. These
developments are particularly ominous for infected women, 7 and for
the humanity and equality of women whose rights are under attack.
A. The Experts Speak
Most authorities on H1V health care issues advocate education
and voluntary measures as the most effective methods for contend-
intensive to perform, and/or are available only at select research facilities. Id.
Knowledge concerning the impact of HIV on pregnancy is also limited. Studies
conclude that asymptomatic HIV infection confers no additional risk of adverse pregnancy
outcome. See Newell et al., supra, at S112; Modlin & Saah, supra note 3, at 40 (citing
Peter A. Selwyn et al., Prospective Study of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and
Pregnancy Outcomes in Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 1289 (1989)); Lindgren et al.,
supra at 1111. Additionally, knowledge concerning the impact of pregnancy on the course
of HIV disease is "meager and conflicting." Id. There is evidence that pregnancy has no ef-
fect on asymptomatic HIV infection. But there is also evidence that pregnancy may accel-
erate the course of HIV disease. Id. at 1115.
95. One theorist who opposes most forms of control has pointed out that the argu-
ment that infected women should be compelled to desist from pregnancy "would of neces-
sity entail compulsory [HIV antibody] screening of all women of childbearing age, the
sterilization of the infected.... the threat of legal sanctions against those who might be-
come pregnant, and compulsory abortions." Ronald Bayer, Perinatal Transmission of H1V
Infection: The Ethics of Prevention, 32 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 497, 503
(1989) [hereinafter Ethics of Prevention]; see also Ronald Bayer, Letter to the Editor, 261
JAMA 993 (1989) (predicting that preventing HIV-infected women from becoming
pregnant would "require an almost inconceivable state program of mandatory screening
of women of childbearing age and compulsory surgical sterilization").
96. Ruth R. Faden et al., Preface to AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT GENERATION, supra
note 3, at v-ix.
97. While coercive measures concerning prostitutes and pregnant women have been
debated and pursued, the needs of women as individuals potentially at risk for HIV infec-
tion, including preventive education, personal empowerment, and health care, as well as
the myriad needs of women already infected, have often been neglected. Nan D. Hunter,
Complications of Gender: Women and HIVDisease, in AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN
CIVIL RIGHTS 5, 16 n.54 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992).
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ing with the AIDS epidemic.98 Nonetheless, coercive measures have
public support,9 particularly when designed to target prostitutes,"'
"recalcitrant individuals,"101 or women's childbearing potential.
10 2
Consequently, despite the fact that historical precedent has proved
such measures ineffective in curtailing the spread of epidemics,
1 3
several influential health policy makers have endorsed coercion. In
1988, the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficien-
cy Virus Epidemic recommended criminalizing conscious acts which
risk HIV transmission. 0 4 Although this recommendation does not
specifically mention perinatal transmission through planned or
voluntarily continued pregnancy, it does not specifically exclude it,
and becoming or choosing to remain pregnant when one's child has a
30% chance of becoming infected with HIV might be considered a
conscious act risking transmission. Therefore, the Commission re-
port arguably could be cited as support for criminalizing childbear-
98. See Ronald Bayer, As the Second Decade of AIDS Begins: An International
Perspective on the Ethics of the Epidemic, 6 AIDS 527, 528 (1992) ("All democratic nations
have emphasized that fostering voluntary behavior change represents the most effective
strategy for altering the course of the AIDS epidemic."); see also Gostin, supra note 85, at
1017.
99. Robert Allard, Beliefs About AIDS as Determinants of Preventive Practices and of
Support of Coercive Measures, 79 Ai. J. PUB. HEALTH 448, 449 (1989) (reporting that 74%
of respondents favored forced HIV testing "of certain groups of people," 40% supported
outlawing "certain kinds of sexual activity"); Gostin, supra note 85, at 1019 nn.6-7 (citing
national opinion polls in 1985 and 1986 finding between 28 and 58% of respondents
favoring quarantine and government restrictions on sexual activity of people with AIDS).
100. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.6 (West Supp. 1993) (requiring testing for persons
convicted of prostitution or solicitation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-1-7.1(e), 35-38-1-10.5
(Burns Supp. 1992) (providing for HIV testing of anyone convicted of prostitution); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5129(3) (West Supp. 1992) (mandating that person convicted of
prostitution shall be tested for HIV); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.356 (Supp. 1991) (requiring
testing of anyone arrested for illegal prostitution); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-255 (Law. Co-
op. 1991) (mandating HIV testing of anyone convicted of prostitution offense); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-29-145 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (making it a felony punishable by up to ten years in
prison to engage in prostitution when one knows she is HIV-positive); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-516 (1992) (making it a class C felony to engage in sexual activity for business or to
loiter in a public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity when
one knows one is HIV-positive); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1 (Michie 1992) (mandating
HIV testing for anyone convicted of prostitution); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-2(f)(2)(i) (1992)
(mandating HIV testing of anyone convicted of prostitution). But see WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.24.350 (West 1992) (requiring that voluntary HIV testing and counseling
services be offered to anyone arrested on prostitution charges).
101. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1017 n.1.
102. See discussion supra part I.C.
103. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1041 n.128; Beth Bergman, AIDS, Prostitution, and
the Use of Historical Stereotypes to Legislate Sexuality, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 777
(1988).
104. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HtMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY
VIRUS EPIDEMIC 130-31 (1988).
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ing for HI-positive women.
Recommendations on perinatal transmission of HIV issued by
the CDC in 1985 specify that HIV-positive women should "postpone
pregnancy," but do not mention the fact that an HIV-positive woman
has choices to make once she is pregnant. 0 5 Because infection with
HIV is now assumed to be life-long, the call to postpone is really a
call to forego having children completely. While a proposal was
made to include advice that women be counseled on the abortion
option and that their decisions be respected, the final recommenda-
tions do not contain any mention of choice. This omission is the
result of the influence of both anti-abortion forces and consultants
concerned about American practices of coercing minority women in
public clinics to have abo-tions.10 Hence, the CDC has been silent
concerning whether its call for HIV-positive women to desist from
reproducing extended to directing those already pregnant to have
abortions.'0 7 However, the 1985 CDC recommendations have been
influential in the development of many AIDS programs and have
served as the basis for subsequent recommendations issued by state
health departments across the country.0 8
105. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Assisting in the Prevention of
Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IIliLymphadenopathy-
Associated Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDITY &
MORTALrrIY WKLY. REP. 721 (1985). The CDC recommends, however, that HIV testing of
pregnant women be undertaken only with the woman's consent and always in conjunction
with counseling and confidentiality. Id. at 724. The advice to avoid pregnancy altogether
when a woman is HIV-positive is common. For example, former Surgeon General C.
Everett Koop advised that every woman be voluntarily tested for H1V antibodies before
becoming pregnant because "[olne of the greatest concerns was the potential threat to the
babies of infected mothers. The virus can pass from mother to infant in the womb." AIDS
Test for Women Urged Before Pregnancy, N.Y. TMIEs, Mar. 25, 1987, at B4. In 1988, Dr.
James Curren, Director of the CDC's AIDS Programming, was quoted as saying that
'[t]here is no reason that the number of [IYV-infected infants] shouldn't decline ....
Someone who understands the disease and is logical will not want to be pregnant." Ethics
of Prevention, supra note 95, at 501.
106. See Albert E. Gunn, Letter to the Editor: The CDC and Abortion in IV-Positive
Women, 259 JAMA 217 (1988); David A. Grimes, Reply to Letter to the Editor, 259 JAMA
217(1988).
107. Ethics of Prevention, supra note 95, at 502.
108. Id. at 501-03 (citing San Francisco Dep't of Public Health as one state health
department which has urged women to "postpone" pregnancy pending further study of
prenatal transmission). For example, advice distributed to local Californian health
officials in 1985 stressed "the potentially disastrous result for the fetus when an
expectant mother is infected with the AIDS virus" and counseled that women at increased
risk be identified, followed by serologic examination, and educated about AIDS. Ethics of
Prevention, supra note 95, at 500 (citations omitted). Other literature mirrored the CDC
directive. See, e.g., Gina Pugiese & Thomas Lampinen, Prevention of Human
Immunodefciency Virus Infection: Our Responsibilities as Health Care Professionals, 17
AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 1, 17 (1989) ("Because of the potential high risk of infant
infection and the preliminary evidence that pregnancy itself may accelerate the develop-
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In 1987, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists issued a policy statement recommending, "Women infected
with HIV... should be strongly encouraged not to become preg-
nant... those who do become pregnant should be counseled again
about the risks to themselves and their child and should be informed
about the option of pregnancy termination."1 9
The professional medical opinion that HIV-positive women
should not have children has surfaced in other forums."' One of the
few panels addressing women and AIDS at the Fifth International
Conference on AIDS held in Montreal in June, 1989, was "HIV
Infection, Reproduction and Parenthood." Commentators report that
panelist John Arras, a medical ethicist and Director of the
Department of Social Medicine at Montefiore Hospital in Bronx,
New York, responded negatively to the question, "Should HIV-
Positive Women Have Children?" Commentators summarize,
[He] concluded that society's interest in avoiding the costs of babies with
AIDS outweighed the judgment of many [HIV-positivel ... women that a
one third chance of bearing a child with HIV infection was a risk worth
taking in light of the significant cultural premium placed on child bear-
ing."'
ment of AIDS, infected women should postpone pregnancy.... [Iun regions of high
seroprevalence, screening of all pregnant women may be indicated.").
109. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Prevention of Human
Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 53 ACOG COMMI7TEE STATEMENT, 1, 1-4 (1987). However,
ACOG does not endorse mandatory testing. See American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, Human Immune Deficiency Virus Infectious, ACOG TEcHNICAL BULL. Dec.
1988, at 5 (recommending HIV testing and counseling with informed consent only "in any
medical setting in which women at risk are encountered"); see also S.E. Hassig & R.W.
Ryder, The Epidemiology of Perinatal Transmission of HV, 2 AIDS S83, S87 (1988)
(noting that prevention requires "screening women who are anticipating pregnancy and
encouraging them not to become pregnant. Alternatively, and much less acceptable,
would be the screening of pregnant women for HIV antibodies in the first trimester with
subsequent therapeutic abortion of fetuses of seropositive women.").
110. E.g., Norman Hearst & Stephen B. Hulley, Preventing Heterosexual Spread of
AIDS: Are We Giving Our Patients the Best Advice?, 259 JAMA 2428 (1988) ("Preventing
the perinatal transmission of infection to newborn babies involves testing prospective
mothers for HIV antibodies and advising those who test positive to avoid pregnancy or, if
already pregnant, to consider abortion."); see, e.g., The Ethics of Prevention, supra note
95.
111. Arleen Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Woman in the AIDS Epidemic: A
Portrait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 519, 525 n.24 (1990) (citing John
Arras, Director of the Department of Social Medicine at Monteflore Hospital, Bronx, N.Y.,
Address at V International AIDS Conference (June 1989)).
In a 1990 article, Arras argued that because nondirective counseling of HIV-positive
women does not effectively result in decisions to abort pregnancies, altering norms of in-
formed consent for counseling HIV-positive women concerning childbearing may be justi-
fied. For example, rather than merely describing the risks of HIV transmission to her fu-
ture child, and describing what HIV illness is like for most children, health care providers
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The obvious implication of such a conclusion is that the legal protec-
tions of reproductive autonomy of HIV-positive women must give
way to society's need to prevent proliferation of HIV-positive ba-
bies.12
Another prominent physician voiced similar sentiments at a
1989 conference focusing on AIDS among Puerto Ricans. Dr.
Carmen Zorrilla, an Associate Professor at the University of Puerto
Rico School of Medicine, urged that "the sterilization option" be
relied upon to reduce the numbers of children with AIDS." 3 Similar
advice is evident in the medical literature."' One commentator out-
should challenge an HIV-positive pregnant woman to explain "whether she has thought
about the suffering she risks imposing on her future child and the likelihood of the child
becoming an orphan... Are her motives for pregnancy sufficiently weighty, given the
deadly serious stakes, or is she failing to consider the potential child's separate dignity
and interests?" Arras, supra note 9, at 372-74. Moreover, despite noting two caveats,
Arras argues that it "might be justified" for health care providers to engage in "directive
counseling". Such directive counseling would involve forthright recommendations to an
HIV-positive woman that she avoid pregnancy or have an abortion in the event that pre-
natal diagnosis of infant HJV becomes possible with an accuracy of 80 to 100%. Id. at 375-
77.
112. Arras has more recently explicitly eschewed coercive interventions in women's
reproductive rights beyond directive counseling, despite the fact that he argues that
"involuntary sterilization or abortion... would be maximally responsive to the interests
of future children." Arras, supra note 9,. at 375-77. He also argues that "[t]he well-being of
children should not be held hostage, even to legitimate and pressing demands
for... decent and human medical services and more equitable social opportunities" for
HIV-positive women. Id. at 359. He makes such statements, he contends, in the context of
legal protections for the rights of HIV-positive women's reproductive choices. Id. at 360.
Assertions that voluntariness be preserved in the law, though not supported by medical
ethics and not followed in informed consent practice, misconstrue the interdependence of
norms of informed consent and the free exercise of reproductive choice.
Moreover, Arras' assumption that the legal right to choose will be unaffected by his
policy recommendations misinterprets the interdependence of public morality, public
health policy, medical practice and the law, which is particularly acute in the area of re-
productive rights. One need only briefly consider the national controversy concerning the
legality of state imposed barriers to abortion to understand this point. Moreover, legal
guarantees of informed consent and reproductive choice mean little if the actual practice
of health care providers is to coerce the most disfranchised women-and those most in
need of legal protections-in their reproductive decision-making. The reasoning behind
Arras' willingness to relax informed consent norms and legal protections for reproductive
rights for HIV-positive women could, and this Article asserts, will, be used to justify
measures beyond directive counseling.
113. Zarembka & Franke, supra note 111, at 525 (citing Carmen C. Zorrilla,
Associate Professor, School of Medicine, Univ. of Puerto Rico, AIDS in Puerto Rico and
Among the Puerto Rican Population on the Mainland, Address at Conference, Wash. D.C.
(Aug. 28, 1989)).
114. Some authorities currently advocate unconiented HIV testing of pregnant and
post-partum women or newborns. Others indicate that the basic rights of HIV-positive fe-
males to marry and to bear children should be open to public referendum. Robert
Edelman & Harry W. Haverkos, Reply to Letter to the Editor, 261 JAMA 993 (1989)
(stating that while the authors declared that they personally oppose criminalized mar-
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lined a radical potential policy path:
A central issue is the right of an infected woman to be pregnant. The right
to become pregnant and to maintain a pregnancy could be seen as part of
a women's right to control her body. However, as more child-bearing
women become infected and give birth to infected children, child-bearing
could come under the surveillance of the state. Women of child-bearing
age could be among the first groups to undergo mandatory testing as part
of an attempt to control women's reproductive choices.... The State's
duty to protect potential life tends to shift to the interest of protecting so-
ciety from another person with AIDS. In this view, seropositive women do
not have the right to become pregnant and should be sterilized automati-
cally. Seropositive pregnant women do not have the right to maintain a
pregnancy and should undergo abortions. Sterilization and abortion would
be advocated for health reasons alone."
5
In a May 1991 editorial to the New England Journal of
Medicine, Dr. Marcia Angell proposed, contrary to traditional norms
of informed consent, that routine, if not mandatory, HIV screening
should be conducted on all pregnant women and newborns." 6 She
reasoned that pregnant women and newborns are accessible to the
health care system because most babies are born in hospitals. Thus,
mandatory testing could allow "[ilnfected women [to] make more-
informed choices about family planning, and infected newborns
could be treated earlier."" 7
Physicians have also pushed to classify AIDS and HIV infection
as sexually transmitted and communicable diseases, thus permit-
ting application of state laws permitting mandatory testing, treat-
ment, and quarantine of those known or suspected of being infected.
riage and childbirth or coerced abortions and compulsory sterilization, they predict that
"as the pandemic widens and deepens in our society, increasingly powerful voices will be
heard calling for such state-imposed restrictions"); Harry W. Haverkos & Robert
Edelman, The Epidemiology of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among
Heterosexuals, 260 JAMA 1922, 1927 (1988) (stating that "societies may soon have to
wrestle with many difficult questions, including.., the suitability of infected individuals
for marriage and natural parenthood"). See also Mhairi G. MacDonald et al., HIV
Infection in Pregnancy: Epidemiology and Clinical Management, 4 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEICIENCY SYNDROMES 100 (1991) (urging universal screening of pregnant women and
infants, particularly in inner city hospitals). But see Vertical Transmission of HIV, supra
note 94 (recommending that HIV-seropositive women be advised on an individual basis
rather than applying a blanket recommendation of termination of pregnancy or even
sterilization).
115. Carole A. Campbell, Women and AIDS, 30 SOC'Y, SCI. & MED. 407,410 (1990).
116. Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1498, 1499 (1991); see also Douglas Black et al., Letter to the Editor, HIV Testing on All
Pregnant Women, 1987 LANCET 1277 (1987); Krasinski et al., supra note 114; Listernick,
supra note 15, at 507 (reporting that doctors in New York called for mandatory testing of
all pregnant women);
117. Angell, supra note 116, at 1498.
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For example, in New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod,18
four local clinical medical societies, including the New York Medical
Society, unsuccessfully sued the New York State Commissioner of-
Health to compel him to define AIDS and HIV infection as sexually
transmitted and communicable diseases. In addition, the House of
Delegates of the American Medical Association in 1990 issued a
policy statement labeling HIV infection as a sexually transmitted
disease. 1 9
Moreover, as noted earlier, the Presidential Commission issued
a policy favoring criminalization of certain intentional transmission
behaviors, without specifically addressing perinatal transmission.
When such a medical authority, well-versed in the modes of HIV
transmission, neglects to specifically address perinatal transmission
when formulating policy, it is perhaps understandable that state
legislators neglect to exempt perinatal transmission when consider-
ing civil and criminal transmission bills. As explained below, such
oversight could encourage overzealous law enforcement authorities
to violate the rights of HIV-positive women.
B. Expert Opinion Reflects and Influences Medical Practice
The public comments of the minority of medical authorities en-
dorsing relaxation of informed consent protections for HIV-positive
women suggest that substantially more physicians are following the
advice in practice. One commentator posits that "with HIV, directive
counseling is not advocated but assumed."20
One survey of 247 physicians and nurses in neonatal intensive
care units in New York City found marked opprobrium for child-
bearing by HIV-positive women. The study found that "65 percent of
the respondents agreed with the statement 'women should not have
babies who will be at risk for [AIDS],' whereas 25 percent agreed
when the risk was for Tay-Sachs disease and only 15 percent agreed
when the risk was for cystic fibrosis."'2 Such opprobrium will inevi-
tably affect delivery of reproductive health care to HIV-positive
women. Indeed, even in the absence of statutes or regulations
118. 555 N.Y.S.2d 911 (App. Div. 1990).
119. Ethics of Prevention, supra note 95, at 150.
120. Nolan, supra note 14, at 60.
121. Kass, supra note 5, at 316 (citing Betty W. Levin et al., Ethics and AIDS in the
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, Presentation at the Meeting of the American Public
Health Association, Chicago (Oct. 26-29, 1989)).
Tay-Sachs and cystic fibrosis can be diagnosed prenatally with 99% accuracy.
Moreover, parents can be screened to determine whether they carry genes for these dis-
eases, and thus, it can be determined, even prior to conception, whether their offspring
would face a 25% or higher risk of having these diseases. See discussion infra notes 411-
12 and accompanying text.
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authorizing it, several studies have found widespread surreptitious
ElIV testing in hospitals. 22 In addition, a medical trade magazine
article explaining how doctors should counsel liIV-positive patients
about childbearing states only that they should follow the practice of
one internist who tells his HIV-positive patients that "it would be
unwise, imprudent, and unfair" for them to have a child.'2
While concrete data are not available, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that women, particularly low income women of color, may often
be denied the right to refuse testing and may be pressured to avoid
conception and/or terminate pregnancies. A former'HIV counselor
reports that because her agency, a large provider of prenatal care to
low income women in her city, was reimbursed more generously for
counseling sessions resulting in a woman's decision to be tested than
for sessions in which she refused consent, counselors felt tremen-
dous pressure to obtain consent. Even the most ethical counselors
were swayed. She stated that "to call what they did 'counseling' is a
complete misrepresentation. Informed consent counseling is meant
to facilitate a patient's free will. They had the explicit agenda to
obtain consent for testing." 24 Moreover, because reimbursement was
greater when the test results were positive, women who acknowl-
edged a history of high-risk behavior or who were members of
groups with high incidence of HIV infection (i.e. African-American or
Latin-American) were even more likely to be pressured to accept
testing. One woman was even tested after refusing consent.125 The
counselor explained that funding for HIV-testing has become the
life-blood of the prenatal clinics, three of which have already been
closed due to budget cuts. "If the clinics had not become HIV-testing
mills, more would have been closed." 26
An AfDS service provider in South Carolina reports that in
1992, two of its women clients who were HIV-seropositive were de-
nied free or low cost abortions by the sole provider of such abortions,
unless they consented to tubal ligations. Both women eventually
consented to the ligations because they needed abortions and had no
other alternatives.1 27 A Native-American woman in Minnesota re-
122. Hunter, supra note 97, at n.73; Philip J. Hilts, Many Hospitals Found to Ignore
Rights of Patients in AIDS Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1990, at Al.
123. David Ghitelman, What to Tell a Patient Who Tests HIV-Positive, MED. ECON.,
Sept. 21, 1987, at 79, 86; see also Janet L. Mitchell, Women, AIDS and Public Policy,
AIDS & PUB. PoL'Y J. Vol. 3, No.2, 1988, at 51 (reporting that a telephone survey of
obstetricians in 1987 led a medical trade newspaper to suggest that a proposal for
"[forced sterilizations for HIV-positive women [is] not beyond the realm of possibility").
124. Interview with ex-counselor of agency, May 28, 1992, at 3 (notes on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
125. Id. at 2, 3.
126. Id. at 2.
127. Response to survey conducted by the Center for Women Policy Studies, 2000 P
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ports that because she was HIV-positive, two different doctors in the
clinic where she was obtaining prenatal care pressured her to have
an abortion. One "strongly recommended" an abortion because her
"baby would have AIDS" and "would die within the first year." The
other doctor told her, "Who do you think you are to bring a baby into
this world only to watch it suffer and die?" The woman reports that
she refused to have an abortion, and that her baby was not infected
with HIV.l
A New York case currently being litigated presents allegations
of coercion in its most severe form. In Doe v. Jamaica Hospital129 the
plaintiff alleges that she was tested for HIV antibodies as part of the
care she was receiving in Jamaica Hospital's prenatal clinic for high
risk pregnancies. Doe alleges that when Jamaica Hospital personnel
informed her that she had tested iHV-positive, she was then heavily
pressured to have an abortion and denied continued prenatal care.
When she finally succumbed to the pressure and submitted to the
abortion, she was subjected to improper medical procedures because
of the health care providers' fears of HIV infection."' 0
It is impossible to determine how widespread unauthorized
HIV-testing of pregnant and post-partum women has become.' 3 '
However, the indications are that the incidence of unauthorized
testing is significant. Directive counseling regarding contraception,
abortion, and sterilization, ranging from encouragement to coercion,
might also occur in more than isolated instances.
Street, N.W. Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036, 2/25/93 (on file with the Buffalo Law
Review).
128. Response to survey conducted by the Center for Women Policy Studies, 2000 P
Street, N.W. Suite 508, Washington, D.C. 20036, 3/16/93 (on file with Buffalo Law
Review).
129. Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., No. 31248/89 slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Co., April 29,
1991) (granting summary judgment to individual doctor defendant on claims alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress, federal discrimination, and violations of plain-
tiffs civil rights; denying summary judgment to defendant doctor on claims of negligence
and state discrimination).
130. Verified Complaint at para. 15, Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., No. 31248/89 slip op.
(Sup. Ct. Kings Co., 1991).
131. A former HIV counselor reports that abortion referral rates for HIV-positive
women obtaining: prenatal care at -the agency where she worked apparently varied
according to the views of the social workers and nurses in charge of the particular facility
where they obtaindd prenatal care. The counselor's impression was that abortion referral
rates for HIV-positive women were higher at a facility where health care providers held
strong views that HIV-positive women should not have babies, than at facilities where
health care providers strongly supported agency policy of free choice for HIV-positive
women regarding pregnancy. Interview, supra note 124, at 3-4.
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C. Criminal Transmission Statutes: Do They Outlaw Childbearing
for HIV-Positive Women?
A large body of developing criminal law authorizes the prosecu-
tion IRV-positive individuals for engaging in certain behaviors
which risk transmitting the virus to others. From 1987 through
1989, twenty states enacted statutes that specifically criminalized
behavior posing a risk of HIV transmission. 1 2 In addition, many
prosecutions have been brought under pre-existing non-AIDS-spe-
cific criminal law.
HIV criminal transmission statutes generally do not require
proof of actual transmission of the virus. Instead some criminal
statutes apply when an HI V-positive person donates blood, semen or
organs, 133 engages in risky sexual contact, 134 or shares needles, 13 re-
gardless of whether anyone else actually contracts [IV. Other more
generally worded statutes prohibit the intentional infliction of risk
of transmission.3 6 Some states have criminalized behaviors which
risk HV transmission by amending preexisting public health stat-
utes regarding the knowing exposure of another person to a sexually
transmitted or venereal disease to include HIV.17
In addition, prosecutors have interpreted pre-existing criminal
laws, not specific to AIDS or public health, to apply to HIV-infected
individuals. For -example, prosecutors have used attempted murder
to prosecute HIV-positive individuals for engaging in behaviors
thought to risk transmission to others. 38 One conservative estimate
132. Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIV
Exceptionalism? 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1502 (1991).
133. See table III.
134. See table III.
135. See table III.
136. See table III.
137. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1988) (classifying HIV infection as a venereal dis-
ease and prohibiting infected persons from knowingly exposing another person to the in-
fection); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 para. 7403 3(3) (Smith-Hurd 1991) (defining HIV as
"sexually transmissible disease"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-2 (1992) (stating that any per-
son "knowingly or willfully violating health department order who is afflicted by life
threatening communicable disease or the causative agent thereof shall be guilty of a fel-
ony"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West Supp. 1993) (adding AIDS and HIV to general
venereal disease statute and prohibiting an infected person from having sexual
intercourse without informing his partner).
138. State v. Sherouse, 536 So.2d 1194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (charging HIV-posi-
tive woman with attempted involuntary manslaughter for engaging in money prostitu-
tion; charges were dismissed because crime requires specific intent); Brock v. State, 555
So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (reversing attempted murder conviction of an HIV-posi-
tive inmate who bit guard); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)
(reversing conviction of attempted murder by finding that spraying blood of HIV-positive
man did not constitute substantial step toward killing anyone); Kathleen M. Sullivan &
Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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posits that as of 1989, there had been fifty to one hundred criminal
cases relating to BIV transmission.139 These prosecutions have had
limited success, however, with the majority of them being dropped
prior to conviction, acquitted at trial, or reversed on appeal.
More states can be expected to enact criminal transmission
statutes in order to become eligible for federal funding. The 1990
Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act'4 ' re-
quires that all states receiving funds for AIDS services have the
statutory capacity to prosecute those who knowingly engage in be-
havior linked with HIV transmission to unknowing partners.4 1
Though the Act's legislative history specifies that it does not intend
to criminalize perinatal transmission,4 3 the wording of the Act itself
does not make this clear. Furthermore, the Act does not prohibit
states from interpreting their own laws to include perinatal trans-
mission.
None of the state laws reviewed above specify application to
HIV perinatal transmission. Nor do they explicitly prohibit HIV-
positive women from becoming pregnant. However, the general and
sometimes vague wording of the statutes could allow a creative or
misinformed prosecutor to act against a pregnant or post-partum
HIV-positive woman. The only way to become pregnant, other than
through artificial insemination, is to engage in sexual intercourse in
which bodily fluids are exchanged. Therefore, an HIV-positive
woman's pregnancy could be used as evidence that she had engaged
in acts which risk transmitting the virus to her sex partner.
Moreover, HIV-positive women who elect to continue their pregnan-
cies might be subject to prosecution for risking transmittal of the
virus to the fetus because perinatal transmission is one of the few
medically recognized modes of transmission of HIV. Due to the pub-
lic opprobrium against the women who are infected by H1V, some-
times even clearly-worded statutes may be misapplied by law en-
forcement authorities intent on punishing HIV-positive women.
Such was the case in a recent North Carolina prosecution.'
In light of recent prosecutions of women who used drugs during
139, 156-57 (1988); see also United States v. Moore, 669 F. Supp. 289 (D. Minn. 1987)
(convicting prisoner of assault with a deadly weapon for biting a guard), affd, 846 F.2d
1163 (8th Cir. 1988).
139. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1039.
140. Id. at 1041.
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff to 300ff-90 (Supp. II 1991).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-47 (Supp. 111991).
143. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 652, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 862, 920 ("The Conferees do not intend that conception or pregnancy or
other means of transmission from mother to child be construed as a 'donation' that is sub-
ject to criminal action.").
144. See discussion infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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pregnancy, under statutes prohibiting the supply of controlled sub-
stances to minors, 145 such misapplication of law in an HIV context is
not surprising. In addition, dicta in several cases reveal a tendency
among judges, even some who are eloquently sympathetic to the
discrimination suffered by HIV-infected people, to disapprove of
childbearing by HI V-positive women. 46 The legal literature has
begun to contemplate the application of criminal transmission stat-
utes against HIV-positive pregnant women.147 Indeed, such applica-
tion was considered so likely by both the Texas and Oklahoma state
legislatures that they explicitly exempted perinatal transmission
from the prohibited transmission risk behaviors in their recently
enacted HIV criminal transmission statutes."4
Analysis of several HIV laws already enacted, and of the ability
of prosecutors to gain evidence of HIV status necessary to use such
laws, demonstrates that such statutes could be misapplied to prose-
145. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
146. See Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D. V.I. 1991) (stating that
an HIV carrier cannot procreate "without endangering the lives of both the offspring and
the other parent"); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 440, 444 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (noting the irrational fear of the public in contracting noninfectious diseases and
stating that "no physical problem has created greater public fear and misapprehension
than AIDS"); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (stating that an HIV-infected person is handicapped due to impairment of the
hemic and reproductive systems which makes "procreation and childbirth dangerous to
themselves and others"); Dr. Reed V. Tuckson, Mandatory AIDS Testing: Public Health
and Private Rights, in Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District
of Columbia Circuit, 124 F.R.D. 241, 290 (1989) (noting that the "discrimination,
ignorance, and selfishness that too often accompanies the reaction to AIDS make it a dif-
ferent disease").
147. Isaacman, supra note 85, at 479. Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman,
Criminally Pregnant: Are AIDS-Transmission Laws Encouraging Abortion?, A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1990, at 76.
148. The Texas criminal transmission statute criminalizes any conduct likely to
cause HIV-infected blood to transfer through the skin or other membrane into the blood
of another, except during in utero transmission of blood or bodily fluids. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.012 (West Supp. 1992). Oklahoma law contains a similar exception. Its statute
makes it a crime to knowingly and with intent to infect another, engage in conduct rea-
sonably likely to result in transfer of bodily fluids containing HIV to another, "except dur-
ing in utero transmission of blood or body fluids." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192 (West
Supp. 1993).
Given the current uncertainties concerning how mother-to-child transmission occurs,
see supra note 94, exceptions which specify "in utero" transmission may not technically
exempt all mother-to-child infections. For example, the exceptions to the Texas and
Oklahoma laws do not account for transmission occurring during childbirth, at a time
when the fetus has left the uterus and is traveling through the vaginal channel, during
the moments before the umbilical cord is severed, or after birth when the child is still
covered with the birthing blood and fluids. The legislatures' intents are clear, however,
that women should not be prosecuted for transmitting HIV to their fetus or child through
pregnancy and childbirth.
CONTROL OF HIV-POSITIVE WOMEN
cute pregnant HIV-positive women. Such prosecutions, similar to
the prosecutions of pregnant women for the transmission of con-
trolled substances, are likely to be judicially invalidated when chal-
lenged. 149 However, despite this likelihood, prosecutors might still
attempt to proceed against HIV-positive women who become preg-
nant and/or have babies. Many of the targeted women will be unable
or unwilling to challenge the underlying legality of their prosecu-
tion.
Facially, the transmission statutes of Illinois, Arkansas, Idaho,
and Missouri appear most susceptible to application against child-
bearing women. The Illinois criminal transmission statute,50 en-
acted in 1989 and touted by one commentator as a "model" HIV-
specific criminal law,'5 ' is susceptible to misapplication to perinatal
transmission. The statute defines as a felony, punishable by not less
than three and not more than seven years in prison, 5 2 the act of
engaging in "intimate contact with another" when knowingly in-
fected with HIV. "Intimate contact with another" is defined as "the
exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person
in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV ."'53 Two
commentators have already speculated that this law could be read to
criminalize childbearing for HIV-positive women in Illinois.'54
Without the cooperation of the state health department, how-
ever, an Illinois prosecutor intent on applying the transmission
statute to pregnant or post-partum women would have a difficult
time amassing proof of HIV infection. HIV test results are not read-
ily accessible. Anonymous testing is available,'55 and the law re-
quires specific consent. 55 In addition, unauthorized disclosure of
HIV information is punishable as a class A misdemeanor 57 and is
149. See infra note 195.
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1989).
151. Donald H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 373-74 (1990). Hermann states that the only significant
problem with this statute is the overbreadth and vagueness of the definition of "intimate
contact." He suggests correcting this problem by giving the definition a judicial
construction which limits it to the transmission of HIV by means recognized by medical
and scientific authorities. Such construction would still include perinatal transmission.
I&
152. ILL. REV. STAT. at para. 1005-8-1.
153. Id. at para. 12-16.2(b). Another section of Illinois law which could be interpreted
by an overzealous prosector to apply to perinatal transmission is: "transfers, donates or
provides his or her blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other potentially infectious body fluids
for transfusion, transplantations, inseminations or other administration to another." Id.
at para. 12-16.2(a)(2).
154. Isaacman, supra note 85, at 479; Closen & Isaacman, supra note 147.
155. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 7306 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
156. Id. at para. 7304.
157. Id. at para. 7312 (Smith-Hurd 1988).
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subject to civil suit.15 Although HIV-positive test results must be
reported to the health department,'59 that information is exempt
from the Freedom of Information Act."' It can only be released by
court order upon a finding of a compelling need which cannot be
otherwise accommodated. That need must be found to outweigh both
the test subject's privacy interest and the "public interest which may
be disserved by disclosure which deters blood, organ and semen do-
nation and future HiV-related testing."16 ' However, if a prosecutor
were to obtain knowledge of a woman's HIV-positive status, the fact
that she is pregnant could be construed as evidence that she is likely
to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse, that she thus presents
a public health threat and that there is a compelling need for disclo-
sure. Thus, it is not inconceivable that such a petition could be
brought and granted by a judge unversed in or hostile to the com-
plexities of constitutional protections for childbearing rights.
6 2
Similarly, under Arkansas law, pregnant HIV-positive women
might be prosecuted for "exposing another person to [HJV infec-
tion] ... through the parenteral transfer of blood." 163 The law does
not limit or explain the phrase "parenteral transfer of blood."
Therefore, it might be interpreted to encompass the birthing blood
which bathes the child during childbirth or blood which might cross
the placenta during gestation."
Unlike Illinois, a woman's HIV status is easily accessible to
prosecutors in Arkansas. First, state law requires all HIV-positive
patients, including pregnant women, to inform their physicians that
they are HIV-positive prior to receiving any health care. 5 In turn,
the law requires all physicians, laboratories, hospitals and state
agencies to report all persons infected by HIV to the State
Department of Health. 66 Prosecutors may then obtain that informa-
tion by subpoena in order to enforce the criminal transmission stat-
ute. 16
7
Even when a woman does not know her HIV status prior to
seeking health care, prosecutors can easily obtain this information.
158. Id. at para. 7313.
159. Id. at paras. 7351 & 7408 (Smith-Hurd 1988 & Supp. 1992).
160. Id. at para. 7408 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
161. Id. at para. 7309(g)(i).
162. See supra note 146 for a discussion of judges who have stated that they believe
an HIV-positive woman endangers her offspring by procreating.
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie Supp. 1991).
164. See Closen & Isaacman, supra note 147, at 77.
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-15-903 (Michie 1991).
166. Id. § 20-15-906.
167. Id. at 20-15-904(c) (Michie Supp. 1991). Although the statute allows such sub-
poena, any information disclosed pursuant to the subpoena can be disclosed only to the
court. Id.
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Under state law, physicians may imply a patient's consent to an HIV
test from her consent to receive general prenatal or obstetric care. 1'
Thus, a physician might decide that an HIV test is "medically indi-
cated" for a pregnant woman because the doctor does not believe a
responsible person would continue a pregnancy if she had the
knowledge that she was HIV-positive. The doctor would then per-
form the test without the patient's consent or knowledge; if the
result is positive, state law requires the physician to inform both the
woman and the health department.169 Such a scenario is more likely
to occur when the pregnant woman is poor, African-American, or
Latin-American because of doctors' perceptions of risk groups and
because doctors tend to have less respect for the reproductive auton-
omy of these women. 70 Thus, Arkansas prosecutors would conceiv-
ably have access to information identifying all known HIV-positive
women receiving prenatal care or medical assistance at birth.
Idaho's criminal transmission statute could also be misapplied
to prosecute a pregnant HIV-positive woman. The statute punishes
the act of "expos[ing] another [to HIV in any manner with the in-
tent to infect" with up to fifteen years in prison and/or a fine of up to
five thousand dollars.171 Under this law, a prosecution might proceed
on the theory that the woman must have had the specific intent to
infect her sexual partner because pregnancy reflects that she en-
gaged in unprotected sex. However, many factual issues can be ar-
gued to raise reasonable doubt for crimes requiring the intent to
infect.
With respect to risk of perinatal transmission, an Idaho prose-
cution theory might be that a woman intended to infect her offspring
with HIV, knowing she had HIV, and knowing pregnancy and child-
birth would expose and possibly infect the fetus and the newborn,
she nonetheless decided to continue the pregnancy. However, be-
cause the odds are one in three that their offspring will be infected,
HIV-positive women who continue pregnancy arguably do so in the
hope that their children will be healthy. 72 Therefore, it seems un-
likely that a jury would find that a woman held the statutory requi-
168. A patient's specific informed consent to an HIV test is not required when "in the
judgment of the physician, such testing is medically indicated to provide appropriate diag-
nosis and treatment to the subject of the test, provided that the subject of the test has
otherwise provided his or her consent to such physician for medical treatment." Id. § 20-
15-905(c).
169. Id. § 20-15-905(c), 906(b)(1).
170. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
171. IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (Supp. 1992).
172. Carol Levine & Nancy Dubler, Uncertain Risks and Bitter Realities: The
Reproductive Choices of HIV-Infected Women, 68 MILBANK Q. 321 (1990).
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site of specific intent to infect.173 On the other hand, Idaho juries
may indeed convict because of the widespread disapprobation for
HIV childbearing and because intent may be inferred from "the
circumstances connected with the offense." 174
Idaho law implicitly requires specific informed consent for HIV-
testing. 175 However, state health authorities have wide discretion to
test those "reasonably suspected of being infected."76 Once a health
care provider learns that a patient is HIV-positive, the provider
must report the patient's name to state health authorities. 77
Missouri's criminal transmission statute could also be misap-
plied to prosecute pregnant or post-partum HIV-positive women.
The statute criminalizes the act of "[dieliberately creat[ing] a grave
and unjustifiable risk of infecting another with HIV through sexual
or other contact when an individual knows that he is creating that
risk."17 Thus, if a woman continues her pregnancy when she knows
that she is HIV-positive and that the virus can be transmitted peri-
natally, she has arguably "deliberately" and "knowingly" created a
risk of transmission. It would be up to a jury to decide whether a one
in three chance of infecting one's offspring is a "grave" risk, and
whether such a risk is "unjustifiable" because "grave" and
"unjustifiable" are not defined by the statute.7 9 Likewise, a prosecu-
173. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-114 (1992) (making mental intent or criminal negli-
gence an element of every crime); see also State v. Carter, No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct.,
Escambia County, July 23, 1990) (dismissing delivery of illegal substance charges because
defendant could not, as a matter of law, have had the intent to deliver cocaine through
the umbilical cord to a person when she ingested cocaine while pregnant).
174. IDAHO CODE § 18-115 (1987); see also State v. Booton, 375 P.2d 536, 539 (Idaho
1962). Idaho law on jury charges may make convictions more likely. A judge must charge
the jury on the specific intent required for specific intent crimes. However, a court's addi-
tion of general intent language-for example, "every person of sound mind is presumed to
intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts"--is not reversible error on ap-
peal. State v. Rutter, 245 P.2d 778, 783 (Idaho 1952). Notwithstanding, an Idaho
prosecution will probably not survive a motion to dismiss brought at the earliest stages of
litigation on the basis that the statute was not intended to criminalize childbearing.
175. Although Idaho law does not explicitly require specific informed consent to
precede an HIV test, the law waives the requirement of'informed consent for testing only
in specific limited circumstances. See IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4303A(a)(1), (2) (1992).
176. IDAHO CODE § 39-603 (1985) (permitting compulsory examination, treatment
and quarantine of those suspected of infection with venereal disease); see also IDAHO
CODE § 39-601 (Supp. 1992) (defining HIV to be venereal disease).
177. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-602, 606 (Supp. 1992).
178. MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (1),(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
179. The jury's evaluation of the risk may depend in great part on socioeconomic
factors. Some scholars hypothesize that people respond to numeric risks differently based
on racial, cultural, and socioeconomic differences. For example, poor women whose off-
spring face elevated health and life risks regardless of the possibility of HIV infection
would be more likely to find a 30% risk of perinatal HIV transmission justifiable. See
Kass, supra note 5, at 318; Zarembka & Franke, supra note 111, at 524-25.
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tor determined to punish childbearing HIV-positive women could
proceed on the theory that in order to have become pregnant, the
woman must have engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse which
constituted a criminal risk. A conviction could draw a sentence of up
to five years imprisonment'80 or a fine of five thousand dollars or
both.181
Although anonymous testing is available in three cities in
Missouri,182 once a person learns she has tested HIV-positive, she is
required by law to give notice of her HIV status to any health care
professional before the professional provides her with care. 8 3 In
turn, health care professionals who "perform or conduct HIV blood
sampling" are required to report to the Department of Health the
identity of any individual confirmed to be infected with HIV.'8 In
addition, courts are authorized to order HIV testing on nonconsent-
ing individuals when the Department of Health demonstrates that
there "are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual is in-
fected with HIV and there is clear and convincing evidence of a
serious and present health threat to others posed by the individual
if infected."'m In sum, Missouri law creates several avenues through
which a pregnant woman's HIV status could become known to state
health authorities and/or prosecutors. 186
Such application of criminal transmission statutes is not lim-
ited to theoretical possibility. On March 25, 1992, in Cumberland
County, North Carolina, Cassandra McLellan, an HIV-positive
pregnant woman, was sentenced to two years in prison for violation
of criminal transmission regulations issued by the state health
commission. 187 The regulations specified that she utilize condoms
and inform her partners of her HIV status whenever she engaged in
sexual intercourse." The evidence supporting this conviction was
180. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 191.677, 558.011.1(4) (1991).
181. Id. at § 560.011.1(1).
182. Id. at § 191.686.
183. Id. at § 191.656.5.
184. Id. § 191.653.3.
185. Id. at § 191.674.1. Pursuant to the same theoy as that discussed regarding
Illinois, it is not impossible that a judge would issue an order to test a pregnant woman.
186. Missouri's criminal penalties are triggered if the Department of Health files a
complaint with the prosecuting attorney "alleging that an individual has violated a provi-
sion" of the criminal transmission statute. Id. at § 191.677.3.
187. State v. McLellan, No. 92 CR 05684 (Gen. Ct. Justice Cumberland County, N.C.
Mar. 25, 1992), affd, No. 92 CR 05684 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1993) (transcript of bench
trial, judge's order of conviction and sentencing, and oral notice of appeal on file with the
Buffalo Law Review). Under North Carolina law, McLellan cannot be paroled unless a
District Court determines that she would "not create a danger to the public health." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-25(c) (Supp. 1991).
188. In this hastily conducted trial, District Court Judge Sol G. Cherry entered his
verdict at the close of the evidence by stating merely, "All right. Stand up. Stand up.
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testimony by the director of the county health department.189
Despite allegations that McLellan had been violating the crimi-
nal transmission regulations since she was first informed of them,
no charges were brought against her until she came to the public
health clinic requesting a pregnancy test which proved to be posi-
tive. 9 ' The State used McLellan's pregnancy as evidence that she
had violated the regulations requiring her to use a condom. While
the prosecution stressed that the criminal transmission regulations
were designed to protect the health of the HIV-infected person as
much as to prevent the transmission of the virus to others, 9 ' the
punitive aspect of enforcing the regulations belies this assertion.
Two years in the North Carolina Central Prison are unlikely to
benefit McLellan's health.192 Indeed, because her appeal was unsuc-
cessful,1 93 she could spend the rest of her life in prison. 194
Enter a verdict of guilty." Transcript of proceedings at 28-29, McLellan (No. 92 CR 05684).
At the opening of the trial, the assistant district attorney listed the charges against Ms.
McLellan as violations of N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 130A-144, 130A-145. These charges were
based on her failure to comply with quarantine and isolation orders and her violation of
health department control orders. Id. at 2. See N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15A, r. 19A.0202
(Dec. 1991) (stating that control measures for HIV require that infected persons shall: "(a)
refrain from sexual intercourse unless condoms are used; exercise caution when using
condoms due to possible condom failure.... (e) notify future sexual intercourse partners
of the infection").
189. When asked by the prosecutor: "If you're pregnant, you've had sex, basically?",
Dr. Jesse F. Williams, the Director of the County Health Department, answered
affirmatively. Transcript of proceedings at 9, McLellan (No. 92 CR 05684). The prosecutor
continued: "And would that be in violation of the rules that you had promulgated to Ms.
McLellan, Sir?" "That would be in violation of the rules," Dr. Williams replied. Id.
However, Dr. Williams did acknowledge under questioning that conception could result
from either artificial insemination, id., or condom failure. Id. at 5, 15-16. Additionally, he
admitted that the Health Department regards condoms as "more efficacious in prevention
of disease than they are in birth control." Id. at 15.
The only other trial witness was the public health nurse assigned to Ms. McLellan's
case who alleged that McLellan had initially refused to use condoms in April of 1990
when she was first informed of the criminal penalties attached to the health department
regulations requiring that she use them. Id. at 18, 24, 26. However, "she did come
around" and used them thereafter, id. at 26, though she was not informing her sex part-
ners of the fact that she was HIV-positive. Id. at 23-24.
190. Transcript of proceedings at 22, McLellan (92 CR 05684).
191. Id. at 11.
192. See Bruce Lambert, Prisons Criticized on AIDS Programs, Health and Legal
Experts Say Inmates with Disease Face a Disastrous Situation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1990,
at A16 (reporting that "among the problems health and prison officials cited [in testimony
before the National Commission on AIDS] were poor medical care and lack of medicine,
ostracism and harassment by prison employees and other prisoners"); see also T. Ford
Brewer & Janice Derrickson, AIDS in Prison, A Review of Epidemiology and Preventive
Policy, 6 AIDS 623 (1992) ("Each year, AIDS is becoming the leading cause of death for
more prison inmate populations.").
193.'Under North Carolina criminal procedure, having filed an appeal, McLellan was
entitled to a de novo trial by jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1447(a), -606 to -614 (1990).
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Fortunately, prosecution of IV-positive women for becoming
pregnant is likely to be judicially invalidated. As discussed in parts
IV and V respectively, such prosecutions would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment right to bear children and the Fourth
Amendment right to bodily integrity. In addition, the application of
particular state transmission statutes to pregnancy and perinatal
transmission could be vulnerable to invalidation on several other
grounds. First, the legislative history of the applied transmission
statute must be reviewed to determine whether application to preg-
nancy and perinatal transmission was intended. If not, lack of legis-
lative intent is a powerful argument against such application. To
date, in fact, every single challenged prosecution of women for using
drugs while pregnant has been dismissed, usually on the grounds of
lack of legislative intent.'95 In addition, since no transmission stat-
194. Depending upon the course of Ms. McLellan's HIV disease, her life expectancy
could be two years or less. The adverse health conditions inside prison may well shorten
that expectancy. See generally ROSEMARY L. Gmo & WILLIAM GAUNAY, NEW YORK STATE
COMMISSION OF CORRECTION, UPDATE ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME A
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF NEW YORK STATE INMATE MORTALITIES 1981-1986 (September,
1987) (stating that HIV-infected inmate survival rates in the New York State prison sys-
tem were less than half that of non-incarcerated HIV-infected people); Lambert, supra
note 192.
195. For cases citing lack of legislative intent, see Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 214 (1977) (unanimously holding that state felony child endangerment statute
was not intended to apply to unborn child, or to woman's prenatal conduct); People v.
Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego, Cal., Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987) (holding that criminal
child support statute that explicitly covered "child conceived but not yet born" was not in-
tended by legislature to impose additional legal duties on pregnant women); Johnson v.
State, 602 So.2d 1288, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (reversing conviction, finding unanimously "that
the legislative history does not show a manifest intent to use the word 'delivery' in the
context of criminally prosecuting mothers for delivery of a controlled substance to a minor
by way of the umbilical cord"); State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that state child abuse law was not intended to apply to pregnant woman who
uses drug); State v. Luster, No. A92A0233, and Luster v. State, No. A92A0415 (Ga. Ct.
App. April 23, 1992) (affirming trial court's dismissal of drug delivery charges, on grounds
that legislature did not intend statute to apply to perinatal transfer of cocaine); Welch v.
Commonwealth, No. 90-CA-1189-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 1992) (reversing criminal child
abuse conviction bf woman for using drugs during pregnancy, on grounds that statute did
not mention fetus and thus was not intended to apply to prenatal conduct);
Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970 (Mass. Oct. 15, 1990) (holding that state drug de-
livery statute was not intended to apply to women who give birth to substance-exposed in-
fants); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991), appeal denied, 471 N.W.2d
619 (Mich. 1991) (holding that statute prohibiting delivery of cocaine to children crime not
intended to apply to prenatal conduct); People v. Cox, No. 90-53545 FH (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Jackson County July 9, 1990), appeal docketed, No. 131 999 (Mich. Ct. App., Aug. 21,
1990) (granting motion to dismiss, on grounds that state drug delivery statute was not
intended to regulate prenatal conduct); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Mun.
Ct. 1992) (dismissing child welfare endangerment charge against woman who allegedly
smoked cocaine during pregnancy, on grounds that legislature excluded unborn children
from the statute); Commonwealth v. Smith, No. CR-91-05-4381 (Va. Cir. Ct., Franklin
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ute explicitly covers pregnancy or perinatal transmission, statutes
so applied would be vulnerable to vagueness challenges."s5
A further compelling argument for cases involving prosecution
for risk of perinatal transmission relies upon the fact that under
current law the fetus is not a person.'97 Yet all criminal transmission
County Sept. 23, 1991) (granting motion to dismiss, finding that state's child abuse
statute was not intended to apply to fetuses or prenatal conduct); Commonwealth v.
Turner, No. 91-054382 (Va. Cir. Ct., Franklin County, Sept. 16, 1991) (also granting
motion to dismiss, on same grounds as in Smith). Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-
01 (Va. Norfolk Juv. & Dom. Rel. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991) (dismissing" child abuse charges
against a woman who allegedly used cocaine during pregnancy, finding that its
application to these facts would contravene intent of the legislature).
See also, Greene, supra note 65, at 744 (noting that "developing weight of state court
authority rejects these criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers as beyond the leg-
islative intent of general drug prohibition and other statutes"). The only case cited by
Professor Green as an exception to this trend has been reversed by the Florida Supreme
Court, sub nom. Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
Charges have occasionally been dismissed on other grounds. See, e.g., State v.
Carter, No. 89-6274 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Escambia County July 23, 1990) (dismissing delivery of
illegal substance charges, on grounds that defendant could not, as a matter of law, have
had the intent to deliver cocaine through the umbilical cord to a person when she
ingested cocaine while pregnant); State v. Bremer, No. 90-32227-FH (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Muskegon County Jan. 31, 1991) (dismissing drug delivery charges on principles of
statutory construction, due process and privacy, holding that drug delivery law did not
cover ingestion of cocaine by pregnant woman); State v. Inzar, Nos. 90CRS6960 & 61
(Robeson County, N.C., Super. Ct. April 9, 1991) (dismissing charges of assault and
cocaine delivery, on grounds that a fetus is not a "person" within meaning of relevant
statutes); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1992) (finding, in addition
to lack of legislative intent, that woman's due process rights would be denied by reading
the term "child" to include a fetus); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (dismissing
child endangerment charge, on grounds that a fetus is not a "person," nor is a woman a
"parent," until time of birth).
196. The standard for vagueness is that:
[A] criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair no-
tice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute" or is so indefinite
that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for
vagueness. This appears to be especially true where the uncertainty induced by
the statute threatens to inhibit exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979) (citations omitted) (holding that a
Pennsylvania statute imposing a standard of care on a p6rson performing an abortion was
void for vagueness). Application of this principle could be extended to statutes which in-
hibit the constitutionally protected right of free choice in childbearing.
Clearly the ambiguity in criminal transmission statutes fails to give adequate notice
as to whether they apply to perinatal transmission. Enforcement is likely to depend upon
the views of local prosecutors, or, in election years, their understanding of public views
regarding childbearing by HIV-positive women. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1419
(regarding discriminatory enforcement in Pinellas County, Florida). Allowing such
application of criminal transmission laws would thus "impermissibly delegateD basic pol-
icy matters to [prosecutors,] policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (emphasis added).
197. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2848 (1992)
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statutes require risking transmission of HIV to "another person." "'
A creative prosecutor might attempt to proceed on the theory that
during the moments directly after birth before the neonate has had
the birthing blood washed off, there is a person to whom the risk of
HIV transmission is imposed. However, the fact that science cannot
accurately determine at what point perinatal transmission occurs-
at conception, during gestation, during birth, or immediately after
birth 99-- would mitigate against such an application of this stat-
ute.20 0 The requirement of exposing another "person" to the virus
should thus prevent such prosecutions.
In addition to challenging the application of a criminal trans-
mission statute to pregnancy, cases may present factual issues
which can lead to acquittal. For example, pregnancy does not consti-
tute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in
unprotected sexual intercourse and risked infecting her partner.
First she may have been artificially inseminated. Second, she and
her partner may have used condoms in order to avoid transmission,
but the condom failed.20' Third, the woman's partner may already
have been infected with EIV before the sex act which resulted in
conception. Fourth, because the risk of transmitting the virus during
one particular act of sexual intercourse is estimated to be only one in
500,202 the woman could have engaged in the act with the specific
intent of not infecting her partner, and the statistics would demon-
strate that this was not an unreasonable intent.
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "No member of this Court ... has
ever questioned our holding in Roe that an abortion is not 'the termination of life entitled
to Fourteenth Amendment protection." Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973)); id. at 2839 (Stevens,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[T]he unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.... MIlndeed no member
of the Court has ever questioned this fundamental proposition.").
198. See discussion supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 94.
200. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992) (noting that "no other
jurisdiction has upheld a conviction of a mother for delivery of a controlled substance to
an infant through either the umbilical cord or an in utero transmission").
201. See Elise F. Jones & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Contraceptive Failure Rates Based
on the 1988 NSFG, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 12, 12 (1992) (noting that 15% of condom users
became pregnant in the first year of use); Philip Kestelman & James Trussell, Efficacy of
the Simultaneous Use of Condoms and Spermicides, 23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 226, 226
(1991) (noting that the first-year failure rate for typical condom user is 12%); James
Trussell et al., Condom Slippage and Breakage Rates, 24 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 20, 20 (1992)
(noting that 7.9% of condoms either broke during intercourse or withdrawal, or slipped off
during intercourse; in addition, 7.2% slipped off during withdrawal).
202. Kestelman & Trussell, supra note 201, at 227 (stating that infectivity of HIV per
act of intercourse is 0.2%, regardless of sex of infected partner). It is considerably less
likely that an HIV-positive woman will transmit the virus to a man during sexual
intercourse than vice versa. Nancy S. Padian et al., Female-to-Male Transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 266 JAMA 1664 (1991).
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D. Public Health Law and Control of Childbearing
HIV-positive women, and indeed all childbearing women, could
be subject to a growing body of civil law which adopts or permits
coercive measures. These measures could range from mandatory
testing and treatment, to civil confinement.0 3
Florida and Delaware require that all pregnant women be
tested for lIV, regardless of consent.0 4 Additionally, New York and
203. Several state legislatures have acknowledged the deterrent effect of compulsory
HIV health measures. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 711(a) (Supp. 1992) (stating that
no court order for unconsented release of information on HIV infection shall be issued un-
less the court finds that a compelling need for release outweighs, inter alia, the harm to
the public of deterring future testing and treatment); FL. STAT. ANN. § 381.004(1) (West
Supp. 1992) ("The Legislature finds that despite existing laws, regulations, and
professional standards which require or promote the informed, voluntary, and confiden-
tial use of [HIV] tests ... many members of the public are deterred from seeking such
testing because they... fear that test results will be disclosed without their consent.");
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47(s)(2) (Michie Supp. 1992) (allowing court to order release of HIV
test results after weighing "compelling need" for disclosure against the "privacy interest
of the person identified by the information and the public interest which may be disserved
by disclosures which may deter voluntary tests"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 141.23(g)(1) (West
1989) (allowing a person demonstrating a compelling need, which cannot be accommo-
dated by other means, to access test results); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(9)(a)
(Mffichie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (providing that a person demonstrating a compelling need,
which cannot be accommodated by other means, can obtain a court order to have an
individual tested); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2785(5) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (providing
that the court shall weigh, inter alia, the "public interest which may be disserved by dis-
closure which deters future testing or treatment"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.243(c)(1)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (providing that the court shall weigh, inter alia,
the public interest which may be disserved by disclosure which deters future testing or
treatment); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 7602(c) (1993) (explaining that legislative intent in
providing guarantees of voluntariness and confidentiality in HIV testing is to "encourage
those most in need to obtain testing and appropriate counseling"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
29-136(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (permitting release of HIV records to law enforcement
agencies if the need for disclosure outweighs the potential harm from possible future de-
terrence of HIV testing); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705(a) (Supp. 1991) (requiring
disclosure of individually-identified HIV related testing or counseling information if there
is a demonstration of compelling need).
204. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §708 (Supp. 1992) (requiring prenatal blood test for
sexually transniitted diseases (STDs)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §711 (Supp. 1992)
(requiring that Division of Public Health records regarding STDs, "including infection
with human immunodeficiency virus ... shall be strictly confidential."); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, §1202(c)(5) (Supp. 1992) (providing for exception to specific consent requirement
for HIV testing pursuant to Chapter 7 when "[niecessary to control the transmission of
HIV infection"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.31 (West Supp. 1993) (mandating that anyone giv-
ing prenatal care to a woman must take the woman's blood sample and have it tested for
sexually transmitted diseases, "as required by the rule of the department"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 384.23 (West Supp. 1993) (defining sexually transmissible disease to include
human immune deficiency virus infection). Florida reportedly plans to screen only "high
risk women." Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS, Uses and Abuses, 16 A. J. L. & MED.
33, 95 (1990) (citing 1 MONA ROWE & CAITLIN RYAN, A PUBLIC HEALTH CHALLENGE:
STATE ISSUES, POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 2-28 (1987)). Because of the demographics of HIV
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New Jersey have considered, and Rhode Island has enacted, laws
which allow a health care provider to conduct an 1V test on an
infant without parental consent."' Such laws could have the same
effect as identifiable mandatory IV-screening of all women who
give birth in hospitals. North Carolina has enacted a measure which
permits mandatory testing of children upon "reasonable suspicion"
of HIV infection.0 6 Louisiana allows unconsented testing of children
when the attending physician "believes it is necessary to treat the
child."20 7
Mandatory testing policies specifying that newborns be tested
infection among women, targeting "high risk women" is equivalent to targeting poor
women and women of color. See supra notes 16-17.
Several other states have enacted statutes governing informed consent for HIV
testing which remove it from the common law norms of medical consent and could result
in unconsented HIV testing without the consent of childbearing women. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 22-11A-52 (Supp. 1992) (providing that consent to HIV test may be implied when
physician determines it is necessary because 1) patient is, "based upon reasonable
medical judgment at high risk for HIV infection; 2) [patient's] medical care may be modi-
fied by the presence or absence of HIV infection; 3) the HIV status of [patient] shall be
necessary in order to protect health care personnel from HIV infection"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 214.181 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (providing that general written consent to
health care is sufficient as long as the consent form specifies that HIV antibody testing
might be among the testing administered); MICH. COMiP. LAWS ANN. § 333.5133(2) (West
Supp. 1992) (requiring written informed consent for HIV testing unless the doctor or hos-
pital believes it necessary to test "for diagnostic purposes to provide appropriate care or
treatment" or in order to protect the health and or safety of other patients or persons pro-
viding care and treatment to the person to be tested); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3701.242(E)(5) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (requiring specific informed consent for HIV
testing, except that consent may be implied when general consent to health care is given
and the physician "determines the test is necessary for providing diagnosis and
treatment" to the subject of the test).
205. R.I. GEN. LAWS § § 23-6-12 to -14(a) (Supp. 1992) (providing that a health care
provider may conduct an HIV test without consent on a patient "under one year of age");
But see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-6-15 (1989) ("No involuntary testing for the AIDS virus shall
take place under any of the exceptions set forth in § 23-6-14 until reasonable efforts have
been made to secure voluntary informed consent."). In New York, all babies born in
hospitals have been tested for HIV antibodies without the knowledge or consent of the
mother since December, 1987. The results have been doubly blinded, and thus are not
traceable to the mother or the baby and have been used only epidemiologically. In June,
1989, however, the State Department of Health announced that it would unblind the new-
born testing program and offer mothers the option of learning their babies' results. When
greeted by strong opposition from women's advocates, this change of policy was tabled in
July, 1989. Babies AIDS Test to Remain Secret, NEWSDAY, July 7, 1989, at 6, 24. No
changes in the previous testing policy were made and thus consent is still not necessary
prior to testing. State of N.Y. Dep't of Health, Press Release 1 (June 15, 1989) (on file
with the Buffalo Law Review).
206. North Carolina permits testing without consent when a "parent or guardian has
refused consent to such testing and there is reasonable suspicion that the minor has
AIDS virus or HIV infection or that the child had been sexually abused." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-148 (1989).
207. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1300.13(F)(6) (West 1992).
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definitively reveal only a mother's antibody status. Although all
infants born to HIV-positive women will carry the HIV antibody
until approximately their eighth month of life, only thirty percent of
those infants will themselves develop the HIV infection.08 Newborns
do not develop immune systems independent of their mothers until
months after birth.0 9
Many states also have laws which, although not intended to
apply to perinatal transmission of HIV, might be misinterpreted to
permit health authorities to take action against pregnant or post-
partum HIV-positive women. Since 1987 a number of states have
enacted civil isolation measures authorizing the imposition of test-
ing, health care treatment, and/or confinement of people infected by
Iff[V 2 1 0 In some states, this has been accomplished by amending ex-
isting isolation laws dealing with "sexually transmitted" or
'venereal" disease so as to include HIV infection. 1 Some of these
laws permit treating or confining HIV-positive people based solely
on the fact that they are infected with a contagious disease.212 Other
208. See discussion supra note 94 and accompanying text.
209. Id. "Tests that detect ... antibodies ... accurately reflect maternal infection but
do not specifically identify infections in newborns and infants, who may carry passive ma-
ternal antibody well into the second year of life." Nolan, supra note 14, at 56.
210. Bayer, supra note 131, at 1502. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-9.5-4 to 9.5-9, 16-1-
10.5-8.5 to 10.5-20 (Burns Supp. 1992) (authorizing mandatory testing, treating,
detaining, and isolating upon court order, when the court finds either that: a person 1) is
a mentally ill carrier of dangerous communicable disease, including HIV, and is gravely
disabled or dangerous; or 2) is a carrier who presents a serious and present health threat
and who has violated a restrictive order issued by a health official); MICH. COmP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 333.5201 -.5205 (West Supp. 1992) (authorizing testing and treatment when an
individual infected with HIV is a "health threat to others"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145
(1989) (granting health authorities power to quarantine and isolate so long as public
health is endangered, all other reasonable means for correcting the problems have been
exhausted, and no less restrictive alternative exists); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.4-01
(1991) (providing that health officers can examine anyone "reasonably believed to be in-
fected with or to have been exposed to" HIV); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23.07.4-02 (Supp. 1990)
(permitting the state health officer or designee to petition the county court for injunction
and the court may take other appropriate measures including taking the person into cus-
tody, when imminent danger to the public health by HIV-positive person's behavior ex-
ists); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-70 to -115 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (providing for manda-
tory reporting, examination, treatment, isolation, and confinement of people with
sexually transmitted disease, including HIV); WYO. STAT. § 354-133 (Supp. 1991)
(authorizing health officers to isolate, examine, and treat individuals suspected of
infection with sexually transmitted disease).
211. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.410
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.5101(g) - .5111 (West Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-135 (1992); S.C. CODE REGS. 61-21(A)(1)(2),(B) (1992);
WYO. STAT. §§ 35-4-130(a),(b) (Supp. 1992).
212. See e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-603 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing health authorities,
when in their judgment it is necessary to protect the public health, to treat and or confine
"persons reasonably suspected of being IHTV-] infected"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-144, -145
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states have passed public health laws dealing with the AIDS virus,
that empower authorities to take action against known or suspected
HIV-positive individuals when they are believed to have engaged in
dangerous behavior.213 There are also public health laws in several
states which do not specifically mention HIV or AIDS, but which
would probably justify imposing health care on BIV-positive peo-
ple.214 In addition, several public health laws impose criminal penal-
(1989) (providing that the Commissioner for Health Services can order control measures
for HIV and other communicable disease, which doctors must in, pose on "patients
reasonably suspected of being infected or exposed"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-5-104 (Supp.
1992) (obligating local health officials to take steps to quarantine or isolate someone sus-
pected or known to be infected with "communicable contagious disease"). These laws seem
to permit the internment of almost any HIV-infected person for any reason, or indeed, for
no reason. Such status-based laws have been convincingly criticized and would have little
chance of surviving constitutional review. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1028, 1033-35; see
also Sullivan & Field, supra note 138, at 144-52 (addressing the shortcomings of a stat-
ute-based quarantine). Indeed, that these status-based laws survive at all is due to the
fact that they have yet to be challenged in court. Once challenged, at the very least, a
court should require that health authorities provide due process to the individual charged
and demonstrate that the HIV-infected individual presents a "significant risk" to the pub-
lic health. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1029-31, 1036-38. Because HIV is difficult to transmit
and does not spread through casual contact, health authorities would need to demon-
strate that the individual has engaged in behaviors which pose a risk of transmission.
Thus, if status-based statutes survive judicial scrutiny, they are likely to take on the form
and substance of behavior-based statutes. See Gostin, supra note 85, at 1033-35.
213. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-11A-32 (1990) (permitting civil commitment if "the
person is dangerous to himself and the health of the community" or if "the person
conducts himself so as to expose others to the disease"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-4-
1406, -1407 (West Supp. 1992) (holding that when a person is or is reasonably believed to
be infected with HIV, the state or local health department may order the person to be ex-
amined and tested, to visit a health worker's officer for counseling, or to cease and desist
from specified dangerous conduct; if a person violates a cease and desist order, personal
restrictions can be imposed as necessary to prevent dangerous conduct; and failure to
comply with the statute can result in criminal penalty); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.28 (West
Supp. 1993) (permitting a quarantine to prevent the "probable spread of a sexually
transmitted disease, until such time as the condition can be corrected or the threat to the
public's health eliminated or reduced"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.281 (West Supp. 1993)
(permitting prehearing detention of someone alleged to require quarantine if, inter alia,
the suspect engages "in behaviors which create an immediate and substantial threat to
the public" and refuses to conduct herself in such a manner as to not place others at risk);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441A.300 (lichie 1991) (permitting confinement when a person
with AIDS violates an order of a health authority or "engages in behavior through which
the disease may be spread").
214. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1028; Sullivan & Field, supra note 138, at 144 n.18. A
number of state statutes authorize health officials to control people with communicable
diseases and define communicable disease in such a way as to include HIV. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-221(b) (West Supp. 1992) (authoriiing health directors to order
that an individual be confined if there are reasonable grounds to believe he or she is in-
fected with a communicable disease and is unwilling or unable to act in a manner so as
not to expose others to danger of infection); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.4171-4186 (West
1989) (authorizing public health officials to issue orders and to apply for court enforce-
360 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
ties for violations of quarantine or control orders.215
AIDS-specific laws that are susceptible to misapplication to
childbearing include those which authorize civil confinement when
an H1V-positive person either generally engages in "dangerous con-
duct,"216 or performs specified dangerous acts such as refusing "to
comply with treatment measures."217 In the context of childbearing,
conceiving and/or continuing a pregnancy, thereby risking transmis-
sion to sex partners or risking the birth of HIV-infected children,
could be argued to be "dangerous conduct." Likewise, refusal to use
contraception or to submit to sterilization could be argued to be a
refusal of "treatment measures," and therefore, held to justify civil
confinement.
Unfortunately, civil containment laws could be misused to
require mandatory HIV-testing or contraceptive use, or to compel
abortion or sterilization. In addition, because the broad public
health powers have not been widely tested or circumscribed in re-
cent times, an ambitious or misinformed public health commissioner
could use them to attempt to quarantine or incarcerate an HIV-
positive woman.
ment of such orders for, inter alia, compulsory testing, treatment, and confinement when
they reasonably believe someone has a "communicable disease" and is a health threat to
others); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-501, 1-502 (West 1984) (permitting the prevention
and control of communicable disease); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.1-.20 (1993)
(authorizing health officers to isolate any person infected with a communicable disease
for safekeeping and treatment).
215. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-12-22 (1990) (stating that it is a misdemeanor to know-
ingly transport person or thing in violation of quarantine regulations); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-630 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-230 (West 1990) (making violations of
quarantine regulations subject to fines and imprisonment); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-17-8
(Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 24 (Smith-Hurd 1988) (making it a
misdemeanor to refuse to obey a rule of the Department of Public Health); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6005 (Supp. 1991) (including violating secretaries' rules as misdemeanors);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-25, -144, -145 (1992) (providing that a violation of a quarantine,
isolation, or control order is a misdemeanor); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.19 (1993)
(making it a misdemeanor for a person who is quarantined to leave the place of isolation
without the consent of the medical director); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-16 (1989) (stating
that a violation of quarantine regulations is subject to fines and imprisonment); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-5-104(b) (Supp. 1992) (making willful escape from lawful quarantine a
misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.24.024, -.034 (West Supp. 1993) (making it a
gross misdemeanor to violate health department orders regarding compulsory
examination, treatment, and detention); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6003-6005 (Supp.
1991) (permitting the Secretary to adopt rules for the prevention and control of AIDS and
providing that a violation of such rules is a misdemeanor).
216. See supra note 213.
217. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-107(1)(c) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-3
(Supp. 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 143.07 (2), (4), (5) (Michie 1989).
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E. Summary
A vocal minority of health policy experts now call for manda-
tory HIV-testing of all pregnant or post-partum women. Some policy
experts have proposed policies which would diminish informed con-
sent protections, and thus protections of bodily integrity, for HIV-
positive women regarding their childbearing. Thus, one expert advo-
cates directive counseling and another urges us to "rely on the ster-
ilization option." The view that HIV-positive women should not have
children is widespread. Included among the adherents to this view is
the CDC, which recommends that pregnancy be "postponed" if one is
HIV-positive. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such opinions are
reflected in gynecological obstetrical practice, though the extent of
the coercion of HIV-positive females has not yet been ascertained.
Concurrently, there is a move throughout the states to use law
enforcement powers to attempt to curb the spread of AIDS. Over
twenty states have passed laws specifically criminalizing behaviors
which risk HIV transmission. In addition, over twenty states have
passed public health laws authorizing the imposition of health care
on or the isolation of individuals who are HIV-positive and likely to
transmit the infection. It appears probable that law enforcement
authorities committed to using their power to prevent children from
becoming HIV-infected will attempt to apply such laws to the risks
of transmission associated with conception and childbearing.
In all likelihood, legal protections against state interference
with an individual's right to bear children will eventually be applied
to invalidate prosecution of pregnant HIV-infected women. These
protections will prevent the imposition of compulsory medical
treatment which would regulate an individual's childbearing.218 The
common law right to informed consent, the Fourteenth Amendment
protection from state interference in childbearing, and the Fourth
Amendment protection from state interference with bodily integrity
are powerful legal doctrines which should act to check the impulse to
control "socially unacceptable" childbearing. 19 However, as this
Article predicts, we are likely to observe an increase of such prosecu-
tions before they are curbed. History has a way of repeating itself.
218. See discussion infra parts IlH.V.
219. Additionally, like the criminal statutes, the civil statutes authorizing such
prosecutions may be vulnerable to challenges for lack of legislative intent and on
vagueness grounds. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc. 455 U.S. 489
(1981). Although the Supreme Court has "expressed greater tolerance of enactments with
civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are
qualitatively less severe," when civil measures, such as those affecting HIV childbearing,
"threaten to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights," they are required to
be exactingly precise to avoid vagueness invalidation. Id. at 499.
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III. THE RIGHT TO INFORMED CONSENT TO MEDICAL CARE
This part argues that the imposition of HIV testing, forced con-
traception, and involuntary abortion or sterilization will usually
violate state informed consent law, whether the health care provider
is a private or state actor. Although a patient's right to consent or
refuse medical care varies from state to state, and some states have
enacted exemptions affecting the medical rights of HIV-positive
childbearing women, most states follow common law consent doc-
trine. Under this doctrine, health care cannot be provided to a pa-
tient absent consent which is knowing, voluntary, and competent. 220
Thus, health care providers who impose unconsented HIV testing
(absent statutory authority), and those who pressure or compel
women to accept contraception, abortion or sterilization, will be
liable for medical malpractice. 221 Health care procedures can be per-
220. The specific legal requirements for informed consent vary from state to state as
it is determined either by the common law of each state, or as is increasingly the case, by
state statute. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE §
1.13.3 (2d ed. 1990); see also RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 30-34 (1986); THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 311 (1986); SHARON
RENNERT ET AL., Am. BAR ASS'N, AIDS AND PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES:
THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 37-42 (1989). Currently, the American Medical Association
(AMA) directs that "[t]he patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if
the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice .... The
physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the
therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice." THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL
AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS para.
8.08 (1989); see also 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL COMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT
IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 70 (1982) [hereinafter STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS]; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, STANDARDS FOR
OBSTETRIC-GYNECOLOGICAL SERVICES 88 (7th ed. 1989).
221. Depending upon state law and the circumstances of the case, civil actions could
be brought for assault, battery, violation of informed consent, and intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress. While it is difficult to predict how juries will evaluate
HIV-positive women's claims, damage awards in several related cases are instructive.
A woman contending that she had been forcibly tested for HIV when arrested in
1988 on charges of prostitution and reckless endangerment attained a tentative
settlement of her suit against the City of Honolulu in the amount of $50,000. Woman
Settles Suit Claiming Test for HIV Was Forced, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1992, § 1, at 36.
In 1990, a woman negligently subjected to an abortion without her consent was
awarded $5,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. In affirming the
jury's award, the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted that she had sought only a sec-
ond. opinion about whether to have an abortion when the doctor who examined her
performed the abortion. In sustaining the jury verdict, the court noted that "[s]he suffered
pain from the procedure without anesthesia; she was deprived of her right to choose the
doctor to perform her D & C; in addition she sustained emotional injury." Tisdale v.
Pruitt, 394 S.E.2d 857, 860 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
Although not specifically involving unconsented medical procedures, damages
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formed on a person absent her express consent pursuant to the doc-
trine of implied consent. Implied consent is applicable in certain
emergency circumstances or when a person is not competent to con-
sent. However, none of these traditional exceptions to the need for a
patient's express consent would justify intrusive medical procedures
such as compelled testing, contraception, or abortion. In states
which have legislatively removed portions of health care services
from consent law (i.e. by permitting unconsented HIV tsting of
pregnant women or newborns), medical malpractice claims may be
limited. However, even in states with such statutory exemptions,
informed consent norms still govern the administration of most
types of health care, including the prescription or implant of contra-
ceptives, abortion, or sterilization. In the absence of statutory over-
ride, traditional informed consent norms are powerful deterrents to
imposing unwanted health care procedures upon IHV-positive
women.2
This part also explains in detail why two exceptions to the
requirement of informed consent-that of overriding a parent's
refusal to consent to health care for a child, and that of the state's
power to impose medical treatment when there is a proven compel-
ling need to protect the public health-are unlikely to justify impos-
awarded in other pregnancy related cases may shed some light on the amounts that
might be obtained. A judge delineated $450,000 of a pain and suffering award as
compensation for the mental anguish of losing a fetus through miscarriage when a
woman bus driver was not assigned to light duty when she requested the assignment as
an accommodation to her high risk pregnancy. New York City Transit Authority v. State
Division of Human Rights, 581 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 1992); see also Planned
Parenthood of N.W. Indiana v. Vires, 543 N.E.2d 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (awarding
$60,000 to a woman who had an IUD negligently inserted while pregnant; insertion of the
IUD caused her to miscarry, which necessitated a follow up D & C). See generally Schneck
v. Government of Guam, 609 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing judgment that hospital
had no duty to supervise treatment given by a private physician); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383
So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App.) (awarding $20,000 for pain and suffering to a woman for the
loss of her six month pregnancy as a result of a blow sustained to her abdomen in a car
accident).
One would expect relatively greater awards when interference with childbearing is
intentional, when it is carried out with force, and when it involves higher degrees of in-
tervention. Thus, damages from unconsented HIV testing would be valued lower than
damages from unconsented abortion. Damages from a medical procedure carried out after
a patient "consents" where she had been momentarily persuaded by directive counseling
would be valued lower than damages from a procedure carried out by forcibly anesthetiz-
ing a patient who had refused consent.
222. Informed consent analysis will often be crucial to Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment analyses. While this Article argues that government imposed Norplant inser-
tion and compulsory abortion violate both the Fourteenth Amendment right to bear chil-
dren and the Fourth Amendment right to bodily integrity, a complete defense against
such claims would be that the woman freely consented to these health care procedures.
See discussion infra parts IV-V.
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ing coercive measures on HI V-positive women to prevent their
childbearing.
A. Overview of Informed Consent Law
The right to medical consent derives from the common law
right to bodily integrity and self-determination.22 3 It has been recog-
nized in United States law for over one hundred years,2 and in the
1970's became codified in more than half of the states.
225
In one of the earliest informed consent decisions, the Appellate
Court of Illinois in Pratt v. Davis22 recognized the fundamental role
of medical consent in our democracy:
[Ujnder a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest
right, which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his per-
son, in other words, his right to himself-is the subject of universal acqui-
escence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however
skillful or eminent... to violate without permission the bodily integrity of
his patient.... 22
While the earliest cases stood for the proposition that surgery
could not be performed unless the patient specifically agreed to the
procedure, informed consent doctrine has developed2 8 to require
that consent to all medical treatments be knowing, voluntary and
competent.
A final general point relevant to this discussion is that a
223. "[The] notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that
informed consent is generally required for medical treatment." Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
224. "No right is held more sacred... than the right of every individual to the pos-
session and control of his own person." Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (holding that civil plaintiff could not be compelled to undergo medical examina-
tion). The Supreme Court quoted this language almost 100 years later. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. at 269.
The protections afforded by the doctrine of informed consent are intimately con-
nected to the right to self-determination and are recognized as essences of liberty. Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) ("That
the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as
the common law."); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("Anglo-American
law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each
man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, ex-
pressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment.").
225. Between 1975 and 1977, 24 states enacted informed consent legislation. JAY
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 81 (1984); see Alan Meisel & Lisa D.
Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41
U. PrIT. L. REV. 407, 417 (1980).
226. 118 Ill. App. 161 (App. Ct. 1905), affd, 79 N.E. 562 (Ill. 1906).
227. Id. at 166.
228. See generally KATZ, supra note 225, at 48-84 (tracing the historical development
of the right to informed consent).
1993] CONTROL OF HIV-POSITIVE WOMEN 365
woman's right to medical consent is not diminished by pregnancy.m
Medical treatment cannot be forced upon or withheld from a preg-
nant woman without her consent in the purported interest of the
fetus. This is because a person cannot be compelled to undergo "a
significant intrusion upon his or her bodily integrity for the benefit
of another person's health." " In addition, the fetus has not even
been held to be a person. As the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals explained, "[surely... a fetus cannot have rights... supe-
rior to those of a person who has already been born."231 Moreover,
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
state's interest in fetal life cannot justify imposing increased health
risks on women.1 2 Thus, the governmental interest in the fetus
* cannot override a woman's right to refuse medical intervention.
B. The Knowledge Requirement Prohibits Coercion
The goal of the informed consent dialogue is to ensure that the
health professional imparts all of the relevant medical knowledge to
the patient concerning her health situation and treatment options
which will enable the patient to make an informed choice about the
best course of action to pursue.ms The treatment options discussed
229. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C.
1990). Indeed, because many informed consent protections have developed from cases
concerning women subjected to reproductive coercion, it would be inconsistent if
reproductive health were accorded lesser protection. See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562
(111. 1906) (holding a doctor liable for performing an operation without consent when a
woman sought treatment for epilepsy;, the physician told her he needed to do surgery in
order to repair a few superficial cervical and rectal tears, and the physician subjected her
to a hysterectomy and removal of her ovaries); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md.
1977) (discussing whether physician had disclosed information necessary for informed
consent decision in tubal litigation operation).
230. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44 (citations omitted); see also McFall v. Shimp, 10
Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (holding that a person could not be
compelled to donate bone marrow necessary to save life of a cousin).
231. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244 (holding that compelling a woman to undergo a
Cesarean section in the interest of her fetus violated her medical consent and constitu-
tional rights).
232. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979); see Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2822 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-
63(1973).
233. Canterbury v. Itch, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972) (observing the need to afford patient the "opportunity to evaluate knowledge-
ably the options available and the risks attendant upon each"); see also Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 n.8 (1976) (interpreting the word
"informed" in statute requiring informed consent to abortion as meaning knowledge about
the proposed medical treatment and its risks); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (including communication of the risks
and benefits of and alternatives to that treatment as part of informed consent).
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must also include the alternative of foregoing any treatment at all.
234
Moreover, except in a limited set of exceptions discussed below, the
option of rejecting all treatment is the patient's to pursue. This is
true even if the health care provider disagrees and even when such a
course is likely to result in the patient's death.235
The knowledge element requires that information concerning
treatment alternatives be communicated "in language as simple as
necessary" for the particular patient to understand.3 The aims of
this requirement are twofold. First, it ensures that the patient un-
derstands the information conveyed by the professional. Second,
simple language encourages the patient to engage in candid dia-
logue with the provider about her health history and life circum-
stances. This dialogue enhances the professional's ability to accu-
rately evaluate the patient's condition and describe the possible
risks and benefits of various treatments. This maximizes the accu-
racy of the description of the risks and benefits, and therefore, better
fulfills the knowledge requirement.
Varying levels of specificity of consent are required depending
upon the type of procedure involved. In circumstances when a rou-
tine health care procedure promises practically universal benefit
and minimal risk, a patient's consent may be implied when the pa-
tient has consented to receiving general health care from that
provider.27 Many types of routine blood tests, such as those gener-
234. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270, 277 (1990).
235. Id. at 281 (observing that "an interest in refusing life sustaining medical treat-
ment" is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); In re A.C.,
573 A.2d 1235, 1243-47 (D.C. 1990); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71 (N.Y. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SuSTAINING TREATMENT 44 (1983); Norman L. Cantor, A Patient's Decision
to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life,
26 RUTGERS L. REV. 228, 237 (1973); Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right to Die: An
Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 58
U. CIN. L. REV. 1367 (1990).
236. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960); see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §
441.257 (a)(2), (3) (1991) (specifying that, in the case of sterilization of a Medicaid patient,
suitable arrangements be made to ensure effective communication "to any individual who
is blind, deaf or otherwise handicapped," and, if the "individual to be sterilized did not
understand the language used on the consent form or the language used by the person ob-
taining consent," an interpreter must be provided); President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medical and Behavioral Research, The Values Underlying
Informed Consent (1982), reprinted in THE CRISIS IN HEALTH CARE: ETHICAL ISSUES 217,
220 (Nancy F. McKenzie ed., 1990); see also GRISSO, supra note 220, at 323 (noting that a
patient's lack of awareness of her own treatment and condition might be a consequence of
the manner in which the treating professional disclosed the information to the patient, as
opposed to the patient's incompetency).
237. RENNERT, supra note 220, at 42. But see Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in
the Prescription Drug Context, 61 WASH. L. REv. 367 (1986) (arguing that specific
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ally administered in a woman's first prenatal checkup, do not cur-
rently require specific consent."5 However, consent should never be
implied for sterilization, abortion, contraception, or HIV testing.
For over one hundred years the law has held that consent can-
not be implied for surgical intervention. 9 Thus, prior to steriliza-
tion or abortion, there must be a detailed dialogue between health
professional and patient culminating with the granting of specific
consent by the patient.240 Although the insertions of Norlplant or of
an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) are arguably less inva-
sive, they are still surgical procedures. Thus, specific consent would
be required prior to insertion of these devices. 1 Significantly, while
not invasive at all, the prescription of birth control pills is recog-
nized to require a woman's specific informed consent. 2
Finally, the HIV antibody test should also require specific con-
sent because of its potentially grave psychological and social signifi-
cance. Indeed, as of April 14, 1993, thirty states recognized this by
enacting statutes requiring that physicians ordinarily obtain specific
consent before conducting an HIV antibody test.243 Many hospitals
also have issued their own IRV testing consent policies.2" Moreover,
informed consent should be required for all proposed drug treatments because all drugs
present risks and are "dangerous," drug therapy is less predictable than surgery, drugs
are grossly over utilized, and the potential benefits of drugs vary widely).
238. See RENNERT, supra note 220, at 42.
239. Katz, supra note 225, at 48-84.
240. In some jurisdictions, sterilization has been recognized to be so integral to the
right to self-determination and so susceptible to coercion, that specific informed consent is
mandated by statute or regulation. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-
107(F)(1XI)&(II) (1990) (disallowing consent of substitute decisionmaker for abortion or
sterilization). Following the revelations of widespread sterilization abuse against
Medicaid patients in the 1970's, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
adopted regulations mandating specific informed consent for sterilization. LINDGREN &
TAUB, supra note 28, at 415-16. These regulations were later enacted as local law by the
New York City Council, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 17-404 (1991) (requiring, along with both
Health and Hospital regulations, that specific consent for the procedure be obtained from
the patient in writing thirty days before the actual operation and that the patient not be
hospitalized at the time the consent is given). The regulations served as the basis for fed-
eral regulations for Medicaid funded sterilization and hysterectomies. 42 C.F.R. §§
441.257, .258 (1991).
241. See Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a
physician's failure to warn a woman of the risks of an IUD violated his duty to obtain in-
formed consent).
242. Klink v. G.D. Searle & Co., 614 P.2d 701 (Wash. 1980) (holding that physician's
failure to warn a woman of risk of stroke from contraception pill violated physician's duty
to obtain informed consent); see also Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1976)
(holding that a physician's failure to warn women of risk of birth control pills violated his
duty to obtain informed consent).
243. RENNERT, supra note 220, at 42 (citations omitted); see infra table II.
244. Charles E. Lewis & Kathleen Montgomery, The HIV-Testing Policies of U.S.
Hospitals, 264 JAMA 2764 (1990) (concluding from survey that 78% of nonfederal
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the major legal and medical bodies that have considered the
question concur that consent to the HIV antibody test must be
specific. These include the American Public Health Association,
AMA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, and the AMA Center
on Children and the Law, and the National Academy of Sciences'
National Institute of Health.?5
C. The Requirement of Voluntariness
A physician is not permitted to "[slubstitute his own judgment
for that of the [competent] patient by any form of artifice or decep-
tion." 6 Because we as a people attach "profound importance and
authority to the words of advice spoken by the physician,"241 the
hospitals nation-wide have promulgated policies requiring specific informed consent prior
to conducting an HIV antibody test).
245. The following groups oppose testing without the consent of the woman: The
Committee on Prenatal and Newbor Screening for HIV Infection of the Institute of
Medicine: HIV Screening of Pregnant Women and Newborns (Hardy ed., 1991); The
Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, HIV Infection,
Pregnant Women and Newborns, 264 JAMA 2416 (1990); American Academy of
Pediatrics, Task Force on Pediatric AIDS, Perinatal Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection, 82 PEDIATRICS 941 (1988); American Pub. Health Ass., APHA Policy Statement
#8814, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 340, 359 (1989) (specifying that counseling and testing for
perinatal transmission of AIDS should be "voluntary," the provision of information should
be "nonjudgmental and sensitive to cultural, parous, life-status and age factors," and that
counseling and health care be available regardless of the decisions a woman makes;
calling on CDC to develop standards for HIV test counseling for pregnant and childbear-
ing age women, "noting cases where women have been denied funding for abortion of
"alleged HIV-positive fetus unless it is part of a sterilization procedure"); RENNERT ET AL.,
supra note 220; SECRETARY'S WORK GROUP ON PEDIATRIC HIV INFECTION AND DISEASE,
DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, FINAL REPORT (1988) [hereinafter WORKING
GROUP, POLICY PROPOSAL]; NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRENATAL CARE (Irwin R. Merkatz et
al. eds., 1990); Ruth R. Faden et. al., supra note 14, at 331 (rejecting "implementation of
counseling and screening policies that interfere with women's reproductive freedom or re-
sult in the stigmatization of vulnerable social groups" and endorsing informed consent for
HIV testing, which consent should include an explanation of the "limits of confidentiality,
associated social risks, available antidiscrimination protections .... available anonymous
testing services". and available health care for her and/or any child she may birth); see
also Health and Policy Committee, American College of Physicians & The Infectious
Diseases. Society of America, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and
Infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
460, 464 (1988) (opposing mandatory HIV testing because "it is widely believed, that such
an approach would only drive potentially HIV-infected persons away from the health care
system").
246. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
247. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "In our
society, the doctor/patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship of trust. The
specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress often attendant to
health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete confidence, and often
their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals." Id. In the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not disagree with Justice Blackmun, but avoided the issue by find-
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health care provider must exercise great care to impart knowledge
to the patient without attempting to direct the result. Evidence of
coercion, duress, undue influence, or deceit negate a person's con-
sent.25
When the patient has restricted access to alternative sources
for treatment, health professionals are not permitted to deliver ul-
timata that a patient must accept a particular course of treatment or
seek treatment elsewhere.4 9 Nor may professionals invoke the re-
traction of any other benefit from the patient (i.e. welfare subsidies,
child custody) as a consequence of refusing a recommended treat-
ment.250 Several states have specifically codified this principle in
regard to EIV testing and prohibit conditioning the receipt of health
care on the acceptance of IIIV testing or proof that one is HIV nega-
tive.251
The aspect of voluntariness also requires that professionals
may not withhold or give inaccurate information about potential
ing that the challenged regulations did not "significantly impinge upon the doctor-patient
relationship." Id. at 1776; see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791, 2824 (1992) (joint opinion) (holding that because of its legitimate interest in
protecting fetal life, the state can require a doctor to inform an abortion patient of the
availability of materials concerning the impact of a procedure on the fetus, even though
"in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion"). However,
Casey's rationale would not permit an individual physician to express a preference
against an HIV-positive woman bearing a child. Moreover, because the State has no
legitimate interest in preventing the birth of potentially HIV-positive babies, see infra
part IV.A.1-2, it could not enact a requirement that physicians express such a preference.
248. See Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989); Relfv. Weinberger,
372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
106 (4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-3 (Burns Supp. 1992) (defining in-
formed consent to be consent free from "any form of force, fraud, constraint, deceit, duress
or coercion").
249. ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 1.4.2. But cf. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 613
(4th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978) (stating that "[wie perceive no reason
why Dr. Pierce could not establish and pursue the policy he has publicly and freely an-
nounced" of refusing-obstetric care to Medicaid patients with two or more children unless
they consented to be sterilized).
250. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196; see also Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 49
(4th Cir. 1975) (finding that a complaint alleging violation of right to bear children when
social worker threatened to cut family from welfare rolls if daughter was not sterilized
was not time barred).
251. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-582(b) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that
"informed consent to an HIV-related test shall include.., acknowledgment that consent
to an HIV test is not a precondition to receiving health care"); MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-
GEN. § 18-336(c) (1990) (stating that "refusal to consent to the HIV antibody test or a
positive test result may not be used as the sole basis.., to deny services or treatment);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.245(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (prohibiting public agencies
from requiring HIV results to be provided to obtain services); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
1128(a) (Supp. 1992) (prohibiting health care providers from making an HIV test a
condition for receiving unrelated treatment).
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risks and benefits because this might sway a patient's decision.
Hence, a pregnant HIV-positive woman should be informed in com-
prehensible terms of the range of odds that her child might be HIV-
infected. She should also be told that while the impact of continuing
a pregnancy is unknown, there is some evidence that pregnancy can
jeopardize her health through escalation of HIV replication and the
normal suppression of the immune function associated with preg-
nancy.252
In one particularly relevant case, a court held that a cause of
action was stated for medical malpractice and violation of civil
rights when a doctor allegedly engaged in extensive directive coun-
seling. An HIV-positive woman alleged that her doctor counseled her
that there was a "very high chance" that her baby would be born
with AIDS, that AIDS was worse than spina bifida for a child, that
her baby would suffer and be a burden to society, and that she
should have an abortion and could not continue receiving prenatal
care in his hospital." s
A far subtler pressure than that exerted in Doe v. Jamaica
Hospital can undermine a woman's free will. In the words of Justice
Blackmun: "One seeks a physician's aid not only for medical advice
or diagnosis, but also for guidance, professional judgment, and vital
emotional support.""4 A woman could be particularly susceptible to
such pressure when she is confronting the emotionally-laden deci-
sion about whether to become pregnant or to continue a pregnancy
despite HIV infection.
D. The Requirement of Competence
The element of competence is of vital importance to under-
standing the consent rights of HIV-infected women.2s "[Clompe-
tency... turns on the patient's ability to function as a decision-
252. See Lindgren et al., supra note 94, at 1115.
253. Doe v. Jamaica Hosp., No. 31248/89 slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings County, April
29, 1991) (granting partial summary judgement motion but holding cause of action
existed as to discrimination in access to public accommodation and as to negligent
infliction of emotional distress).
254. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct. at 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. An HIV-positive woman's competence to consent or refuse health care may often
be at issue. Forty-nine percent of reported HIV-positive women had been intravenous
drug users. See Centers for Disease Control, Childbearing and Contraceptive Use Plans
Among Women at High Risk for HIV-Infection - Selected U.S. Sites - 1989.1991, 41
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 135, 135 (1992). Presumably, many of these women
are addicted to drugs, and the course of HIV disease often includes toxoplasmosis or other
dementia-inducing conditions. Because of the practically universal disapproval for HIV-
positive women's decisions to bear children, those decisions themselves might be relied
upon to label particular women incompetent and to seek to override their decisions.
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maker, acting in accordance with her preferences and values."2 6 In
order for consent to be informed, it must be delivered by a patient
capable of "the informed exercise of a choice and that entails an
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the
risks attendant upon each." -
" A patient is presumed th be capable of providing consent or
refusal in the absence of a legal decree of incompetency or some
other legal status of incompetence (i.e. infancy).2 8 However', in cases
where the patient is not competent to decide, either permanently or
temporarily, the duty of health care providers to obtain informed
consent is altered. 9 The diminution of this duty depends on the
nature of the incapacity, the urgency of the need for the proposed
treatment, and the availability of a substitute decisionmaker.
When a patient is temporarily incapacitated and the health
care is not of an emergency nature, the proposed health care must
be delayed until such time as the patient is capable of providing
either informed consent or refusal. 260 However, the law is different
256. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990) (emphasis added).
257. Canterbury v. Itch, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); see Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (1914) (requiring
patient to be "of sound mind").
258. "It is improper to presume that a patient is incompetent." In re A.C., 573 A.2d at
1247. Apatient "is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that he is medically competent
until such time as his incompetence is properly adjudicated." United States v. Charters,
829 F.2d 479, 495 (4th Cir. 1987). This presumption applies even when a patient is
committed to a mental hospital and even when a patient is undergoing electroshock tre-
atment. Lefebvre v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(denying petition by hospital to perform abortion on psychotic woman who was
involuntarily committed because the woman had not been properly declared incompetent
to make her own decision); ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, §§ 1.6, 1.7.
The fact that someone is deemed legally incompetent to make one type of
decision, such as disposition of assets, does not dictate that she is incapable of providing
informed consent to health care. RENNERT ET AL., supra note 220, at 38; ROZOVSKY, supra
note 220, § 1.5.1. The treating professional must make an individualized assessment of
the patient's competency to provide consent, unless a specific court decree has declared
the patient incapable of making all health care decisions. The refusal to consent to
recommended treatment based on sound medical advice does not necessarily indicate that
the patient is incompetent, however irrational that choice may seem. Lane v. Candura,
376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that patient had the right to
make her own decision regarding life-saving treatment, regardless of whether decision
was wise or unwise). As long as the patient has the mental capacity to understand the na-
ture and consequences of authorizing treatment, his or her consent to or refusal of care is
valid.
259. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 146.025(3) (Supp. 1992) (permitting HIV tests without
consent on institutionalized mentally ill or developmentally disabled people who engage
in behavior posing a significant risk of transmitting HIV).
260. If a woman is so intoxicated that she is incompetent to make health care deci-
sions, the non-emergency decision must be postponed until the effect of the drug has worn
off and the patient is again capable. ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 1.6; see also 41 AM. JUR.
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when a patient is unable to provide consent or refusal in emergency
care circumstances, and a legally-authorized substitute decision-
maker is not readily available to provide consent, or when the time
constraints of the emergency care preclude dialogue. Then, health
care professionals are authorized to proceed with the emergency
care under the guise of implied consent.2 1 However, they cannot also
carry out an elective procedure that is not essential to the emer-
gency care under the guise of implied consent.26' Implied consent for
emergency treatment is deemed to exist when an incompetent pa-
tient is suffering from a life or health threatening disease or injury
that requires immediate treatment.263
Thus, emergency circumstances will rarely, if ever, justify test-
ing a woman for HIV antibodies.2 4 There are no cures for IV infec-
2D Incompetent Persons § 78 (1968) (noting that people addicted to drugs are at times
mentally infirm and at other times sober and rational-a deed or contract executed by an
alcoholic, for example, would be valid if executed while she was sober and in possession of
her faculties). There are varying degrees of intoxication and "mere intoxication" does not
render someone incompetent to enter contracts or execute deeds. A person must be so in-
toxicated that she is unable to grasp or comprehend the consequences of her acts before
she is deprived of contractual capacity. Id. § 76. Likewise, a patient temporarily
incapacitated by shock or a temporary physical condition, such as childbirth, must be
given time to physically recover and make her own non-emergency decisions. See
ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 1.6; see also Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1199
(1974) (holding consent to be invalid where women had been induced to give consent to
tubal ligations while in labor).
261. ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, §§ 1.16.3, 2.3 (noting that some states have codified
this doctrine); see also Crouch v. Most, 432 P.2d 250, 254 (N.M. 1967) (holding that no
consent is necessary in actual emergency where the patient is in no condition to make a
judgement).
262. ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 2.2.2.
263. Id. at 106-10.
264. Nor would emergency circumstances justify unconsented emergency testing of
newborn children. See infra part III.E for a discussion of substitute decision-making for
health care treatment for children.
In addition, the fact that a woman needs emergency medical care for a non-HIV
related condition would not, under traditional norms, justify conducting an HIV antibody
test without her consent due to temporary incapacity. All medical procedures require em-
ploying universal precautions. Thus, concern for the protection of the patient or the
health care provider should not justify imposing an HIV antibody test on an incapacitated
patient. However, several states have statutes authorizing emergency testing to facilitate
the care of a patient. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (Burns Supp. 1992); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.181(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-
F:5(V) (1990) (permitting HIV test to be administered if patient is incapable and when
test is "immediately necessary to protect the health of the person"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
2B-5(B) (Michie 1991) (permitting lack of informed consent when subject is unable to
grant or withhold consent and test is "necessary for medical diagnostic purposes to pro-
vide appropriate emergency care or treatment"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-148(h) (Supp.
1991) (authorizing health care providers to conduct an HIV antibody test in emergency
circumstances when a patient is incapacitated and it is "necessary for appropriate
diagnosis or care of the person"); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(1) (Baldwin Supp.
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tion, and none of the HIV related treatments are known to dramati-
cally increase their efficacy when administered without any delay. 65
Waiting to test until after consent has been obtained, after the
emergency situation has passed, will not be detrimental to a pa-
tient's condition relative to HIV. Emergency circumstances would
thus only justify unconsented HIV testing when the knowledge of
the patient's H-V status is necessary to treat the emergency condi-
tion itself.
When emergency circumstances do not preclude it, the consent
of a substitute decision-maker must be sought when a patient is
incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of author-
izing treatment.66 In a majority of states, the substitute decision-
1990) (allowing HIV test to be administered absent consent when "medically necessary to
avoid or minimize immediate danger to the health or safety of the individual to be tested
or another individual"). Some statutes authorize emergency testing to inform a health
care worker of a patient's HIV status after accidental exposure. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-2B-
5(D) (Michie 1991) (permitting unconsented testing when test is necessary to provide ap-
propriate care to health care woKker exposed to blood or body fluids and subject is
incapable of consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.24.2(E)(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1990)
(permitting unconsented testing when health care worker or emergency worker has sus-
tained a significant exposure to body fluids of individual while rendering assistance to
him and he has refused consent). The existence of such laws implies that these
legislatures believe that emergency circumstances may occur which could justify
conducting an HIV antibody test without specific consent.
265. Although the administration of AZT may delay the immune system's decline,
and aerosolized pentamidine may prevent PCP pneumonia, the efficacy of these
treatments has not been shown to be significantly compromised if administered a day or
so later. Mark H. Jackson, The Criminalization of HIV, in AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING
ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 239, 255; see Steven Eisenstat, An Analysis of
the Rationality of Mandatory Testing for the HIV Antibody: Balancing the Governmental
Public Health Interests with the Individual's Privacy Interest, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 327, 360
(1991) (stating that AZT has not been shown to be more effective when commenced within
two weeks rather than six months after exposure to the virus).
266. Many state legislatures define who is authorized to act on behalf of an incapaci-
tated patient. See infra table I. In the absence of specific statutes defining who can pro-
vide substitute consent for health care, state law addressing the appointment of a
guardian or conservator would determine who should make health care decisions. E.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2001 to -2085 (1989).
Even when a substitute decision-maker has been authorized to provide consent for
an incapacitated patient, a court order is required in many states for particularly
intrusive medical treatments which affect fundamental rights (i.e. sterilization, abortion
and refusal of life-saving treatment). RENNERT ET AL., supra note 220, at 40; e.g., Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841, (1990) (permitting withdrawal of life-sav-
ing treatment with a court order); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978)
(requiring a court order to perform sterilization despite consent of authorized substitute
decision-maker); Lefebvire v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., -566 So. 2d 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (stating that a court, before granting incapacitated person's guardian
authority to consent to an abortion, must be persuaded by clear and convincing proof that
it is in the best interests of the incapacitated person); D.R. v. Daughters of Miriam Center
for the Aged, 589 A.2d 668 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1990) (granting guardian permission to obtain
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maker has a duty to attempt to replicate the choice that the patient
herself would have made. 7 Thus, when a patient's actual wishes
are unknown, a substitute decision maker could consent to a par-
ticular health care procedure in the belief that the patient herself
would have consented. However, substitution can never be utilized
to override a patient's known informed refusal of a particular treat-
ment.
268
E. The Doctrine of Override of Parental Refusal to Consent2 9
The inviolate right to refuse medical treatment is tempered
when a parent refuses care for a child,2 70 as opposed to care for her-
abortion for incompetent ward requires examination of ward's best interests); In Re
Grady, 426 A.2d 467 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that sterilization is a privacy right pro-
tected by federal and state constitutions, and may not be authorized for an incompetent
unless there is clear and convincing proof that sterilization is in person's best interests).
267. RENNERT ET AL., supra note 220, at 40; see City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945). Other jurisdictions require the decision-maker to act
in the best interest of the ward based on what a "reasonable, competent person" would do
under the circumstances. A third approach requires the guardian to carry out the wishes
of the ward when they are known, and otherwise to do what is in the best interest of the
ward. RENNERT ETAL., supra note 220, at 39-40.
268. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249 (D.C. 1990); STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra
note 220, at 56; see also RENNERT ETAL., supra note 220, at 40.
269. Several states also recognize a "therapeutic privilege exception" to the require-
ment of obtaining a patient's informed consent. See ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 2.4. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (1976). Under this doctrine, a physician is relieved of the
duty to disclose risks of a proposed procedure when he or she makes the professional
judgment that the patient will be so upset by the disclosure that it would have a serious
adverse impact on the patient's health. However, this "exception" cannot be invoked to
justify withholding information from a patient in order to induce the patient to consent or
to disregard a patient's consent or refusal. It merely permits the professional to make a
medical judgment (which must conform to professional standards) about the appropriate
information to disclose for a particular patient, given her circumstances. For this reason,
this Article does not address the therapeutic privilege as an exception to the requirement
for a patient's informed consent.
270. Children are generally deemed incapable to consent to health care until they
reach the age of majority. In most states the age of majority is 18. RENNERT ET AL., supra
note 220, at 39. However, many states have enacted statutes enabling capable minors to
consent to health care under various circumstances. Some statutes give minors that are
judged by the health care professional to be mature enough to fulfill the requirements of
informed consent authority to consent to any type of health care. See AIDS Policy Center,
George Washington Univ., States That Specifically Allow Minors to Consent to HIV/STD
Testing, August 1992 (unpublished data on file with the Buffalo Law Review). Many
states recognize the "emancipation" of minors who can then consent to their own health
care and some permit minors to consent to health care for their own children. RENNERT
ET AL., supra note 220, at 39; e.g., CAL. HEALTH SAFETY § 199.27(a)(1) (West 1990)
(deeming minor incompetent to consent to HIV test only if under 12 years of age); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 141.22(6) (West Supp. 1992) (stating that minor can consent to contraceptive
services, or screening or treatment for AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, but
parent or guardian will then be informed of a positive HIV test); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
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self. 1 The Supreme Court has recognized that the state's interest in
safeguarding children's health is sufficiently weighty to justify
infringing on a parent's fundamental rights in certain strictly cir-
cuMscribed situations. In Prince v. Massachusetts,72 the Court held
that a parent could be prohibited from using a child to distribute
religious literature on the street for long hours. In so holding, the
Court stated that "the right to practice religion freely does not in-
clude liberty to expose... the child... to ill health or death. 273
State courts have relied upon this holding to override a parent's
refusal to consent for medical care for a child if the child's life is
greatly and immediately endangered and the proposed medical
treatment is likely to alleviate the danger by curing the underlying
condition.27 4 Thus, court orders have been obtained to override par-
§ 333.9132 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that a minor may consent to prenatal and
pregnancy related health care or to health care for her own child); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 333.5127 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that a minor may consent to treatment for
venereal disease or HIV infection); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(g), (h), (i) (Supp. 1991)
(allowing minor to consent to health care when emancipated when minor possesses
sufficient intelligence to render informed consent, and when consent pertains to
pregnancy or childbirth); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:17A-1, -4 (Supp. 1991) (permitting a minor
to consent to health care if the minor is married, is pregnant, is actually or allegedly
afflicted with a venereal disease, appears to have been sexually assaulted, or is suffering
from drug or alcohol dependency); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.610, 433.045(5) (1991)
(permitting minor to consent to treatment for venereal disease, including HIV); W. VA.
CODE § 16-4-10 (1991) (permitting minor to consent for treatment of venereal disease).
But see NEV. REV. STAT. § 441A.310 (1991) (mandating that any minor suspected of
having or of having been exposed to a sexually transmitted disease can be examined and
treated by a health authority "regardless of whether the minor or either of his parents
consent to the examination and treatment").
In the absence of statutes enabling minors to consent to health care, the child's
parent or guardian is generally authorized to consent to or refuse care. RENNERT ET AL.,
supra note 220, at 39.
271. In re B.B.H., 111 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 1929 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Aug. 18, 1983).
272. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
273. Id. at 166-67.
274. Jennifer Lew, Note, Terminally Ill and Pregnant: State Denial of a Woman's
Right to Refuse a Cesarean Section, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 619, 638 (1990). Some states
statutorily provide for the override of a parent's refusal of nonelective medical care for a
child. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1616 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4071 (West 1979).
Other states govern such decisions pursuant to statutes prohibiting medical neglect. E.g.,
Mass. Family Court Act § 1012, Subd. [f], par. fi], cl. [A] (child's "condition has been
impaired as a result of the failure of his parent... to exercise a minimum degree of care
in supplying the child with adequate.., medical... care, though financially able to do
so."); N.J STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:9 (West 1993) (including in definition of abused child "a child
whose physical, mental, or emotional condition is impaired or is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his parent... in supplying the child with
adequate ... medical or surgical care"). See generally ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, §§ 5.16
to 5.17.
The doctrine of override never justifies the imposition of treatment on the parent for
the alleged benefit of the child. For example, though it might be in a child's interest for an
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ents' refusal of medically necessary blood transfusions for their chil-
dren.27 5 On the other hand, courts will not override a parent's refusal
of consent even though the child's life is endangered if the proposed
health care presents significant risks and is not likely to cure the
health problem . 7 There have been mixed results when courts have
alcohol dependent parent to receive drug treatment, a court could not override that par-
ent's informed consent right to refuse treatment. However, in some instances the parent
could be prosecuted for abuse or neglect, or declared unfit and have the child removed
from his or her custody. Furthermore, in a custody. proceeding in which clear and
convincing evidence demonstrated that a parent mistreated a child because of substance
abuse, the court could set drug treatment as a condition for continued custody. However,
child neglect or abuse would not justify violation of the parent's bodily integrity. But see
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (Supp. 1991) (stating that the right to refuse consent for
medical treatment may be limited to refusal which is not arbitrary, obstinate or without
reasonable medical justification when the patient is pregnant). This statute would likely
be invalidated on constitutional grounds if challenged. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237
(D.C. 1990).
275. E.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967), affd per curium, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (holding that Washington statutes
empowering superior court judges to declare children to be dependent for the purpose of
authorizing blood transfusions against expressed objections of parents were not invalid
under Constitution of United States); People v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (upholding actions of state circuit court in appointing a
guardian for 8-day-old child suffering from erythroblastosis fetalis and in granting guard-
ian the authority to consent to a blood transfusion for the child whose parents were
Jehovah's Witnesses); ROZOVSKY, supra note 220, § 5.16.
Additionally, criminal prosecutions and convictions of parents whose children die
from readily curable conditions because their parents denied them medical care for relig-
ious reasons have been sustained. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 873 (Cal.
1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989) (permitting state to proceed with prosecution of
Christian Scientist mother for involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment
arising from death of four year-old daughter due to meningitis after mother refused scien-
tific medical treatment and relied on spiritual healing); Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the
Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief
and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 321 n.7 (1991). But see
State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 937-38 (C.P. Ohio, Coshocton County 1984)
(dismissing charges of child endangerment against Christian Scientist parents when their
son died of readily treatable medical condition, because religious exemption to child en-
dangerment law was unconstitutionally vague and therefore parents were not on notice
that their actions were criminal).
276. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986) (holding that
the withholding of treatment from a handicapped infant where there is no parental con-
sent does not violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; without the parents'
consent the infant has not been denied care "solely by reason of his handicap"); In re
Philip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980); In re
Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (permitting parents of a child suffering from
Hodgkin's disease to refuse chemotherapy and radiation, and opt for injections of laetrile,
despite objections of physician); In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (N.Y. Monroe County
Cir. Ct. April 12, 1982), mandamus denied, State ex. rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S
140 (May 27, 1982), cert. denied, Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983)
(refusing to override parental refusal to consent to removal of an infant's esophageal ob-
struction that was preventing oral feeding when the infant had Down's Syndrome and
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been asked to override parental refusals when the danger to the
child's life is not immediate or the proposed low risk treatment is
likely to greatly alleviate suffering though not cure the underlying
condition. Some courts have refused override in such circum-
stances. 77 Others have permitted override when there is significant
chance of death or the "most basic quality of the child's life is
endangered," even if the child is not certain to die without the
proposed treatment. While courts will not override parental
refusal to impose risky treatments on children, they might when low
risk treatments are available. The greater the harm to the child to
be averted, and the more lasting protection the treatment will
provide, the more likely the override becomes.
Traditional override doctrine does not provide a basis for im-
posing medical treatment on a pregnant woman in the interest of
protecting the life of her fetus. Abortion is the only currently avail-
other handicaps and would soon die); see also Custody of a Minor B., 434 N.E.2d 601
(Mass. 1982) The Court decided to withhold medical treatment for an abandoned child.
There is no treatment or surgical procedure available, proven or experimental,
which offers any hope for the minor's cure. Death for a child with this minor's
diagnosis normally occurs within the first year of life, with or without
treatment. There is no research or study which holds promise of aid in the
child's condition, nor is there a reasonable hope of a treatment being developed
before this child's death.
Id. at 604; cf In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 1978) (upholding children's
decision to withhold treatment for terminally-ill incapacitated parent because treatment
would do nothing to cure or relieve the underlying illness).
277. For example, in 1972 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to override a
mother's refusal of blood transfusions for her son, reasoning that his life was not
imminently endangered. He had polio and required surgery to correct a spinal curvature
which threatened to shorten his life. He was likely to need the blood transfusions during
or after the surgery. In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972). In 1955, the New York Court of
Appeals reached a similar result, refusing to override a father's refusal to consent to non-
emergency surgery to correct his son's cleft palate and harelip. In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d
820 (N.Y. 1955).
278. In re Cabrera, 552 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1989) (ordering low risk blood trans-
fusions over parents' objection to treat sickle cell anemia, which presented a 16-18%
chance of dying.within a year and an 80% chance of severely disabling the child, despite
the fact that no cure for disease exists); In re Eric B., 235 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (permitting override although child's life not imminently endangered where there
was a 40% chance of death and the availability of low risk treatment was highly likely to
avert risk); In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or. 1981) (ordering surgery over parents'
objections for child with hydrocephalus when surgery was likely to avert severe mental
and physical effects and to allow child to live normal life, despite lack of outright cure);
Muhienberg Hospital v. Patterson, 320 A.2d 518 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1974) (ordering low risk
blood transfusions for child to avert imminent danger of serious irreparable harm-not
death); State v. Perricone, 181 A.2d 751 (N.J. 1962), cert. denied sub nom., Perricone v.
New Jersey, 371 U.S. 890 (1962) (validating state's appointment of guardian for child of
Jehovah's Witnesses for purposes of consenting to blood transfusions when child's life
imminently endangered, treatment not risky, and treatment likely to alleviate problem
though not entirely correct it).
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able treatment for preventing perinatal transmission of HIV. Thus,
the state would be in the position of arguing that it must kill the
fetus to protect its life-that it must prevent a child from coming to
life in order to ensure it will not endure a thirty percent risk of
suffering HIV infection and an untimely death. Proposed interven-
tions to prevent an HIV-positive woman from conceiving are both too
remote and too invasive of a woman's bodily integrity and privacy to
be permissible under the doctrine of overriding parental refusal.
Moreover, they do not "benefit" the child because there is clearly no
child prior to conception.
Override arguably justifies 1IV testing of a pregnant woman.
Some health analysts assert that a pregnant woman's HIV status is
relevant to the care of the fetus during pregnancy and to the prepa-
ration for the child's care following birthY.2 9 However, under current
legal standards, testing a pregnant woman without her consent to
discover whether her child might be HIV-infected, in order to pre-
pare to treat the child at birth, is impermissible. There are currently
no medical treatments available for newborns which cure HIV infec-
tion and fulfill the legal requirement of low risk treatment with a
high likelihood of alleviating the danger to the child's life.280
Additionally, there is no way to determine whether the fetus of an
IV-infected woman is itself HIY-infected.2 1 Moreover, even if one
could determine that a fetus would ultimately be HIV-infected, there
are currently no treatment modalities available for administration
in utero.
Override doctrine presents more of an argument to justify test-
ing a newborn for HIV absent maternal consent. One commentator
predicts that the recently promulgated recommendations for prophy-
laxis of Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia (PCP) in children282 could
279. Marcia Angell, A Dual Approach to the AIDS Epidemic, 324 N. ENG. J. MED.
1498, 1499 (1991); see also Margaret C. Heagarty & Elaine J. Abrams, Caring for HIV-
Infected Women and Children, 326 N. ENG. J. MED. 887 (1992) (advocating testing with
informed consent).
280. Indeed, one medical commentator notes that ."there are currently no treatment
modalities with proven benefits for neonates." Isaacman, supra note 85, at 483 n.39. The
FDA recently approved use of AZT for symptomatic children older than six months. It has
been asserted that children receiving oral AZT "for long periods have improved growth,
and appear to have fewer hospitalizations and serious infections." Modlin & Saah, supra
note 3, at 49. However, AZT as a treatment clearly falls far short of a cure or a treatment
which would justify parental override. Moreover, because it is recommended for
symptomatic children who are older than six months, AZT could not justify screening all
newborns.
281. See supra note 94.
282. Working Group on PCP Prophylaxis in Children, Guidelines for Prophylaxis
Against Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia for Children Infected with Human
Immunodeftciency Virus, 40(RR-2) MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1 (1991).
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present a treatment which would arguably justify override of a par-
ent's refusal to have a newborn tested.m By administering an HIV
antibody test to a newborn, a health care provider could at least
determine whether the baby is at risk of HIV infection. Prophylaxis
could then be administered to at-risk babies presenting symptoms of
HIV infection. However, this treatment could only reduce the risk of
death from PCP for those infants actually HIV-infected.m It would
not cure HIV, and the child would still be likely to die at a ybung age
from other opportunistic diseases.
If health care providers seek to impose HLV testing over a par-
ent's objection in order to administer PCP prophylaxis, courts will
have to weigh the risks of the treatment both for babies that are
HIV-infected and those that are not, and of the revelation of the
mother's and infant's HIV status, against the possible benefit of
temporarily extending the child's life and alleviating its suffering.
This potential benefit is quite tenuous because unless a child other-
wise exhibits symptoms of HIV infection, it has only a 30% chance of
being HIV-infected if the mother is infected.28 Even in areas of high
incidence of HV infection, only one in thirty-two women giving birth
are infected and preliminary information indicates that only thirty-
six of 1800 HIV-infected babies contract PCP."-6 Override doctrine
would not justify imposing HIV testing in the name of such an
attenuated potential benefit. Furthermore, the antibody test results
from umbilical cord or newborn blood samples reveal the antibody
status of the mother and do not indicate whether the infant itself is
BIV-infected.8 7 As a result, a woman's medical consent rights would
attach with equal force to the testing of the newborn and the cord as
they do to testing of her own body.
Two medical developments on the horizon could widen the pa-
rameters of the debate in this regard."s The first is a test, which has
proven effective in small scale samples, that can separate maternal
HIV anti-bodies from the newborn's antibodies."a Such a test would
permit diagnosis of newborn 1HV infection without specifically re-
vealing the mother's HIV status. The authors of the study recom-
283. Bayer, supra note 132, at 1501.
284. In New York State, of the approximately 1800 babies born exposed to HIV each
year, approximately 36 contract PCP pneumonia; 12 to 18 of them die even when treated.
Letter from Dr. Sarmistha B. Hauger, Columbia University Medical Center to author,
(Oct. 27, 1992) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
285. See supra note 94.
286. See supra note 11; see supra note 284.
287. See supra note 94.
288. See generally Faden et. al., supra note 14, at 350-54.
289. Steven A. Miles et al., Rapid Serologic Testing with Immune-Complex:
Disassociated H1Vp24 Antigen for Early Detection of H1V Infection in Neonates, 328 NEW
ENG. J. MED 297 (1993).
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mend large scale clinical verification of the test prior to submitting
to the FDA for approval.29 If this test proves effective on a large
scale, its availability might lessen the concerns of the mother's pri-
vacy interest in her own HIV status and the concerns of treating
infants for HIV disease who are not themselves infected. Thus, the
potential for infant diagnosis would alter the balance of factors
involved in evaluating whether override would be appropriate for
PCP prophylaxis. When infant diagnosis becomes available, there
will also likely exist more reliable data concerning the risks PCP
poses to infected infants and the risks and efficacy of prophylaxis
treatment. Courts will have to weigh these factors at that time.
However, the question of whether to override a parent's refusal to
have an asymptomatic child tested for HIV infection still would
present a level of attenuation for potential benefit to the child that
would be unlikely to justify override even when early ELY diagnosis
is possible.29' It would still not eliminate the reality that there is no
cure for HIV infection and the child is likely to die at a young age.
The second potential medical development is the use of AZT to
prevent perinatal transmission. Currently, the National Institute of
Health is conducting a placebo controlled study to determine
whether early administration of AZT to pregnant EIV-positive
women will prevent transmission to the fetus.292 If proven effective,
and preliminary -theories that AZT causes birth anomalies are
proven wrong, the availability of this treatment to prevent perinatal
transmission will present a complex case for analysis under override
290. Id. at 301; see also Philip J. Hilts, Effective Test Is Developed to Find AIDS in
Newborns, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1993, at B8 (reporting that the FDA should speedily
approve the new test).
291. Even if treatments for an HIV-positive child are developed which would fulfill
the requirements to override parental refusal, the informed consent doctrine would re-
quire the health care provider to engage in the informed consent dialogue with the
parent. Thus, health care providers would have to explain the treatment options, benefits,
risks and alternatives in understandable terms and seek override via court order only af-
ter the parent's informed refusal. Moreover, in the event such treatments are developed, a
decision whether to override a parent's refusal to allow the child to be tested would have
to be based on the availability of these treatments to the child at issue. See Faden et al.,
supra note 14, at 334. One of the Group's recommendations is that a necessary component
of any program testing pregnant women or newborns for HIV is that
[e]very effort should be made to secure specialized medical interventions for the
management of HIV infection, appropriate social services and supports, and in-
tensive primary care and abortion services (where requested by pregnant
women) for all women and infants identified as HIV-positive as a result of pre-
natal or newborn testing.
Id
292. Modlin & Saah, supra note 3, at 49; see Rhoda S. Sperling et al., A Survey of
Zidovudine Use in Pregnant Women with Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 326
New Eng. J. Med. 857 (1992).
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doctrine.
This analysis would require fulfillment of the requirements
necessary to override parental refusal of health care for children
before administration of AZT to pregnant HIV-positive women. AZT
can have potent side effects and therefore is contraindicated for
many. HIV-positive people.293 Consequently, ingesting AZT is riskier
for most IV-positive people than donating blood is for most healthy
people. By analogy, no court should order a pregnant woman to
ingest AZT because courts fail to compel people to donate blood.2
This analogy is persuasive even if the court believes AZT will save
the child from a thirty percent chance of becoming infected with
HIV. This same analysis would apply to any in utero treatment
developed for the fetus of an IlV-positive woman.
Given the current state of medical knowledge concerning peri-
natal transmission and the lack of treatments available for 1IV-
infected (or potentially infected) newborns, no sufficient justification
exists for overriding the woman's right to refuse reproductive health
care, including HIV testing for herself or her newborn child.
Additionally, traditional override doctrine will not permit any in
utero treatment for the fetus, for a court will not impose medical
treatment on one person (the mother) for the benefit of another and
it certainly will not impose it for a nonperson (the fetus).
F. Public Health and the State Police Power
The police power of state governments 9 5 permits governmental
restrictions on individual liberty in order to protect the public health
and safety. This power presents a narrowly circumscribed exception
to the requirement of informed consent to medical care. This excep-
tion is limited to circumstances where an individual's refusal to
accept medical treatment endangers other people. It would not jus-
tify negating 1IV-positive women's informed consent rights in order
to prevent them from bearing children.
Traditionally, the police power to legislate measures to control
293. Patients with impaired renal function "may be at greater risk of toxicity from
zidovudine [AZT]." PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 827 (47th ed. 1993) [hereinafter PDRI.
Warnings for the drug indicate that therapy with AZT "is often associated with
hematologic toxicity including granulocytopenia and severe anemia requiring transfu-
sions." Id. at 788.
294. Furthermore, kidney transplants from parent to child have never been ordered.
295. Police power is retainecby the states upon entry into the Union. U.S. CONST.
amend. X; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905). It is a power founded
"[ulpon the principle of self-defense." Id. at 27; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471
(1877) (citing The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 456 (1849)). A state's police
power "can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond
the scope of that necessity." Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
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contagious disease epidemics was practically boundless in its ability
to impose quarantine and mandatory treatment on persons with
infectious diseases. Though statutes authorizing these measures
survive in most states, recent developments have significantly cur-
tailed the power. These include medical science's ability to treat
disease and pinpoint modes of transmission,2 the expansion of con-
stitutional protections for individual liberty against government
interventions, and the development of the doctrine of informed con-
sent and self-determination in medical treatment.29
Currently, states rely upon the public health police power to
impose regulations which do not significantly encroach upon indi-
vidual liberties and which provide proven benefits to both the af-
fected individual and to society at large. For example, state govern-
ments may regulate health care procedures to safeguard public
safety and hygiene298 and require children to be vaccinated for cer-
tain diseases prior to attending school.2 9
When state health measures infringe upon employment rights
or the right of children to attend public school, they must be justified
by proof that they actually protect the public from a significant
health risk.30 On the other hand, contemporary law for disease con-
trol measures, like quarantine or compulsory medical treatment,
which drastically infringe upon fundamental liberties, has been less
clearly delineated. These archaic doctrines remain almost com-
296. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1027.
297. See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1985) [hereinafter Parmet, AIDS]; see also
Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 661-62 (W. Va. 1980) (granting a writ of habeas
corpus to one whose constitutional rights were violated when petitioner with tuberculosis
was involuntarily confined).
298. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (stating that a state has a legitimate
interest in ensuring safety of health care procedures).
299. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mashigian, National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 387,
393 (1987); Jennifer Trahan & Susan M. Wolf, Rights of State and Family Clash In
Forced-Immunization Cases, NATIONAL L.J., May 13, 1991, at 28.
300. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (holding that a
public school teacher could not be fired for having tuberculosis if she did not pose a
"significant risk" of transmitting the disease); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that children testing positive
for hepatitis B could not be excluded from a public school program because they did not
present a significant risk of transmitting the disease to others); District 27 Community
Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (invalidating a public
school policy excluding all children with AIDS from school on the basis that it did not ef-
fectuate a valid state purpose); In re Westchester County Medical Center, No. 91-504-2,
Dec. No. 191 at 40 (Dep't of Health and Human Servs. Appeals Bd., April 20, 1992)
(ruling, by an administrative law judge, that hospital violated the Rehabilitation Act of
1974 by imposing employment restrictions on HIV-infected pharmacist when risk of expo-
sure "is so small as not to be measurable"); Gostin, supra note 85, at 1021.
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pletely untested by courts applying contemporary legal standards.
However, some state legislatures have repealed or amended their
statutes authorizing quarantine and mandatory medical treat-
ment-including unconsented IlV testing-to comply with modern
procedural protections of individual liberty.3°1 The appropriate judi-
cial limits on government disease control powers should be influ-
enced by two related areas: 1) the law on civil commitment of the
mentally retarded and mentally ill and 2) the law on unconsented
sterilization.
1. The History of Public Health Police Power. Historically, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the state's police power to man-
date public health measures could be exercised to the extent that it
did not unjustifiably encroach upon individual rights.3°2 However,
the case law demarcating the bounds of this power developed during
the epidemics of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, be-
fore the emergence of the doctrine of informed consent and when
individual constitutional rights were in their infancy. Moreover, the
undeveloped state of medical science permitted states wide discre-
tion to impose coercive measures in the name of health, due to igno-
rance about how the diseases at issue were actually transmitted. As
a result, the case law fails to map proper boundaries for contempo-
rary use of the state public health power in the AIDS epidemic.3
At the turn of the century, constitutional protections for indi-
viduals against intrusive actions by their government were not fully
developed. However, some courts reviewing government measures
aimed at controlling devastating epidemics of smallpox, yellow fever,
cholera, and other diseases nonetheless recognized the supremacy of
these protections. In 1900, in two separate cases, a California fed-
eral court circuit panel invalidated public health measures promul-
gated by the city of San Francisco, finding that the measures were a
mere guise for enforcing racially discriminatory practices. In Wong
301. See supra notes 327-30.
302. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905), stating:
Such measures are within the discretion of the State, subject of course, so far as
Federal power is concerned, only to the condition that no rule prescribed by a
State... shall contravene the Constitution of the United States or infringe any
right granted or secured by that instrument. A local enactment or regulation,
even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a State, must always yield in
case of conflict with... any right which that instrument gives or secures.
303. Wendy E. Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, the Police
Power, and Individual Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH, POL., POLY & L. 741, 745-46 (1989)
[hereinafter Parmet, Legal Rights]; Parmet, AIDS, supra note 297, at 58, 75. See gener-
ally Bergman, supra note 103, at 788 n.58 (citing "a litany of cases upholding the state's
police power to quarantine").
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Wai v. Williamson,0 4 the court struck down a city ordinance that all
Asians be inoculated for bubonic plague before leaving the city be-
cause there was no evidence that Asians contract the disease more
than other races or that such inoculations would serve any valid
health interest.305 In response to this decision, the city issued an
order quarantining the Asian community to predominantly Asian
neighborhoods. The order specifically exempted Caucasian resi-
dences within Asian areas. In Jew Ho v. Williamson,0 6 the court
applied strict equal protection scrutiny and invalidated the quaran-
tine order, noting that it was based on racial bias and not a genuine
public health necessity.307
In 1905, in the landmark vaccination case, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,30 8 the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
states' power to enact compulsory vaccination, quarantine and
"health laws of every description."0 9 While the Court specifically
upheld the imposition of a five dollar fine on a person who refused to
obtain a vaccination,310 it limited its holding by noting that "the
police power of a State... may be exerted in such circumstances or
by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to
justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppres-
sion."3" Despite these limitations, however, Jacobson was later
304. 103 F. 1 (C.C.D. Cal. 1900).
305. Id. at 10 ("Ihe [police] power, however broad and extensive, is not above the
constitution. When it speaks, its voice must be heeded. It furnishes the supreme law ...
and, so far as it imposes restraints, the police power must be exercised in subordination
thereto." (citation omitted)).
306. 103 F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
307. Id. at 26. The court stated:
[Tihis quarantine cannot be continued, by reason of the fact that it is unreason-
able, unjust, and oppressive, and therefore contrary to the laws limiting the po-
lice powers of the state and municipality in such matters; and, second, that it is
discriminating in its character, and is contrary to the provisions of the four-
teenth amendment of the constitution of the United States.
Id.; see also Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471-73 (1877) (holding that a statute pro-
hibiting entry of any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle into Missouri during 8 months of
the year was an invalid exercise of police power because it was ineffective in keeping dis-
eased cattle out of the state and infringed upon constitutionally protected commerce and
transportation rights).
308. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
309. Id. at 25 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824)).
310. Id. at 12-14 (stating that Mr. Jacobson was fined $5.00 and "committed until the
fine was paid" upon refusing a smallpox vaccination, absent evidence that his health
would be damaged by the vaccination).
311. Id. at 38; see also Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana St.
Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 397 (1902) (Brown, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's af-
firmation of Louisiana law barring entry of even healthy immigrants from southern
Europe and the West Indies for the purpose of controlling the yellow fever epidemic on
the ground that it was a sham for oppressing immigrants),
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relied upon to justify a more drastic and physically invasive imposi-
tion-eugenic sterilization,31 one method employed in the notorious
campaigns against "social undesirables."313
Apart from eugenics, the primary area of coercive public health
legislation during the twentieth century concerned venereal dis-
eases. Most of the laws targeted prostitutes either facially or as ap-
plied. These laws have largely been condemned by contemporary
scholars as "ineffective; discriminatory and invidious."314 During the
first two decades of the twentieth century, local governments closed
down more than a hundred "red light districts" and had thousands
of prostitutes forcibly examined for venereal disease, quarantined
and treated, in the name of curtailing the syphilis epidemic. 15
During World War I, more than 30,000 prostitutes were incarcer-
ated in federally-supported institutions.1 6 In the few instances when
these measures were challenged, they were always upheld,31 despite
the fact that they did not reduce the incidence of syphilis. Indeed,
syphilis increased dramatically during the years of the War.18
312. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1922) (stating that "[t]he principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes").
313. See discussion supra part I.
314. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1019.
315. ALLAN M. BRANDT, NO MAGIC BULLET, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880 85-95 (1987) [hereinafter BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE].
Brandt reports that "[b]y March 1918, thirty-two states had passed laws requiring
compulsory examinations of prostitutes for venereal disease." Id. at 85 (citations omitted).
Many state or local regulations were passed during this same period, empowering health
officers to examine "persons reasonably suspected of having syphilis, gonorrhea or
chancroid." Id.
316. Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, 14 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 231, 233 (1986) [hereinafter Brandt, AIDS].
317. See Bergman, supra note 103, at 797, and sources cited therein.
318. Brandt, AIDS, supra note 316, at 233. Scientific research has also discredited
once prevalent notions that prostitutes are primarily responsible for the spread of HIV in-
fection. For a discussion of print media portrayal of the risks HIV-positive female
prostitutes pose on men, see Donna King, Prostitutes as Pariah in the Age of AIDS: A
Content Analysis of Coverage of Women Prostitutes in the New York Times and the
Washington Post, Sept. 1985 - Apr. 1988, 16 WOMEN & HEALTH 155 (1990). Current
findings demonstrate that HIV infection rates among women in the United States
correlate not to prostitution, but to drug use or a sexual partners' drug use. Marsha F.
Goldsmith, As AIDS Epidemic Approaches Second Decade, Report Examines What Has
Been Learned, 264 JAMA 431, 433 (1990) ("Contrary to earlier fears, female prostitutes do
not appear to be serving as a bridge for AIDS transmission into the larger heterosexual
population."); Cohen et al., Prostitutes and AIDS: Public Policy Issues, AIDS & PUB. POLY
J. 16 (1988). But see Robert R. Redfield et al., Heterosexually Acquired HTLV-III/LAV
Disease (AIDS-Related Complex and AIDS): Epidemiological Evidence for Female-to-Male
Transmission, 254 JAMA 2094, 2095 (1985) (reporting study which included ten IiV-in-
fected men who alleged that they were transmitted the virus by infected women, eight of
the ten from prostitutes). See generally Mindell Seidlin et al., Prevalence of HIV Infection
in New York Call Girls, 1 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES 150 (1988). Male
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In the 1930s, states began to enact blood testing laws.3 19 In
1938, Connecticut and Rhode Island became the first states to enact
laws requiring syphilis blood tests for all pregnant women, and other
states soon followed suit.' Because syphilis, once detected, could be
treated and cured,321 these laws greatly reduced the infant mortality
rate caused by congenital syphilis. 22 Although some states now re-
quire that women consent to be tested and have the right of re-
fusal,123 no legal challenges have been brought against statutes
HIV-infection similarly correlates to homosexual sex and drug use and not patronage of
female prostitutes. See EVE K. NICHOLs, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE & NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, MOBILIZING AGAINST AIDS 50-51 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1989).
Despite this information, at least twenty-eight states have acted on the unfounded
belief that prostitutes are likely to spread HIV infection and currently mandate HIV anti-
body testing of prostitutes. Jackson, supra note 264, at 239, 258 & n.60 (citing
unpublished data of the Intergovernmental Health Policy Project); see, e.g., supra note
100. Several states have also enhanced the penalties for criminal prostitution offenses
when committed by someone with knowledge that she or he is HIV-positive. E.g., COL.
REV. STAT. § 18-7-201.7 (Supp. 1992). Colorado also criminalizes the patronization of a
prostitute by a person who knows he or she is HIV-positive. COL. REV. STAT. § 18-7-205.7
(Supp. 1992); see also FLA. STAT. chs. 796.08(5)-(6) (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.358
(1987). Though government policies concerning pregnancy and HIV have been slower to
develop, those now under consideration which are discussed in this Article may be just as
misinformed as those concerning prostitution.
319. In 1935, Connecticut passed the nation's first law requiring a premarital blood
test and physical examination. If either party was found to be infected by a number of dis-
eases, including syphilis, no marriage license would be issued until that party had been
cured of the infection. BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE, supra note 315, at 147-48. "By...
1938, twenty-six states had enacted provisions prohibiting the marriage of infected
individuals." Id.
320. Id. at 149-50; Katherine L. Acuff & Ruth R. Faden, A History of Prenatal and
Newborn Screening Programs: Lessons for the Future, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE NEXT
GENERATION, supra note 3, at 59; see infra table IV.
321. Salvarsan, the first effective treatment for syphilis, was discovered in 1909,
modified in 1912, and widely used by 1920. BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE, supra note 315,
at 40-41. Penicillin was discovered to be effective for treating syphilis and gonorrhea in
1943. Id. at 161; Acuff & Faden, supra note 320, at 65.
322. This Article contends that the same effect in reducing infant mortality would
result if the law mandated health care providers to recommend rather than require pre-
natal syphilis tests for all pregnant women. Originally, such syphilis testing laws were
necessitated by physicians' refusal to offer the test to patients for fear of offending them.
BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE, supra note 315, at 150; Acuff & Faden, supra note 319.
Physician reluctance to test is unlikely to be a problem today; the risk of malpractice
liability is an effective incentive for physicians to routinely offer such tests to their
pregnant patients. At any rate, reluctance to carry out their professional duty on the part
of health care providers is hardly a justification for undermining the informed consent
rights of pregnant women. Furthermore, allowing patients to make this health care
decision could reap substantial benefits. "Testing in pregnancy should be used as an
opportunity to educate patients about prenatal care and the impact of maternal behavior
on fetal outcomes, and should be conducted with at least the affirmation of the patient."
Faden et al., supra note 14, at 336.
323. CURRAN ET AL., AIDS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY POICY 310 (1988); e.g., KAN.
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which authorize involuntary testing.
States have enacted few new mandatory public health meas-
ures in the latter half of the twentieth century due .to the evolution
of medical science and enhanced constitutional protection for indi-
vidual rights, including the right to informed consent.324 Further-
more, states have rarely applied existing mandatory health mea-
sures.rs As cures were developed and the epidemics of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were stanched, quarantine
laws for communicable diseases were no longer utilized.2 6 Other
STAT. ANN. §. 65-153f (Supp. 1991) (permitting testing for syphilis of each pregnant
woman "with the consent of such woman"); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.017 (1991) (requiring
every licensed physician attending a pregnant woman for conditions relating to her preg-
nancy to obtain informed consent prior to testing blood for any infectious conditions
"which may affect a pregnant woman or fetus"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 521.13 (1993)
(requiring prenatal syphilis exam except when the woman "dissents"); see also infra table
IV.
324. As tests to detect disease and courses of treatment were developed for Tay-
Sachs, cystic fibrosis, neural tube defects, and the Hepatitis B virus, legislatures declined
to interfere with the medical establishment and did not determine how and when such
tests and treatment be administered. One exception is the New York Legislature, which
has required prenatal screening for Hepatitis B since 1990. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §
2500-e(1) (McKinney Supp. 1992). California makes prenatal testing for genetic disorders
and birth defects available to all women, but requires that it be "wholly voluntary and
shall not be a prerequisite to eligibility for, or receipt of, any other service or assistance
from, or to participation in, any other program." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 156.2
(West Supp. 1992).
Statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s mandated screening newborns for pku and
sickle cell anemia, but imposed no punishment for non-compliant parents. See generally
Acuff & Faden, supra note 320, at 65. Originally statutes concerning sickle cell screening
were mandatory;, however, these became increasingly controversial, and in 1972, a federal
law was passed offering funding only to states with voluntary sickle cell screening pro-
grams. Most states amended their screening laws to provide for voluntary testing. Id. at
67-71. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 308 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 383.14(4)
(West Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4801, 4905 (Smith-Hurd 1989); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-a(b) (McKinney 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
33.001 (West 1992); see also infra table IV.
Statutes permitting a parent only the right to refuse pku or sickle cell testing do not
provide full informed consent protections. However, these simple blood tests detect
treatable conditions which could be quite disabling to affected children who are not
promptly treated. They provide universal benefit and minimal intrusion, and as a result
there has been no motivation to challenge them and they remain on the books. For
similar reasons, consent to testing newborns for these conditions could be implied from a
mother's consent for general health care services for her newborn; as a result therelis no
need for statutory override of informed consent doctrine.
325. See Mireya Navarro, Gauging Threat of Recalcitrant TB Patients, N.Y. TIMES,
April 14, 1992, at Al, B2; Mireya Navarro, Grappling With the Care of Problem TB
Patients, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1992, at B2 (both articles describe the use of compulsory
health measures in extreme cases of patients with infectious TB who either refuse
consent to treatment, or who are unable or unwilling to pursue treatment).
326. BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE, supra note 315, at 191; Sullivan & Field, supra
note 138, at 143-44.
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laws, like some requiring premarital syphilis testing, were recog-
nized as costly and ineffective127 and were repealed.
28
In one of the few recently published opinions addressing the
state power to quarantine, the West Virginia Supreme Court relied
upon recent civil commitment case law, rather than archaic disease
control law, as precedent for its ruling.329 In Greene v. Edwards, the
court held that the potential loss of liberty resulting from quaran-
tine is as serious as that of civil confinement and mandated that the
stringent procedural standards applied to mental health civil com-
mitment proceedings should also apply to litigation initiated by
those subject to quarantine. 3 0
Other aspects of civil commitment law, discussed below, further
delineate restrictions on state power to enact public health meas-
ures. In addition, this Article reviews laws on unconsented steriliza-
tion-another area where compulsory health measures have been
subjected to judicial scrutiny under modern standards of individual
rights. Developments in these areas confirm that with the advent of
constitutional protections for individual rights, the public health
police power has been radically curtailed.331 As the following two
327. BRANDT, VENEREAL DISEASE, supra note 315, at 19-20, 177; Yehudi M. Felman,
Repeal of Mandated Premarital Tests for Syphilis: A Survey of State Health Officers, 71
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 155, 157 (1981).
328. Maine and Texas, for example, have repealed statutes mandating testing. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1181 (West 1992) (repealed 1985); TEX. HEALTH CODE ANN.
§ 1.25 (West 1975) (repealed 1989).
There have been numerous calls to utilize coercive health powers to deal with the
AIDS epidemic. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS,
261 JAMA 1621 (1989). Some coercive AIDS measures have already proven ineffective
and been repealed. For example, Illinois and Louisiana both enacted laws requiring pre-
marital testing for the HIV antibody before a marriage license could be issued. ILL. ANN.
STAT., ch. 40, para. 204 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (amended 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:230
(West 1991) (repealed 1988). In both states, the measure proved to be exorbitantly costly
and to produce questionable benefit. The Illinois law, which was in effect for 20 months
before being amended, identified only 23 new cases of HIV infection at a cost of $243,000
per case identified. Field, supra note 204, at 73. The amendment effectively replaced the
old statute with a simple requirement that all persons applying for marriage licenses re-
ceive a brochure'concerning sexually transmitted diseases. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 40, para.
204 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992). The Louisiana law was in effect for only six months before
being repealed because it had similar results. Id.
329. Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W.Va. 1980).
330. Id. at 663. The court ultimately granted a man confined to a hospital with active
tuberculosis a new hearing, complete with appointed counsel, written notice detailing
grounds and underlying facts on which commitment had been sought, the right to be pre-
sent to cross-examine, confront, and present witnesses, a clear and convincing evidence
standard of proof, and a transcript for appeal. Id.
331. E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 214.181(c)(9)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (permitting
court ordered HIV testing only when a compelling need for testing is demonstrated which
cannot be accommodated by other means and when adhering to due process protections
for test subject); OR. REV. STAT. § 433.019 (1991) (requiring that, before ordering the im-
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sections explain, the law in these areas clarifies that neither the
state's police power, nor its powers to provide health care to incom-
petent people, will justify overriding women's informed consent
rights to prevent HIV-positive women from bearing children.
2. Civil Commitment Substantive and Procedural Protections.
Throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
state parens patriae power 3 2 to safeguard incompetent people, cou-
pled with the police power to protect society at large, provided the
bases for committing people to mental institutions for indefinite
periods of time, often based upon scant factual findings. Until
recently, those committed had little legal recourse.33 More recently,
civil commitment statutes were challenged and invalidated or modi-
fied in a series of cases reaching the U.S. Supreme Court.3 In its
position of a measure to control the behavior of an individual infected with a communica-
ble disease, a circuit court must hold a hearing and find by clear and convincing evidence
that the proposed measure is necessary and is the least restrictive alternative).
332.
'Parens patriae,' literally means 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to
role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as
juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on
behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the
state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
333. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972) (noting that "the states have
traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill"); see supra
part I. See generally James W. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of
Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840 (1974); Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill. Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1288 (1966) [hereinafter
Civil Commitment].
The case of "Mrs. Packard" is emblematic of the historic power to commit. In 1860,
Mr. Packard, a Calvinist minister, had his wife committed to a mental hospital because
she disagreed with his theological views in public. Ellis, supra, at 842. He "could not man-
age her at home" where he kept her imprisoned in her room. He utilized a state statute
which permitted a husband to petition to have his wife committed "without evidence of
insanity or distraction [as] required in other cases." Ralph Slovenko, Criminal Justice
Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (1977). After securing her
release from the hospital, she became an effective crusader for reform of civil commit-
ment law and for regulation of mental hospital conditions. Unfortunately, many of her re-
forms were short-lived. Ellis, supra at 842-44.
334. E.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992) (holding that person
acquitted under an insanity defense, who was no longer insane, could not continue to be
held in confinement simply because he continued to be dangerous to himself and others);
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 606 (1979) (requiring that commitment of minor by
parents be held to "exacting constitutional scrutiny, including a formal, adversary, pre-
admission hearing decided by a neutral fact-finder"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
431-33 (1979) (holding that in a civil commitment proceeding, mental illness must be
shown by "clear and convincing" evidence, rather than a mere "preponderance" of the evi-
dence); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (holding that commitment may
last only as long as there is a "constitutionally adequate basis" for it); Jackson v. Indiana,
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decisions, the Court recognized that "civil commitment for any pur-
pose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty"33 5 and thus is
subject to rigorous due process requirements including the rights to
counsel, to confront adverse witnesses, to neutral factfinders, and to
appeal. 36 In addition, the Court imposed the weighty substantive
requirement that the state show, "in a sufficiently reliable way, that
the goal it seeks to achieve outweighs the person's loss of liberty and
other costs."337
Applying these civil commitment principles to the hypothetical
mandatory measures preventing HIV-positive women from child-
bearing demonstrates that such measures are unlikely to survive
this substantive threshold test, because neither preventing concep-
tion nor forced abortion benefit fetuses or future children.
Incarceration or quarantine of HIV-positive pregnant women would
have no effect on their likelihood of transmitting the virus to the
fetus. Moreover, HIV-infected babies are highly unlikely to engage
in behaviors which might transmit the virus to others, and thus
present no danger to the community. Therefore, the purported goal
of curbing HIV transmission would not be furthered and there would
be no justification for the woman's loss of liberty.33
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that the 'nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed"); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (requiring a hearing for initial civil commitment in-
cluding rights to counsel, to confront witnesses, to cross-examination, to offer evidence,
and to appeal).
335. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 425.
336. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. at 1781 (ruling that a candidate for involuntary
civil commitment was entitled to "constitutionally adequate procedures"); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 494-96 (1980) (holding that a prisoner being transferred to a mental
hospital was entitled to the same due process protections as a civil committee, including
the rights to notice, to present evidence, to confront adverse witnesses, to an independent
factfmder, and to counsel).
337. Gary Gleb, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar
Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings,
39 UCLA L. REv. 213, 218 (1991) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425); see also Foucha v.
Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992) (holding that mental health confinement on the
basis of an antisocial personality where there is no evidence of mental illness violates due
process). In Addington, the Court held that a state could civilly commit a person only
when it was proven to be necessary to fulfill the state goals of protecting the individual
from harming himself or others. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 426.
338. Even assuming arguendo that a compelling state interest for reproductive
coercion of HV-positive women exists, civil commitment law establishes the necessity for
applying strict procedural protections, including the right to counsel, written notice, pres-
entation of evidence, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and verbatim transcript for ap-
peal. Civil commitment law also provides guidance concerning the appropriate standard
of proof for reproductive coercion proceedings. These strict procedural protections will
make it difficult to ever secure court orders to control HIV-positive women's childbearing.
The Supreme Court requires the standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings to be
greater than that of other civil proceedings because of the importance of the liberty inter-
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3. Substantive and Procedural Protection& of State Law
Governing Unconsented Sterilization. Although the Supreme Court
at one time found that the state police power encompassed "cutting
the Fallopian tubes,"3 9 forming the basis for eugenic sterilization
laws in thirty-two states, the modern trend deviates from this
ruling.3 40 Only four states-Delaware, Georgia, North Carolina, and
Mississippi-allow consideration of either a woman's likely ability to
est at stake. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 427. The Addington Court held, however,
that '[gliven the lack of certainty and fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious
question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." Id. at 429 (citations omitted).
In addition, the Court noted that the standard of proof must fairly allocate the risks of er-
roneous determinations. The Court reasoned that it was worse to allow some dangerous
mentally ill people to remain untreated than to commit some mentally ill people even
though they were not dangerous. In so finding, the Court noted its belief that civil
commitment was "likely to benefit" erroneously committed mentally ill people. Id. at 428-
29; see also Civil Commitment, supra note 333, at 1290 (noting that "due explanation for
the different treatment of mentally ill persons is the assumption that hospitalization of
someone suffering from mental illness is likely to benefit him even if he is not
dangerous"). But see Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search for the Missing
Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill,
40 RUTGERS L. REv. 303 (1988) (disputing the Court's premise in Addington that
involuntary commitment necessarily benefits mentally ill people); David Ferleger, Anti-
Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 603-13 (1983)
(disputing the Court's premise regarding institutionalization of mentally retarded people).
On the above grounds the Court rejected the criminal standard of proof and adopted
the intermediate "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
at 431-33 (stating that "[cilear and convincing proof" is required for indefinite involuntary
commitment). Several states have adopted a "clear and convincing evidence" standard in
hearings to determine whether compulsory measures, including HIV testing should be or-
dered for an individual alleged to engage in behavior presenting imminent danger to the
public health, and whether the proposed compulsory measure is the least restrictive
means necessary to protect public health. E.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-11A-24 to -36 (1990)
(providing procedural guarantees for civil commitment which include notice, hearing,
right to appointment of attorney, and the clear and convincing evidence standard). The
West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the clear and convincing evidence standard for
proceedings concerning the quarantine of a person suspected of having active tuberculo-
sis. Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W.Va. 1980).
Government infringement upon the right to bear children is equally invasive as the
infringements imposed in civil commitment or confinement. Since both pregnancy and
HIV serostatus are readily ascertainable, the government should be required, at a
minimum, to meet the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" for commitment or man-
datory treatment. Moreover, unlike the confinement of the mentally ill, the procedures
forced upon these defendants would produce no benefit for those erroneously subjected to
them. In fact, impositions such as a forced sterilization or abortion would produce
irreparable damage. Although forced implantation of intrauterine devices or Norplant do
not carry the same permanence, the psychological effects of enduring such an experience
cannot be erased. For these reasons also, reasonable doubt is the appropriate standard of
proof.
339. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
340. The transformation of sterilization law is a direct result of the elaboration of
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care for any children she might bear, or the likely "fitness" of the
offspring, in determining whether she should be sterilized. 4' With
the exception of these four states, however, one of which has not
constitutional protections for the right to bear children, which began in 1942 with the
Supreme Court's declaration that sterilization involved "one of the basic civil rights of
man [sic]." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). By 1980, only eleven states
permitted compulsory sterilization of the mentally retarded and mentally ill in order "to
protect society." Coleman, supra note 30, at 56 & n.13 (listing the eleven states:
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia). However, California repealed its eugenic
sterilization law effective January 1, 1980. CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 7254 (West 1984)
(repealed 1979)). Georgia was actually the eleventh state: GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3
(Michie 1991). Georgia's statute was enacted in 1970, declared unconstitutional by the
Georgia Supreme Court in 1983 in Motes v. Hall County Dep't of Family and Children
Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1983), and amended in 1985. See Sidney P. Wright, Note,
Involuntary Sterilization in Georgia: The Aftermath of Motes v. Hall County Dep't of
Family and Children Servs., 1 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 75-76 (1984) [hereinafter
Involuntary Sterilization in Georgia].
As of 1991, all but four of these state statutes were repealed: only Delaware,
Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina continued to allow compulsory sterilization of
the mentally ill. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.341. State statutes, with the exception of those of Georgia, North Carolina, and
Mississippi, do not authorize sterilization absent the patient's consent unless findings are
made, at a legal proceeding employing stringent due process protections, that the patient
is incompetent to consent and that it is in his or her best interests to be sterilized. The
Georgia Code authorizes sterilization of
irreversibly and incurably mentally incompetent [persons who] ... with or with-
out economic aid (charitable or otherwise) from others, could not provide care
and support for any children procreated by them in such a way that such chil-
dren could reasonably be expected to survive to the age of 18 years without suf-
fering or sustaining serious mental or physical harm.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-20-3 (Supp. 1992). The North Carolina Code permits sterilization of
mentally retarded or mentally ill person absent a finding of incompetence, even if a
capable person refuses consent and sterilization is not in the person's best interest. Such
sterilization is permitted, if the court finds the sterilization to be in the "public good" or
that the person is likely to produce offspring "who would have a tendency to serious
physical, mental or nervous disease or deficiency." N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-43 (1991). The
Mississippi Code requires a finding, prior to sterilization of an inmate of a mental
institution, that the inmate is a "probable potential parent of socially inadequate
offspring." MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-9 (Supp. 1992). Although such sterilization must be
found to promote "the welfare of the inmate and society," the statute does not require that
the best interest of the inmate take precedence. Id.
In addition to Mississippi, only two other state statutes, those of North Carolina and
Delaware, continue to allow eugenic considerations to enter into the determination of
whether a woman will be sterilized absent her consent. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5707
(1991) (requiring that a petition to sterilize a mentally incompetent person shall include,
inter alia, "[whether:... The respondent, if not sterilized, is likely to procreate a child
who would have any probability of serious physical, mental or nervous disease or
deficiency"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (1991) (authorizing unconsented sterilization of
mentally retarded or mentally ill persons who either will not be capable of caring for a
child, or are likely to produce "a child or children which probably would have serious
physical, mental, or nervous diseases or deficiencies").
19931 CONTROL OF HIV-POSITIVE WOMEN 393
amended its statute since the elaboration of constitutional
protections for childbearing rights,342 state statutory authority to
sterilize emanates solely from parens patriae power rather than
from state police power.3  Unlike the state police power, parens
patriae cannot be exercised against people competent to make their
own medical decisions, and it cannot be invoked to impose measures
damaging to the individual because they are good for society.3" In
states without governing statutes, either involuntary sterilizations
are not conducted, or courts rule on petitions pursuant to their in-
herent parens patriae authority.345
Because parens patriae powers permit state governments to act
only in the "best interests" of people who are legally incompetent to
make their own health care decisions, these powers are entirely con-
sistent with traditional informed consent doctrine. A woman's com-
342. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-45-1 to -19 (1981).
343. Scott, supra note 33, at 817 & n.32. North Carolina's statute, however, derives
its authority from the police power, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 (1991), and its explicit
eugenic purpose has been repeatedly upheld by both the state's highest court and a fed-
eral trial court during the 1970s and 1980s. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 457-58 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding statute as
narrowly drawn, the court stated that [t]he legislative dual purpose-to prevent the
birth of a defective child, or the birth of a nondefective child that cannot be cared for by
its parent--reflects a compelling state interest"); In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1983), modified and affd, 329 S.E.2d 630 (N.C. 1985) (upholding the statute and the
disposition of the case but modifying the language used by the appellate court in
paraphrasing the statute); In re Johnson, 263 S.E.2d 805 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 267 S.E.2d 686 (N.C. 1980) (holding that where involuntary sterilization was sought
for mildly mentally retarded women, evidence regarding woman's morals and sexual ac-
tivity were relevant); see also In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307, 312 (N.C. 1976) (while
validating eugenic purpose of earlier statute, state Supreme Court quoted an intermedi-
ate court in Oregon holding that "[tihe state's concern for the welfare of its citizenry ex-
tends to future generations and when there is overwhelming evidence ... that a potential
parent will be unable to provide a proper environment for a child because of his own men-
tal illness or mental retardation, the state has sufficient interest to order sterilization"
(citation omitted)).
Delaware presents a special case, because it amended its law in 1985 to draw upon
both the parens patriae and police powers of the state. The statute requires that
sterilization of amentally incompetent person be performed only when in her overall best
interests, but requires eugenic consideration of whether that person is likely to produce a
child "who would have any probability of serious physical, mental or nervous disease or
deficiency." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5707 (1991). Delaware also requires consideration of
whether the person to be sterilized is permanently incapable of caring for a child and
likely to endanger the welfare of a child, even if provided with instruction or training. Id.
Thus, it includes eugenic considerations which would indicate its source as the police
power, but it also requires a finding of whether the benefits to the women outweigh the
risks, which would indicate parens patriae as the source. See Slovenko, supra note 332, at
6. The statute supplies no cues to indicate which considerations are paramount.
344. Scott, supra note 33, at 817-22.
345. See In re Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Simpson, 180
N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1962); cf Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985).
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petent refusal must be respected and an incompetent woman's fate
can only be determined by a substitute decisionmaker's decision as
to what is best for her. The practice of imposing sterilization on
incompetent women for the benefit of others has been soundly con-
demned 46 and virtually discarded in practice.
4. Summary. Over the course of the twentieth century, the
scope of the power to legislate public health measures has been
gradually circumscribed as the doctrines of individual rights and
informed consent have evolved. This trend is evident in the evolu-
tion of civil commitment and unconsented sterilization law, both of
which now provide stringent procedural and substantive protections
to protect individuals from government coercion. One commentator
describes the evolution of boundaries on the state public health
police power as shifting from accepting whatever "science" might
justify to protection of individual rights to self-determination from
what "science" might want to do. 47 These stringent protections
should be applied to government measures sought to be imposed
upon HI V-positive childbearing women pursuant to the police
power. If and when they are, the police power will only justify cir-
cumventing informed consent rights when such measures are
proven, under conditions of stringent due process protections, to be
the least restrictive ways to avert a significant public health risk.
Control of childbearing by HIV-positive women does not fulfill these
criteria. Indeed, as the evolution of sterilization law shows, the
police power should never be the basis for imposing sterilization
absent freely given consent.
G. Conclusion
Adherence to traditional norms of informed consent should pye-
vent legislatures from enacting, and courts from permitting, com-
pulsory HIV testing of women, their umbilical cords, or their new-
borns. Under these norms, an HIV test cannot be forced upon a pa-
tient "for her own good" so long as she is competent and has refused
consent for such a test. Her refusal, no matter how unreasonable,
must be respected, even if the doctor believes that her health will be
seriously jeopardized by the refusal. The same is true for her refusal
of contraceptive devices, abortion or sterilization, regardless of the
risks health professionals believe she would face in pregnancy and
childbirth. Indeed, a person has a legal right to refuse even life-sav-
ing treatment.
346. See infra note 381.
347. Parmet, Legal Rights, supra note 303, at 754; see also RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE
ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 5-11 (1989).
[Vol. 41394
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For the foreseeable future of medical science, there is no basis
in informed consent law for overriding an EIV-positive woman's
informed refusal of testing or fertility control either on the basis of
providing care to a child or of protecting the public health.
Informed consent law will often provide legal redress through
medical malpractice actions to HI V-positive women subjected to
reproductive coercion. Moreover, the threat of such actions should
encourage individual health care providers to respect HIV-positive
women's health care rights.
IV. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS CHILDBEARING BY
HIV-POsrrIVE WOMEN
The application of laws to prohibit HIV-positive women from
procreating, or to penalize them for doing so, should not survive con-
stitutional challenge based on the Fourteenth Amendment substan-
tive due process right to bear children.4s As subpart A argues, this
348. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 434 (1990) (stating that "[a] woman's
decision to beget or to bear a child is a component of her liberty that is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 686 (1977) (ruling that regulations that impose a burden on "a decision as
fundamental as that of whether to bear or to beget a child" may only be justified by
compelling state interests); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects zones of privacy deemed fundamental which includes
the right to procreate); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of pri-
vacy means anything it is the right of the individual... to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or to beget a child.").
The Fourteenth Amendment "nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state
action of every kind, which.., injures [the citizens of the United States] in life, liberty or
property without due process of law." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
Regardless of the intent of a legislature, when state officials enforce state or local laws
that infringe upon childbearing rights, such enforcement clearly constitutes state action.
Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1879) ("Whoever by virtue of public position under a
State government, deprives another of property, life, or liberty... violates the constitu-
tional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the
State's power, his act is that of the State."); see also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913) (noting that "whether the State has authorized the wrong is ir-
relevant").
When private health care providers enforce state laws, such as those requiring HIV
testing of all pregnant women, they are state actors. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990) (holding that physicians, staff, and administrators who admitted a man who was
incompetent to consent, into a state mental hospital under the voluntary commitment
authority delegated by the state were state actors); see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436,
U.S. 149, 164 (1978) (ruling that the "state is responsible for the.., act of a private party
when the State by its law, has compelled the act").
Hence, Fourteenth Amendment challenge will be sustainable on behalf of women
who are prosecuted for childbearing pursuant to criminal transmission statutes, or those
who are subjected to forced testing, contraception, abortion, or sterilization pursuant to
civil HIV containment law.
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is likely to be true despite the fact that restrictions on abortion are
no longer reviewed under strict scrutiny, and would continue to be
true even should the Supreme Court overturn Roe v. Wade, 49 an
event which Justice Blackmun has forewarned could be imminent.35 0
The extent to which federal constitutional protection for
women's reproductive autonomy has been undermined stems from
In addition, public hospitals that maintain policies or practices which authorize or
allow violations of HIV-positive women's childbearing rights will be susceptible to
Fourteenth Amendment challenge because public hospitals are recognized to be agents of
the state. Games v. Parker, 922 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a private
entity which contracts with a public hospital authority to manage the hospital is a state
actor); Wofford v. Glynn Brunswick Memorial Hosp., 864 F.2d 117 (11th Cir. 1989);
Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923, 925 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987); Nyberg
v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342, 1347 (8th Cir. 1973), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 891
(1974) (holding that a refusal by a public hospital to permit its facilities to be used to per-
form elective abortions in an unconstitutional state action). The municipality operating
the hospital can be found liable for constitutional violations inflicted by its employees
(including physicians) if its failure to fulfill a duty to supervise, instruct, train, and disci-
pline can be shown to be deliberately indifferent to patients' rights and to have resulted
in the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). An
explicit hospital policy requiring HIV testing of all pregnant women and directive
counseling to abort if HIV-positive would fulfill MoneU criteria. Similarly, a hospital pol-
icy or practice of denying prenatal care to HIV-positive women and referring them for
abortions would satisfy Monell criteria. It might also be possible to show deliberate indif-
ference by a hospital that refused to adequately investigate prior complaints of
unconstitutional behavior by its physicians and, thus, by failing to discipline them, al-
lowed them to continue. See Padilla v. dAvis, 580 F. Supp. 403, 405-06 (N.D. 111. 1984).
However, absent deliberate indifference, municipalities are not otherwise responsible for
unconstitutional actions by their employees. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981) (holding that county was not constitutionally liable to client when county employed
public defender withdrew from representation of client because client's claims were frivolous).
Moreover, securing constitutional liability against individual physicians who do not
purport to act pursuant to public hospital policy or state or local law will be nearly
impossible, even if they are state employees. Padilla v. d'Avis, 580 F. Supp. at 407-08.
This is because physicians are governed by professional ethics in regard to their
treatment of patients and are not "amenable to administrative direction in the same
sense as other employees of the State." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 321. But see
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (holding that a physician under state contract to
provide medical care to inmates on a part-time basis acts under the color of state law).
349. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
350. "1I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote neces-
sary to extinguish the light." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2844 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun has also written that "the plurality ... casts into darkness the hopes and vi-
sions of every woman in this country who had come to believe that the Constitution guar-
anteed her right to exercise some control over her unique ability to bear children."
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). "I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down,
the confirmation process for my successor may well focus on the issue before us today."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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the states' interest in safeguarding the potential life of the fetus.
With the blessing of the Supreme Court,35' many state legislatures
will attempt to use this interest to further drastically curtail a
woman's right to elect to terminate a pregnancy. 52 However, the
right to bear children-to conceive, gestate, and give birth-without
state interference will nonetheless likely remain a fundamental
constitutional right. Childbearing prohibitions for BIV-positive
women do not fulfill the compelling state interest required to justify
government measures infringing upon a fundamental right, and
consequently can be expected to be invalidated by Fourteenth
Amendment challenge.
Part l.B argues that state action directing or compelling lIV-
positive women to undergo sterilization, abortion, or contraception,
or punishing them for becoming pregnant, should be invalidated
pursuant to a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge.
Under this theory, control measures would be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny. Therefore, the fact that childbearing by women
who will potentially birth offspring with similarly predictable and
disabling diseases, like Tay-Sachs, are not similarly controlled,
would prove the control measures to be underinclusive and thus
unconstitutional.
Part ll.C argues that the right to bear children should provide
fundamental protection against compelling a woman to disclose in-
formation concerning her decision to procreate. Thus, compulsory
testing measures which force a woman to confront information about
her HIV status in order to influence her procreation decisions would
infringe upon this fundamental right without effectuating a compel-
ling purpose. Unconsented HIV testing of a freely-drawn blood sam-
ple from a pregnant or post-partum woman for epidemiological pur-
poses, where results are not traceable to the woman or her newborn,
imposes a minor infringement upon her childbearing right while
fulfilling the legitimate state purpose of monitoring the prevalence
of HIV among childbearing women. However, as noted in Part III of
this Article, when such testing is conducted absent statutory author-
ity, it violates informed consent law and thus, could be actionable
under state law.
351. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (joint opin-
ion) (reestablishing "the States' 'important and legitimate interest in potential life'"
(quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163)); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
at 519 (stating that "we do not see why the States' interest in protecting potential human
life should come into existence only at the point of viability").
352. Law & Pine, supra note 60, at 424, 445 n.162; see also Dawn E. Johnsen &
Marcy J. Wilder, Will Roe v. Wade Survive the Rehnquist Court?, 13 NOVA L. REV. 457,
460 (1989) (stating that "Ithe anti-choice minority has ... lobbied successfully for the en-
actment of unconstitutional anti-abortion legislation at the state level").
1993] 397
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A. The Right to Bear Children Continues to Be Fundamental Post
Casey
In 1942, the Supreme Court struck down a state's compulsory
sterilization law and recognized for the first time "the right to have
offspring" as a fundamental constitutionally-protected right. 53 The
Supreme Court has since expanded this fundamental right to
autonomously control reproduction without state interference in a
long line of cases recognizing that decisions about childbearing lie at
"the very heart" of the constitutional "right of personal privacy."3 54
353. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942). "We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541.
354. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). The Court
held:
The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this
cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a particularly
important place in the history of the right of privacy.... This is understand-
able, for in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate of human activi-
ties and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to prevent conception
are among the most private and sensitive.
Id. at 685 (citations omitted); see also Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 311 (11th
Cir. 1989); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that a
woman's claim that she was wrongfully sterilized involved the fundamental right of pro-
creation); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding that "irrevocably
terminating a patient's ability to bear children without her consent is a deprivation of a
fundamental constitutional right"); Poe v. Lynchburg Training Sch. & Hosp., 518 F. Supp.
789, 793 (W.D. Va. 1981) (denying a motion to dismiss a cause of action seeking an order
that all individuals who were sterilized pursuant to Virginia's eugenics law be notified be-
cause of the "fundamental nature of [the] personal interest"); North Carolina Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (noting that
"[tihe right to procreate is a fundamental one").
The historic recognition of the importance in our democracy of freedom from govern-
ment interference in childbearing weighs heavily toward recognition of its fundamental
nature, even according to the most restrictive view of fundamental rights. See Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). The only time in this nation's history that states had widely-
enacted laws explicitly restricting childbearing was during the eugenics era-an era re-
soundingly criticized and eschewed in the public conscience. See Scott, supra note 33, at
809-10; Ethics of Prevention, supra note 95, at 497. Many state courts have also
interpreted the Federal Constitution to consider protecting the right to bear children as a
fundamental right. See, e.g., Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 (1983); Motes v. Hall
County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 306 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 1983) (holding
that sterilization statute involved termination of fundamental right); In re Truesdell, 304
S.E.2d 793, 799 (N.C. 1983) ([S]terilization not only affects the individual's fundamental
right to procreate ... it forever deprives the individual of that basic liberty." (citations
omitted)); In re M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Mo. 1974) ("IWre are faced with a request
for sanction by the state of ... a routine operation which would irreversibly deny to a
human being a fundamental right, the right to bear or beget a child.").
State law in many states provides independent fundamental protections for child-
bearing and abortion rights. Law & Pine, supra note 60, at 434-35, 448; see also Anita L.
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This fundamental right has traditionally encompassed the right to
control conception without interference from the state55 and the
right of an individual woman to decide autonomously whether to
continue a pregnancy or to abort. 5
The Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's decision to
continue a pregnancy and bear a child, even when that child is cer-
tain to be born into a status which will guarantee its suffering. In
Zablocki v. Redhail,357 the Supreme Court held that the* right to
marry could not be denied because the party desiring to marry was
behind on child support payments. The Court reasoned that because
"the woman whom appellee desired to marry [who was already preg-
nant]3 1 had a fundamental right.., to bring the child into life to
suffer the myriad of social, if not economic, disabilities that the
status of illegitimacy brings,... a decision to marry and raise the
child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent protec-
tion."359
Applying this principle to childbearing by HIV-positive women
compels the conclusion that the state may not prevent HIV-positive
women from giving birth. Just as the state could not outlaw out-of-
wedlock births in order to protect children from suffering the oppro-
brium of illegitimacy, the state cannot outlaw the birth of potentially
Allen, Legal Issues in Nonvoluntary Prenatal HIV Screening, in AIDS, WOMEN AND THE
NEXT GENERATION, supra note 3, at 182-87 (asserting that state law also presents
possibilities for tort and contract actions which can also serve to protect reproductive
rights).
Moreover, international law, binding on the United States, also protects the right to
bear children. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
United Nations Dec. 19, 1966, art. 23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 ("The right of men and
women of marriageable age to marry and found a family shall be recognized."). This
treaty was ratified by the United States on June 1, 1992, deposited at the U.N. by the
United States on June 8, 1992, and entered into force for the United States on September
8, 1992. Treaty Actions, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 817, 817 (1992). See generally Isaacman, su-
pra note 85, at 487-89 (considering international law analysis of childbearing as a
fundamental right). A complete presentation of international and state law grounds for
challenging interference with childbearing rights of HIV-positive women is beyond the
scope of this Article.
355. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
356. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976) (holding inter alia that the state cannot require spousal
consent for an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating a
state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unnarried persons). The Eisenstadt
Court declared that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
357. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
358. Id. at 379.
359. Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
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HIV-infected children. While losing one's mother to IV infection at
a young age will likely cause a child to suffer emotionally and so-
cially, preventing that pain does not justify prohibiting an HIV-
positive woman from having children. Likewise, though an HIV-
infected infant will suffer intense physical pain and discomfort, the
government cannot compel a woman to terminate a pregnancy for
the purpose of preventing the infant's suffering. This conclusion is
further compelled when considered in light of medicine's inability to
predict infant infection and the fact that children born to HIV-posi-
tive women have only a thirty percent chance of being infected by
HIV themselves.3 0
Fundamental protections for the right to bear children sur-
vive 361 despite the fact that the current Supreme Court emphasizes
the state's interest in safeguarding the life of the fetus throughout a
pregnancy and no longer evaluates restrictions on abortion under
strict scrutiny. 2 ' Fundamental constitutional protections for child-
360. See discussion supra note 94.
361. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (listing the right to procreate and
the right to use contraceptives as liberty interests the Court has recognized as fundamen-
tal); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989). Tribe quoted Charles
Fried's argument on behalf of the Bush Administration in Webster urging that Roe be
overruled. Justice O'Connor asked, "Do you think that the state has the right to, if... we
had a serious overpopulation problem... require women to have abortions after so many
children?" Mr. Fried answered, "I surely do not. That would be quite a different
matter.... because unlike [the prevention of] abortion.. . that would involve not
preventing an operation but violently taking hands on, laying hands on a woman and
submitting her to an operation." Id. at 14-15. See generally Roberts, supra note 24, at
1464 (noting that "[plunishing drug-addicted mothers unconstitutionally burdens the
right to choose to bear a child"); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
362. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The
Casey decision illustrates the bitter disagreement among the Justices over the
appropriate standard of review and the weight to be given to each interest in abortion re-
striction cases. -Though no majority was attained in Casey, it is clear that strict scrutiny
no longer applies uniformly. Only Justices Stevens and Blackmun applied and would al-
ways apply strict scrutiny. See id. at 2838-43. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and
Thomas applied rational basis review. Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter essentially decided the case
with their "joint opinion" and applied an "undue burden" standard. Id. at 2804.
Pursuant to the "undue burden" standard, strict scrutiny is applied only if, in a
threshold question, a restriction is found to make an abortion virtually impossible for at
least some women to obtain. Otherwise, rational basis review applies. They found only
the spousal consent provision, and the reporting requirements related to it, to be such an
undue burden and applied strict scrutiny to invalidate them. Id. at 2826-30. The rest of
the statute was reviewed under rational basis because it was found not to be an undue
burden. Id. at 2822-26.
In their joint opinion in Casey, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter state that
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bearing require that any measure infringing upon a woman's child-
bearing be demonstrated to be narrowly-tailored and necessary to
effectuate compelling government interests.
Even when abortion was perceived as a fundamental right sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, two lines of case law arose which permitted
governmental regulation in this area. The first permitted the gov-
ernment to design funding schemes to further its legitimate inter-
ests, based on the theory that funding decisions do not "affirma-
tively" restrict a woman's abortion options. The second permitted
state regulation of abortion when such regulation fulfills the
compelling state interest of protecting viable fetal life. 63 A review of
these doctrines is necessary because these two lines of case law are
"there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy." 112 S. Ct. at
2820. They rely upon this interest to eschew the trimester framework of Roe, and to sus-
tain restrictions on abortion which the Court in recent years had invalidated. Id. at 2816-
21. But see id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("Indeed, as
this Court has invalidated virtually identical provisions in prior cases, stare decisis re-
quires that we again strike them down.").
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas, state that
abortion must be treated differently from "marriage, procreation and contraception" be-
cause it "involves the purposeful termination of potential life." Id. at 2859 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325
(1980)); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 792 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (stating that a woman's right to privacy in
abortion is not fundamental because abortion involves the destruction of a fetus; the right
to prevent conception is fundamental because no fetal destruction occurs), cited with
approval in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part). Since 1965, Justice White has recognized the fundamental nature of
the right of married people to use contraception. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64
(1972) (White, J., concurring) (stating that the constitutional right of married people to
utilize contraceptives is fundamental); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504 (1965)
(White, J., concurring) (stating that the constitutional right of married people to utilize
contraceptives is fundamental).
However, no Justice asserts that the fetus is a person. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
363. Although a third line of cases arose which permits states to mediate a minor
woman's abortion decision, these cases are not relevant to this discussion. See Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-50 (1990) (noting that a minor's right to elect abortion is
mediated by the state's interest in protecting the minor's welfare, her parents' right to
control her life, and the interest of the family to remain free of state intervention).
Provisions potentially outlawing pregnancy by HIV-positive women bear no relation
to these state interests. These statutes aim to prevent the spread of HIV infection, and
thus do not bear any relation to protecting the health and welfare of the pregnant, HIV-
positive minor. Pregnancy may pose health risks for the HIV-positive woman beyond the
risks all women face. But because outlawing pregnancy for HIV-positive minors would
entail a complete circumvention of family integrity, parental authority, and the right to
childbearing, the state interest in protecting minors' health should not justify such
measures. These laws take decisions about childbearing out of the hands of the family
entirely and place them in the hands of the government.
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relevant to analyzing HIV containment law and pregnancy. As the
following two sections demonstrate, neither the criminalization of
pregnancy for HIV-positive women nor the imposition of civil meas-
ures to prevent them from bearing children can be justified under
either doctrine.
1. The Doctrine of Government Allocation of Funds to
Encourage Childbearing. It is possible that government may seek to
justify restricting childbearing by HIV-positive women pursuant to
the abortion funding doctrine. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that government may pursue resource allocation strategies to
encourage childbirth and discourage abortion. This is because "[a]
refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated
with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity."3 The Rehnquist
Court perceives "a basic difference between direct state interference
with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative
activity consonant with legislative policy."13 65 Hence, government
may decline to pay for abortions for poor women, while paying for
medical care associated with continuing a pregnancy to term. 6 In
addition, government may prohibit the use of public facilities for
performing abortions.367
However, imposing criminal sanctions on a woman for exercis-
ing her choice to have an abortion is precisely the type of penalty
that the Court recognizes as unconstitutional. 8 Clearly, the HIV
364. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772 (1991) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)). Theoretically this doctrine could be inverted to permit the gov-
ernment to allocate funds to encourage abortion over childbirth. However, the govern-
ment could not selectively fund childbirth services only for women free of HIV. See dis-
cussion infra notes 384-415 and accompanying text.
365. Rust v. Sullivan. 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 465, 475
(1977)).
366. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 325 (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which
withheld federal funds from states under the Medicaid program which were targeted to
reimburse abortion costs, except where the mother's life would be endangered if the fetus
was carried to term); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 (upholding Connecticut welfare
regulation granting medicaid coverage for medical services related to childbirth, but not
for abortion); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (permitting St. Louis to provide
publicly-financed hospital services for childbirth without providing corresponding services
for nontherapeutic abortions).
367. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1771-78 (upholding federal regulations preventing
recipients of Title X funds from counseling, referring, or providing information regarding
abortion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507-11 (upholding
Missouri's restriction on the use of public employees and facilities for the performance or
assistance of nontherapeutic abortions).
368. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 n.7 (1979) (holding that "a State... may
not impose direct obstacles [prior to viability]-such as criminal penalties-to further its
interest in the potential life of the fetus"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18, 164 (1973)
(invalidating Texas state law criminalizing the performance of all abortions except when
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criminal transmission statutes applied to perinatal transmission
impose a direct "government obstacle"369 to childbearing and would
not be justified under this doctrine. Likewise, state-mandated ster-
ilization, abortion, and contraception all constitute affirmative
government obstacles to exercising the right to bear children. These
measures do more than "encourage[] alternative activity deemed in
the public interest."30 They do not leave an HIV-positive woman
with the same range of options she would have had absent govern-
ment activity,"' but rather, they effectively preclude her from bear-
ing children. Thus, courts should scrutinize mandatory treatment
statutes as applied against childbearing, as severe infringements
upon a woman's childbearing right.
Moreover, government could not permissibly condition funding
of prenatal care services for indigent women upon either the exclu-
sion of HIV-positive women or a requirement of counseling that
would direct HIV-positive women to use contraception, abortion, or
sterilization. 2 Indeed, such regulations, unlike those validated in
Rust v. Sullivan, would impermissibly discriminate against a class
of disabled women. Although government could arguably decline to
fund provision of prenatal care to all women,373 it could no more
refuse prenatal care to all lIV-positive women, than it could to all
sight-impaired women or all African-American women. Such restric-
tions would violate both the Equal Protection Clause and civil rights
protections for the disabled. 4 For the same reasons, government
could not require directive counseling in prenatal care for EIV-posi-
tive women while providing prenatal care that fully respects the
informed consent rights of all other women.
Directive counseling provisions would also be invalidated be-
cause they do not firther a legitimate state interest. While under
the mother's life was at stake); see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8 (upholding
Connecticut welfare regulation because it did not "penalize the women's decision to have
an abortion by refusing to pay for it"); see also Roberts, supra note 24, at 1468 (arguing
that criminal prosecution of drug addicted women "exact[s] a severe penalty on the drug
user for choosing to complete her pregnancy").
369. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1765. Under the regulations upheld in Rust,
providers receiving federal grants may not refer a pregnant woman to an abortion
provider, "even upon specific request. One permissible response to such an inquiry is that
'the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and
therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.'" Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5)
(1991)).
373. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. at 1772 (observing that "[a] doctor who wished to
offer prenatal care to a project patient who became pregnant could properly be prohibited
from doing so because such service is outside the scope of the... program").
374. See discussion infra parts IV.3, IV.B.
1993] 403
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the recently-enunciated standard in Casey, the state can regulate
the informed consent dialogue to promote its legitimate interest in
protecting fetal life, 75 it cannot manipulate this dialogue to prevent,
harm, or destroy fetal life. 6
2. No State Interest Justifies Outlawing HIV Childbearing.
Since Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has permitted restrictions on
abortion rights to safeguard the potential life of the fetus, so long as
the restrictions do not endanger the woman's health or life. State
governments might attempt to rely upon this interest in fetal health
to justify interference with HIV-positive women's rights. In addition,
a state's interest in protecting child welfare might be asserted to
justify reproductive coercion. A state might also assert its interest in
protecting its citizenry from the fiscal burden of supporting the
children of parents unlikely to be able to care for their children.
None of these interests, however, should survive strict scrutiny.
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy.3 7 8
However, statutes seeking to penalize HTV-positive women for be-
coming pregnant or continuing their pregnancies do not further this
375. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2824 (1992).
376. Arguably, using directive counseling to discourage or prevent pregnancy of HIV-
positive women would violate the principle articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma. See
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating a statute which sought to prevent
the birth of "socially undesirable offspring"). See infra note 381 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the state's economic interest.
377. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). Despite the Supreme Court's rejection
in Casey of the trimester structure, and its recognition that the state has a legitimate in-
terest in fetal life throughout pregnancy, it retained the principle that the state's interest
in the life of the fetus is not compelling until after viability. Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (joint opinion) (stating "at the
outset and with clarity that Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm... is the
State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger a woman's life or health"). Accordingly, states have been per-
mitted to criminalize post-viability abortion. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386-
87 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60-65 (1976); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 163-64. States may also require that a second physician be present
when'post-viability abortions are performed, Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). Additionally, states may require that testing be performed,
when consistent with prudent medical practice, to determine whether a post twenty-week
fetus is viable. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513-21 (1989).
However, even when recognized as compelling, the state's interest in fetal life has not
been permitted to justify imperiling the health or life of the woman. Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating a
requirement that post-viability abortions utilize methods most likely to preserve the life
of the fetus because such methods endangered the woman's health).
378. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804 (joint
opinion); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. at 519 (holding that a
state's interest in potential life is compelling throughout pregnancy).
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interest, since prohibiting conception will prevent any fetal life from
coming into being, including the seventy percent who will not be-
come infected with their mothers' lLIVY s Just as a state could not,
in the name of safeguarding children's health, order the execution of
all sick children, so too a state cannot seek to eliminate pediatric
AIDS by forcibly preventing BIV-positive women from giving birth.
Indeed, prevention of the birth of "socially undesirable offspring"
was the state's purpose in enacting the statute invalidated fifty
years ago in Skinner v. Oklahoma,"' and has been widely con-
demned as an improper state interest.38' Once pregnant, the only
379. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J.
697 (1990). He states that:
Negligently or even intentionally bringing a genetically handicapped child into
the world cannot really be considered a wrong to offspring. The "responsible" re-
productive behavior urged as the preferable alternative would have prevented
birth altogether, hardly a gain for the offspring being protected.... If the life
were truly wrongful, then there would be a duty to immediately cease all treat-
ment and maintenance. The period of time alive would then be so small that it
would hardly seem sufficient to justify intrusion into procreative choice.
Id. at 716-17.
380. 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).
381. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 454 (IVLD.N.C. 1976) ("Most competent geneticists now reject social Darwinism and
doubt the premise implicit in Mr. Justice Holmes' incantation that '... three generations
of imbeciles is enough.'"); Scott, supra note 33, at 807; Sherlock & Sherlock, supra note
44, at 947, 949-51. "The eugenic justifications [for compulsory sterilization statutes]
originally articulated are now repudiated by most medical experts and hardly would pro-
vide a compelling state interest." Id. (citing American Ass'n on Mental Deficiency,
Sterilization of Persons Who Are Mentally Retarded: Proposed Official Policy Statement
of the American Ass. on Mental Deficiency, MENTAL RETARDATION, Apr. 1974, at 59); see,
e.g. Elyce Z. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit -Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
591 (1966); Charles W. Murdock, Sterilization of the Retarded: A Problem or Solution?, 62
CAL. L. REV. 917 (1974); DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Development, 887
F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (recognizing that Congress' intent in challenged law was to
limit use of funds for international family planning to prevent involuntary sterilizations);
Alan Guttmacher Inst. v. McPherson, 805 F.2d 1088 (2d Cir. 1986) (challenging the
agency decision to deny funding for publishing articles that tended to proselytize the le-
galization of abortions); Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(recognizing that Congress' intent in challenged law was to prohibit use of international
family planning funds for coerced abortions); Mildred G. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760, 782
(Cal. 1985) (Bird, J., dissenting) (perceiving the majority opinion, by invalidating state
law prohibiting sterilization of mentally incompetent women, as opening "the door to
abusive sterilization practices which will serve the convenience of conservators, parents
and service providers rather than incompetent conservatees. The ugly history of
sterilization abuse against developmentally disabled persons in the name of seemingly
enlightened social policies counsels a different choice."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 356 (1972) (rejecting the objective of preventing criminals from procreating as
justification for the death penalty, noting that "this Nation has never formally professed
eugenic goals, and the history of the world does not look kindly upon them"). But see
George P. Smith H, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally Handicapped,
4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 71 (1988) (arguing that the concept of reproductive
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way for an BIV-positive woman to avoid violating criminal trans-
mission laws would be to abort the pregnancy. Thus, such statutes
would actually serve to discourage the creation of or to destroy fetal
life, rather than to preserve it. 3 2
Similarly, civil statutes seeking to prevent HIV-positive women
from conceiving or from continuing pregnancies cannot be said to
fulfill the state interest in protecting fetal life because such statutes
promote fetal destruction or prevent the possibility that a fetus will
come to life at all. For example, Casey held that directive counseling
seeking to deter pregnant women from obtaining abortions fulfilled
the state's interest in preserving fetal life and therefore was permis-
sible.38 However, directive counseling to HIV-positive women en-
couraging them not to conceive or to abort would not further the
state's interest in protecting fetal life. No fetus is helped by such
counseling.
State governments might also attempt to justify laws against
HIV childbearing as a means of preventing the birth of children who
are likely to be inadequately cared for by their mothers and thus to
become wards of the state.38 However, the state's desire to save
money is not a compelling interest which justifies denial of funda-
mental constitutional rights.8 As such, courts should not permit the
freedom for mentally handicapped individuals should be viewed in terms of the social con-
tract and that sterilization of mentally handicapped and incompetent individuals serves
the ends of the social contract).
382. The other state interest served is retributive: HIV-positive women are punished
for child-bearing. This is not a state interest which justifies interference with the
childbearing right. The government's legitimate message regarding HIV and pregnancy is
that women should make informed choices about procreation. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 762 (striking a statute
in part because the information it required to be imparted it "may serve only to confuse
and punish" a woman); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972); Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The majority in Carey held that the state could not le-
gitimately discourage teenage sexual relations by imposing pregnancy as punishment be-
cause it restricted their access to contraceptives. Justice Stevens explained that the
"attempt to persuade by inflicting harm.., is an unacceptable means of conveying a mes-
sage that is otherwise legitimate." Id. at 715-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
383. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24.
384. The likelihood that some states might rely upon this justification is demon-
strated by their reliance upon it in their laws for sterilization of incompetent women. See
supra note 341 and accompanying text.
385. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) (reaffirming prisoners' right to access
to courts by being afforded law library and trained researchers and noting that "[tlhis is
not to say that economic factors may not be considered.... But the cost of protecting a
constitutional right cannot justify its total denial"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
634 (1969) (holding that the waiting-period provision denying welfare benefits to
otherwise eligible recipients solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction
is not supported by a compelling state interest); Monmouth County Correctional Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 336-37 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that inmates right to
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fundamental right to bear children to be curtailed merely on the
basis of economic efficiency.
Moreover, the state cannot presume that a partidular class of
people is incapable of parenting and deny members of the class that
right because the right to rear one's children is fundamental.3817
Instead, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual has been an unfit parent to a particular child.8 s Thus,
state policies seeking to preempt HIV-positive women from becom-
ing parents based on a presumption of unfit parenting should fail
constitutional scrutiny.8 9
3. Constitutional Protections of Childbearing Rights Are Not
Diminished by Disability. A woman's right to have a child is not
diminished by the fact that she is HIV-positive. Though no court has
directly ruled on this issue, court holdings on analogous issues, prin-
ciples of equality and equal protection, and general civil rights pro-
abortion cannot be denied because prison views cost of providing off-site surgery
prohibitive), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988); Society for Goodwill to Retarded Children
v. Casey, 572 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that budgetary constraints could not
justify refusal to provide constitutionally-required level of care for institutionalized re-
tarded children); Involuntary Sterilization in Georgia, supra note 340, at 84-85
(explaining that Georgia General Assembly's legislative intent in passing its involuntary
sterilization law, to prevent itself from being saddled with support of children of mental
incompetent parents, is impermissible).
386. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when unwed fathers' parental rights can be terminated without
hearing, while all other parents are accorded hearing on fitness to parent prior to
termination); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (holding that a statute
requiring prior court approval for the marriage of anyone already having an obligation to
support minor children violated the Equal Protection Clause in that it impermissibly re-
stricted the fundamental right of the affected class to marry and raise children).
387. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that termina-
tion of parental rights affects a fundamental liberty interest); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 649 (1972) (holding that, due to the importance of the right, due process is violated if
parental rights of an unwed father are denied without a hearing).
388. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 768-70 (requiring clear and convincing
evidence standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. at 656-57 (insisting that an individualized determination of parental fitness be
made).
389. This is true even if most HIV-positive women do not prove to be fit parents. The
Court has held that the state may not presume that unmarried fathers are unfit parents
even if "most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful parents." Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. at 654. A number of appellate courts have invalidated attempts by trial
courts to make pregnancy or childbearing a violation of probation for women convicted of
child endangerment or child abuse. See State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. of
Appeals 1989); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 362-66 (Ct. App. 1984); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). Although such women may be
prevented from retaining custody of the children they bear, People v. Pointer, 199 Cal
Rptr. at 365, they may not be constitutionally prevented from bearing them.
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tections for the disabled compel this result.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that a ter-
minally-ill pregnant woman could not be compelled to undergo a
Cesarean section for the alleged benefit of her viable fetus.9 In
reaching its decision, the court ruled that "the right to bodily integ-
rity is not extinguished simply because someone is ill, or even at
death's door."3 9'
Indeed, as the body of law regarding sterilization of mentally
incompetent women makes clear, the fact that a woman is disabled
actually heightens rather than diminishes the procedural legal
protections afforded her right to bear children.3 92 This heightened
protection arises from repudiation of state policies authorizing
eugenic sterilization of the disabled and from the recognition that
third parties often seek to infringe upon disabled women's childbear-
ing wishes in order to serve those parties' sense of fiscal austerity,
convenience, morality, and other interests. 93 Government is prohib-
ited from sterilizing a mentally incompetent person in order to pro-
tect itself from the potential genetic and financial burden of children
who might be born absent sterilization.3
390. In reAC., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. App. 1990).
391. Id. at 1247; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (acknowledging
that the right to self-determination should not be lost merely because an individual is un-
able to sense a violation of it and holding that incompetent individuals retain the right to
refuse treatment).
392. Some jurisdictions have banned sterilization of incompetent persons altogether
because of the history and current potential for abuse of mentally incompetent women's
childbearing rights. The majority of states, however, permit sterilization provided certain
conditions are met which protect the disabled person's interest in autonomy and other in-
terests. When a woman is mentally incompetent to make a decision about whether to be
sterilized, the state may not disregard her right to autonomy in childbearing decisions.
Instead, a substitute decision-maker must make the decision for her, based upon what
her wishes are, if they are known, or based upon her best interests. Scott, supra note 33,
at 807-25; Smith, supra note 380, at 79-82. See In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635
(Wash. 1980) The Hayes court established a rigorous substantive and procedural standard
for authorizing sterilization of the mentally incompetent. The standard requires, inter
alia, that the person be found not competent to make her own decision, that other forms
of contraception be impracticable, and that it be in her ovn best interest not to have a
child, as opposed to the best interest of her caretaker. In addition, the court must attempt
to elicit the woman's views about whether she wants to be sterilized, and must evaluate
her capacity to care for her child. Id. at 641.
393. See Scott, supra note 33, at 821-22; see also, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp.
1383, 1384 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (holding that sterilizations of mentally incompetent residents
of a mental institution are permissible only when in the "best interest of a resident,"
which interest shall not be determined "on the basis of institutional convenience or purely
administrative considerations"); In re Truesdell, 329 S.E.2d 630 (N.C. 1985) (noting,
among other things, that the fact that menstruation of mentally retarded woman who
was incapable of caring for herself caused problems for her caretaker was not an interest
justifying performing a hysterectomy on her).
394. In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1382 (Pa. 1982)); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366 (Col.
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Moreover, a policy that diminishes a woman's reproductive
rights because she is HIV-positive contravenes civil rights protec-
tions for the disabled. Under the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA), 95 discrimination against handicapped people, including
those who are HIV-positive,3" is prohibited by government entities 97
and in certain public accommodations. 9s Congress specifically envi-
sioned the government entity provisions to apply to law enforcement
agencies.29 The ADA-might also apply to substantive acts of judges
and legislatures, though congressional intent on this point is not
explicit.40  The public accommodations sections explicitly cover
1981)); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (N.J. 1981); Scott, supra note 33, at 821; Smith,
supra note 381, at 80-81; Deborah D. Davis, Note, Addressing the Consent Issue Involved
in the Sterilization of Mentally Incompetent Females, 43 ALB. L. REV. 322, 326 (1979). But
see supra note 341.
395. Equal Opportunities for Individuals With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-
12,213 (Supp. I1 1991).
396. Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans With Disabilities Act Definition of Disability,
7 LAB. LAW. 11, 20 n.34 (1991) (summarizing legislative history in which supporters state
that the Act will cover and offer protection to HIV-positive workers); see also HENRY H.
PERRIrr JR., AMERICANs WrrH DIsABILITIES ACT HANDBOOK § 3.5, at 30-32 (2d ed. 1991)
(noting that discrimination of persons with "contagious diseases based on unsubstanti-
ated perceptions of the threat of a contagion" violates the ADA).
397.42 U.S.C. § 12,132 (Supp. 1 1991) ([N]o qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability ... be subject to discrimination by any [public
entity]."). This section's legislative history reveals that its intent was to extend to all state
and local governments and instrumentalities or agencies thereto the prohibitions against
discrimination contained in the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which are applicable
only to recipients of federal funds. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 366; H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 3,
at 49 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 472.
398.42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a) (Supp. II 1991) (The ADA states that "[n]o individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation.").
399. See H.R. REP No. 485, 101st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 85 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 337 (giving the example that under the law, police departments must install
technology to receive 911 emergency calls from deaf people); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st
Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 50, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 473 (stating that police and
jail authorities must be trained to recognize symptoms of epilepsy and to apply first aid
treatment for seizures to comply with the Act).
400. Robert Burgdorf Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
465 & n.266 (1991).
Since the statutory language does not limit its application to executive activities
of state and local governments, judicial and legislative actions may also be sub-
ject to the nondiscrimination requirements of the Act .... Arguably, the cover-
ages of the Act may extend even to substantive legislative and judicial action of
state and local governments. A state law or local ordinance that blatantly dis-
criminates against a class of individuals with disabilities presumably would be
subject to challenge under the statute. Likewise, a judge whose rulings evince
prejudice or malice against litigants on account of their disability would be
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health care providers.40 ' Interpreting the Act to prevent discrimina-
tion against disabled people in childbearing would comport with its
overall legislative intent to "assure equality of opportunity, [and]
full participation... in those opportunities for which our free society
is justifiably famous."0 2
Most states and many localities also provide civil rights protec-
tions against discriminatory treatment of disabled people.0 3 Some of
these laws may strengthen the argument that preventing Hi-posi-
tive women from fully enjoying their fundamental rights is unlawful.
B. Equal Protection Prohibits Outlawing Childbearing by HIV-
Positive Women
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
0 4
guarantees that government will not inflict invidious discrimination
upon its people. Pursuant to this clause, courts apply strict scrutiny
within the purview of the statute. Of course, such scrutiny of judicial and legis-
lative acts must be tempered by constraints of federalism... and must be car-
ried out with due regard for principles of legislative and judicial immunity
where applicable.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,202 (Supp. m 1991) (specifying that a state shall not be im-
mune under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution from an action in federal
court for a violation of the Act and that all remedies will be available against the state as
are available against any other private or public entity).
401.42 U.S.C. § 12,181(7)(F) (Supp. I1 1991) ("The following private entities are
considered public accommodations ... pharmacy,... professional office of a health care
provider, hospital, or other service establishment.").
402. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 (8) & (9) (Supp. III 1991) (findings and purposes of the Act);
"The social consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship
to the physical or mental limitations imposed by the disability. For example. ... it has
meant... being deemed an 'unfit parent.'" H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 267, 323 (statement of Arlene Mayerson,
Testimony before House Subcom. on Select Education and Employment Opportunities,
Ser. No. 101-51, Sept. 13, 1989, at 78-79); see also Faden et al., supra note 14, at 338-39.
See generally Asch, supra note 23. Cf Marian Blackwell-Stratten et al., The
Abortion/Baby Doe Controversy: A Disability Perspective, in FROM ABORTION TO
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, supra note 87, at 241 ("Disabled women.., have never been
considered fit as mothers.... 'Historically child custody suits almost always have ended
with custody being awarded to the non-disabled parent, regardless of whether affection or
socioeconomic advantages could have been offered by the non-disabled parent."(citation
omitted)).
403. Eisenstat, supra note 265, at 356-577 (summarizing state and local statutory
provisions for nonconsensual HIV testing); e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.665 (Vernon Supp,
1992) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of HIV-positive status); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
130A-148 (1992) (containing nondiscrimination protections based on HIV status); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-6-22 (1989) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of HIV status); W.
VA. CODE § 16-3C-6 (1991) (prohibiting discrimination in the provision of health care on
the basis of HIV status).
404. "No state shall.., deny to any person.., the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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to classifications affecting a "suspect class" of people4 .5 or those bur-
dening a fundamental right or interest.406 Laws or governmental
policies restricting the childbearing rights of HIV-positive women
would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause
not because they involve a suspect classification,4 7 but rather be-
405. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to
hold that state statutes denying welfare benefits to resident aliens based oi citizenship
violate the Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict
scrutiny to hold that statutes prohibiting and punishing marriage on the basis of race are
unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1953) (applying strict scrutiny
to hold that the segregation of children in public schools based solely on race denies equal
protection); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (applying strict scrutiny to hold that
state court enforcement of private agreements restricting use or occupancy of certain real
estate on the basis of race violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (stating that all legal restrictions curtailing the civil rights of
a single race are suspect and must be subjected to rigid scrutiny); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that the selection or exclusion ofjurors on the basis
of race or color violates the Equal Protection Clause).
406. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing a fundamental right to
marry); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973)
(recognizing the fundamental right to participate in elections on equal basis with other
qualified voters); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-49 (1972) (recognizing the
fundamental right to control procreation and that such right calls for strict equal
protection scrutiny;, the court did not apply strict scrutiny because "the law fails to satisfy
even the more lenient equal protection standard"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(holding a state law prohibiting interracial marriage to strict scrutiny and, in light of this
standard, invalidating such a law on due process and equal protection grounds); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to statutory provision de-
nying welfare assistance unless applicant resided within the state for more than a year
because it infringed upon the fundamental right to travel, despite the fact that indigents
are not a suspect class); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (implying that the
fundamental right of political association encompasses right of candidates and political
parties to be listed on election ballots among voters' choices by examining whether
government has a compelling interest in regulating such conduct); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing the fundamental right to procreate and invalidating
restrictions by applying strict scrutiny review).
407. The class of people with disabilities has never been held to be suspect. Since
1985, measures impacting upon people with disabilities are accorded only rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985). However, in the Findings and Purposes Section of the recently enacted
ADA, Congress inserted a constellation of phrases used to denote the qualifications of a
constitutionally "suspectr classification entitled to strict judicial scrutiny. Burgdorf, supra
note 400, at 436-37. The Act states:
Individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful un-
equal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our so-
ciety, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals
and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society ....
42 U.S.C. § 12,101(a)(7) (Supp. I1 1991). While this Article's analysis presumes that
discrimination on the basis of HIV status would be accorded only the lowest level of equal
protection review, the reader is alerted to this argument for application of a higher level
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cause they interfere with a woman's fundamental right to bear chil-
dren. Courts should invalidate such laws or governmental policies
on equal protection grounds 408 because such measures substantially
interfere with the right to bear children and do not fulfill a compel-
ling state interest.40
9
Even assuming arguendo that courts found that the applica-
tion of HIV containment law to childbearing fulfilled a compelling
state interest, such application would necessarily be both grossly
over and under inclusive. Therefore, it should still be found uncon-
stitutional under an equal protection strict scrutiny analysis. The
fact that a statute affecting a fundamental right is over or underin-
clusive is not necessarily fatal in constitutional review. However,
when a measure targets a group that is the object of fear, prejudice,
and hatred, such as HIV-positive women, doubt is cast as to the
sincerity of the public objective it purportedly serves.410 Moreover,
unless overbreadth is a necessary outcome of fulfilling the state
interest-which is not the case here-it will serve to invalidate a
statute.41'
Prohibiting the class of women known to be HIV-infected from
childbearing and allowing all other women to freely procreate is not
a sufficiently narrowly-tailored policy for several reasons. Such
policies should be found to be fatally underinclusive for two reasons.
First, if prohibitions or punishments are enforced only against
women known to be HIV-positive, then all infected women who do
not know their serostatus will escape coercion, and could freely give
birth to potentially infected children. Second, some disabilities,
including Tay-Sachs, sickle cell anemia, neural tube defects, and
of scrutiny. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding an equal protection invali-
dation of a law requiring undocumented immigrants to pay tuition to public schools); see
also Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
121, 158 (1989).
Additionally, given the demographics of the AIDS epidemic, a race based equal
protection challenge might also be possible to the extent that HIV containment law has a
disproportionate impact on African-American and Latin-American women. A prima facie
case of intent to discriminate on the basis of race might be established under a statistical
disparity approach to an equal protection violation claim. This approach has been argued
to provide a basis to challenge the prosecution of drug addicted African-American women
who become pregnant. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 1451-54.
408. Strict scrutiny review for fundamental rights under equal protection is the same
as strict scrutiny review for Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process. Galloway,
supra note 407, at 150.
409. See discussion supra part IV.A.2.
410. Gostin, supra note 85, at 1034; Sullivan & Field, supra note 138, at 149.
411. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (acknowledging that al-
though some teenagers who already communicate with family will be burdened by
parental consent law, this fact does not invalidate the law because that outcome is neces-
sary to fulfill purpose of the statute).
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cystic fibrosis, are just as serious as HIV infection for infants.4 12
These disabilities can be detected either pre-conception or prena-
tally with greater precision than HIV.413 Hence, a policy targeting
only known HIV-positive women in an effort to prevent the suffering
of future children would be grossly underinclusive in reaching the
goal of preventing detectable childhood disabilities.
Such policies should also be found to be fatally overinclusive. If
all known HIV-infected women are subjected to coercion, such as
mandatory contraceptive implants, many women will be unnecessar-
fly subjected to drastic bodily intervention. Many HIV-positive
women will never become pregnant and others will voluntarily abort
when they become pregnant.
Outlawing HIV childbearing is also both under and overinclu-
sive as to the asserted state interest in protecting children from
inadequate parenting. Although most HIV-positive women will die
before their children reach the age of majority, some children of
HIV-positive women will be cared for by their fathers, extended
family members, or friends when their mothers die or become too
sick to care for them. Thus, the policy would be overinclusive be-
412. Tay-Sachs almost certainly causes a short, painful life for affected offspring. See
Acuff & Faden, supra note 320, at 71-72. 'Babies born with Tay-Sachs face inevitable
death at the age of three to five years. There is no cure, and the disease is very painful."
Cynthia S. Adelman, The Constitutionality of Mandatory Genetic Screening Statutes, 31
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 897, 913 n.112. Children with sickle cell anemia, after six months of
age, typically have "symptoms such as failure to thrive, serious infections, and severe
anemia." Kass supra note 5, at 310 (citing HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
at 1877-78 (Robert G. Petersdorf et al. eds., 10th ed. 1983). Anecephely makes up 60% of
all cases of neural tube defects and is uniformly fatal. Spina bifida, the other major form
of neural tube defects, affects offspring to varying degrees. Surviving infants experience
disabilities ranging from weakness of the limbs to paralysis with incontinence, and, occa-
sionally, mental retardation. Repeated corrective surgery is not uncommon. Acuff &
Faden, supra note 319, at 72-75. Although children with cystic fibrosis now survive, on
the average, to 20 years of age, "for many, the disease remains fatal in childhood and
early adult life. Classically, a child with cystic fibrosis presents with intestinal problems
in the first year of life. Other obstructions of organ passages cause additional problems
later in life due to abnormal composition of the mucus." Kass, supra note 5, at 310.
Seventy-five percent of HIV-infected children will have symptoms by two years of
age. Twenty-five percent of these children will die within the first two years, and 75% will
die by age five. Id.
413. Amniocentesis is a type of prenatal screening that can be used to detect Tay-
Sachs, sickle cell anemia, spina bifida, and cystic fibrosis. Robertson, supra note 379, at
709. The technique is 99.4% accurate, Adelman, supra note 412, at 902 n.36, and is
utilized to detect these diseases 14 to 16 weeks into the pregnancy. Robertson, supra note
379, at 709. Prenatal screening may be performed even earlier, at eight to ten weeks, via
chorion villi sampling. Id.
Currently, prenatal screening of HIV would prove futile. All babies born to HIV-
infected women will test positive for the HIV antibody, but most are not actually infected.
Serologic tests are only considered diagnostic of HIV infection after the infant reaches 15
months of age. See discussion supra note 94.
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cause children of some HIV-positive mothers will be well-cared for
by their families. On the other hand, this policy would be underin-
clusive because many children are surrendered, .abandoned, or-
phaned, or mistreated for reasons completely unrelated to HIV in-
fection.414 On both of these grounds, policies prohibiting or penaliz-
ing only HIV childbearing in order to protect children from inade-
quate parenting should fail an equal protection challenge. 41 The
under and overinclusiveness of policies restricting childbearing to
HI V-positive women are not necessary outcomes of fulfilling compel-
ling state interests. Indeed, a more effective way to prevent perina-
tal transmission of HIV would be to use voluntary measures.
C. Mandatory HIVAntibody Testing of Pregnant and Post-Partum
Women
The fundamental right to bear children protects information re-
lating to childbearing decisions from government compelled disclo-
sure.416 As the Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,417 has explained,
"tlhe cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions."418 The interest in nondisclosure is particularly
acute regarding constitutionally protected "unpopular [ activi-
ties."419 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly stated that a person is
entitled to "anonymity" in the exercise of unpopular fundamental
rights.420
Fundamental protections apply to any health care procedure
414. In addition, such policies are underinclusive because they do not address the
parenting needs of children whose mothers contracted HIV infection after giving birth.
415. See Wright, supra note 339, at 85-88 (explaining that Georgia's involuntary
sterilization law would fail an equal protection challenge because it is underinclusive in
its protection of children from neglect and abuse).
416. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It
is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision* that the right may be exercised
without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other
third parties."); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617
(1989) (holding that railway employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to
such medical facts as whether one "is epileptic, pregnant or diabetic."); Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976) (permitting statute requiring
reports concerning abortions if used only for statistical purposes and assured anonymity
of patients); Jones v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 156-57 (1981).
417. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
418. Id. at 598-600.
419. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
767(1986).
420. Id. at 766; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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which by virtue of its link to the right to bear children is targeted by
the state.421 Thus, a policy of unconsented HIV antibody testing of
pregnant or post-partum women and/or of reporting positive results
will invoke the fundamental right to privacy because testing is trig-
gered by women's childbearing decisions. This heightened constitu-
tional protection enhances the privacy interest that anyone has in
information concerning their HIV status, irrespective of childbear-
ing.422
The state has no interest to justify forced disclosure and public
reporting of pregnant women's HIV status because government
cannot permissibly interfere in an lIV-positive woman's decision to
continue a pregnancy.42 Nor should the state's interest in curbing
perinatal transmission, its interest in treating potentially-infected
children, or its interest in monitoring the incidence of perinatal
transmission be found to justify forced testing of pregnant or post-
partum women.
421. Thus, legal regulation of standards for all health care procedures, only inciden-
tally applicable to childbirth, do not invoke the right to bear children. However, as was
true in the abortion context prior to Casey, regulations targeting childbearing-related
health care for special treatment should be scrutinized for their "impact on the woman's
exercise of her right." City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 430
(1983); see Adelman, supra note 411, at 926. Cf., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2824 (1992) (joint opinion):
[We depart from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that we
permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn
by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and in-
formed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion.
422. The privacy interest attached to HIV status is generally recognized as great. See
Eisenstat, supra note 264, at 357. Indeed, several state legislatures have enacted
fundamental protections for disclosure of HIV status that are unrelated to childbearing
status or activities. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.243(c)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1990)
(stating that in order for a court to order disclosure of HIV status, it must find that there
is a compelling need that cannot be accommodated in any other way which outweighs
both the individual's privacy interest and the public interest in noncoercion); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 760B (1993) (stating that a court cannot order testing of unconsenting indi-
vidual or unconsented release of information concerning HIV status unless it finds there
is "a compelling need for that information which cannot be accommodated by other
means"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-136 (Law Co-op. 1991) (requiring, in the law enforce-
ment context, a court order for disclosure of sexually transmitted disease records,
including HIV, to be based on finding that release is necessary to enforce regulations con-
cerning the control and treatment of a sexually transmitted disease and that it fulfills a
compelling need which outweighs the person's privacy interest and the public interest in
nondisclosure); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1705 (Supp. 1991) (prohibiting a court from
ordering release of HIV information unless it finds a compelling need for release which
cannot be accommodated by other means); W. VA. CODE § 16-3C-3(a)(8) (1991) (allowing
court ordered disclosure of HEV-related test recipient's identity or test results upon a
showing of compelling need).
423. See discussion supra part IV.L-2.
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The fundamental nature of the "right to have offspring"42A has
paradoxical legal implications. On the one hand, government regula-
tion must fulfill weighty interests to justify burdening a woman's
exercise of the right to bear children because of the importance of
the right. Courts have struck down laws allegedly passed to safe-
guard informed consent to abortion as unjustified burdens on the
right to abortion.4  On the other hand, because of the importance of
the right, it is appropriate for government to take measures to en-
sure that the right will be protected.4" The promulgation of elabo-
rate informed consent regulations for tubal ligations following reve-
lations of sterilization abuse42 demonstrate the lengths to which
government can go to protect informed consent involving fundamen-
tal rights.
Abortion cases regarding informed consent prior to Casey
treated abortion as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court had
allowed medical regulations which comported with standard medical
practice, if the regulations had "no significant impact on the
woman's exercise of her right... [and were] justified by important
state health objectives."428 In addition, regulations were required to
"properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy."429 The
Court held, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
that it was permissible to require a woman's prior written consent to
424. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
425. E.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. at 759-65; City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 442-51. But see
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (joint opinion).
Casey explains that Akron and Thornburgh incorrectly held as unconstitutional
requirements that "truthful and nonmisleading information about the nature of the
[abortion] procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable
gestational age' of the fetus" be given. However, insofar as Akron and Thornburgh
describe requirements by the state to impart information which is not truthful, or is
misleading, those cases limit the state from enacting such requirements. Thus, post-
Casey, bona fide informed consent laws would be upheld, while laws designed to burden,
rather than to inform, a woman in this decision would be struck down.
426. See statutes cited supra note 243, requiring informed consent for HIV antibody
testing.
427. See discussion supra part I.B.
428. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 430 (ruling that proce-
dures having a direct and significant impact must be justified by strict scrutiny). See e.g.,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 514-515 (1989) (holding that the vi-
ability determination requirement must be read to only compel those tests which
according to "reasonable professional judgment" are safe and necessary); id. at 530
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that.requiring ultra sound examination when medi-
cally prudent was permissible based upon amici statement that it is "standard medical
practice" to conduct such tests to determine viability prior to performing an abortion
when the woman is thought to be farther along than twenty weeks gestation);
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 762.
429. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976).
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abortion, even when such consent was not required for any other
medical procedure, because of the importance of the abortion
decision.430 This requirement did not "interfere with physician-
patient consultation or with the woman's choice between abortion
and childbirth" 43' and furthered the state's interest in ensuring that
a woman had freely consented to the abortion procedure. 432 However,
when the effect of abortion informed consent regulations was to
"influence the woman's informed choice between childbirth and
abortion," they were considered "obstacles" to the exercise of her
right and were invalidated.433 After Casey, however, states may
regulate informed consent dialogues with the objective of attempting
to influence a woman to forego abortion in favor of childbirth. Casey
permits such dialogue because of the state's interest in protecting
fetal life. The dialogue is permitted so long as the regulations do not
impose an "undue burden" on the woman and the woman is provided
only "truthful and not misleading" information.4 4
Casey purportedly preserves the standard regarding reporting
medical information related to the exercise of the right to abortion
enunciated in Danforth. The Danforth Court stated that
"recordkeeping and reporting provisions 'that are reasonably di-
rected to the preservation of maternal health and that properly
respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible."435
Hence, reporting of abortion-related information could be required
when it is to be used "only for statistical purposes,"436 which would
advance legitimate state interests.437 A state can require that re-
cords be kept and submitted to public health authorities which
document the statistical incidence of abortion without revealing the
identities of the women involved. 38 Prior to Casey, regulations
requiring recordkeeping which would potentially reveal identifica-
tion of patients obtaining or physicians rendering abortions were
impermissible, even though the patient's name and address were not
430. Id. at 85.
431. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 430.
432. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67.
433. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 445; see also
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 759-64.
434. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823 (joint
opinion).
435. Id. at 2832 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at
80).
436. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 87.
437. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at
766.
438. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 (joint
opinion); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80-81.
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reported.43 9 Moreover, requiring reports of medically irrelevant infor-
mation was unconstitutional.44°
As explained in the next two parts, state-mandated uncon-
sented HIV-testing and publicly reporting HIV-positive women's
identities constitute impermissible interference with the childbear-
ing right. Such requirements serve no compelling state purpose and
only attempt to influence EIV-positive women to abort or to increase
their anxiety for choosing to bear a child. Compelled knowledge of
one's EIV status inherently implicates the childbearing right.
1. Forced Disclosure of HIV Status Constitutes Significant
Interference with Procreation. Compulsory HIV antibody testing of
pregnant or post-partum women constitutes direct and substantial
interference with childbearing regardless of whether physical coer-
cion is involved in extracting the blood sample. Such action requires
a compelling state interest to withstand Fourteenth Amendment
scrutiny.
Clearly, the forcible taking of blood is a significant bodily intru-
sion.4" However, even when blood has been freely given,442 subject-
ing the blood to unconsented HIV antibody testing implicates the
right to bear children because that right provides protection for the
information contained in the blood. 43
On the other hand, offering women, pregnant or not, the oppor-
tunity to be tested for HIV antibodies, and providing full informa-
tion to them about the mechanics of the test and its health and
social implications, would clearly enhance informed consent.
439. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at
766-67. In the context of diminished constitutional status for abortion rights, Casey per-
mits requiring physicians' names to be reported, as well as the state and county of
residence of women obtaining abortions. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33 (joint opinion). These two provisions had previously been
invalidated. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
at 766-67.
440. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at
766. Again within the context of diminished protections for abortion, Casey allows the
most restrictive reporting requirements since 1973, stating that "[tihe collection of
information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and so
it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion
more difficult. Nor do we find that the requirements impose a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33
(joint opinion).
441. See discussion infra part V.
442. Prenatal BIV antibody testing could be performed on a blood sample freely
given by the woman. Post-partum testing could be conducted on the umbilical cord blood
sample or from the blood sample of the newborn, both of which are routinely taken for
testing upon the birth of the child.
443. See discussion infra part V.D.
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Moreover, all women should be told about HIV, its modes of trans-
mission, and the availability of HIV testing and treatments as part
of pregnancy-related health care. States are free to require physi-
cians to counsel pregnant women about HIV and to offer testing.44
However, it is impermissible to force a pregnant woman to learn her
HIV status, and to undergo the informed consent dialogue concern-
ing the fact that she is HIV-positive, when she chooses not to know.
Forcing knowledge of HIV status upon a woman and publicly
recording it because she decides to continue a pregnancy will signifi-
cantly interfere with her right to make procreation decisions free
from state intimidation and public scrutiny. Such information may
be irrelevant for a woman determined to continue her pregnancy
regardless of HIV status."5 Indeed, foisting knowledge of HIV status
upon her could impermissibly cause her anxiety," which could af-
fect both her own and her baby's well-being." 7
In addition, forcing such a woman to know her BIV status
while pregnant will have the effect of impermissibly "officially struc-
turing" the "dialogue between the woman and her physician.""8 A
444. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 33.5123 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring prenatal
testing for HIV, Hepatitis B, and venereal disease after obtaining informed consent un-
less the health care provider's professional opinion is that these tests are medically inad-
visable); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-11-19(a) (1989) (requiring that "[e]very physician or health
care provider attending any person for prenatal or family planning services shall offer
testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) unless deemed inappropriate by the
physician"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.24.095 (West 1992) (requiring AIDS counseling
for all pregnant women).
445. She may be opposed to abortion on religious grounds, or for a host of other
reasons. Levine & Dubler, supra note 172, at 331-36; see Thornburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at 763 (noting that it is impermissible to tell
all women seeking abortion that father of fetus is liable for child support because some
women seek abortion as result of rape); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2823 (joint opinion) (noting that it is permissible to require women
obtaining abortions to be told "truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of
the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the 'probable gesta-
tional age' of the fetus" as well as that materials concerning the consequences to the fetus
be made available if the woman desires to see them).
446. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
at 762 ("This is not medical information that is always relevant to the woman's decision,
and it may serve only to confuse and punish her and to heighten her anxiety, contrary to
accepted medical practice.").
447. As such, it is unconstitutional "state medicine imposed on the woman." Id. at
763. An anonymous HIV counselor has cited one compelling example of such anxiety. One
woman, who was pregnant with twins and lived in a homeless shelter, repeatedly told her
pre-test counselor that she would kill herself if she found out she was HIV-positive.
Despite these warnings, and with what the counselor considers less than adequate
consent, the woman was tested for HIV. When informed of her positive status she
disappeared from the shelter. Interview, supra note 124, at 3-4.
448. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at
763. But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2824 (joint
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health care provider who knows a pregnant woman's HIV status
would be obligated to counsel her on the risks to herself and her
fetus that HIV and pregnancy may pose, as well as her options re-
garding the pregnancy. In today's climate of stigmatization of HIV
infection and especially of childbearing by HIV-positive women, it is
possible that such counseling could include attempts to impermissi-
bly "influence the woman's informed choice between abortion and
childbirth."4
9
Accordingly, heightened privacy protections for women would
accrue particularly in contexts where they would be subject to dif-
ferential treatment with respect to their childbearing potential if
their HIV status were known.450 Thus, the fundamental right to
childbearing should clearly attach to information about HI sero-
status and accordingly, to HIV antibody testing procedures, in the
context of a state or locality which would prosecute an HIV-positive
woman for becoming pregnant and/or for continuing her pregnancy.
The same should be true in the context of a health care setting
where women known to be HIV-positive are subjected to directive
counseling to forego childbearing.
2. State Interests and Compulsory Disclosure and Reporting.
Mandatory disclosure of EIV status requires the state to have a
compelling interest in such disclosure. Strict scrutiny applies be-
cause forced HIV-antibody testing constitutes significant interfer-
ence with the fundamental right to bear children. However, no such
compelling interest exists.
The state's interest in protecting women's health and children's
health does not justify forced disclosure to a pregnant or post-par-
turn woman. Medicine cannot cure the woman of HIV infection; it
cannot prevent the child from facing a thirty percent chance of be-
opinion) (holding that requiring physician to inform patient seeking abortion of risks of
abortion and childbirth is part of reasonable licensing and regulation of the practice of
medicine).
449. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 443-444; see also supra
part IIA-B.
As the severity of the... disease [discovered prenatally] increases, the goal of
objectivity becomes more difficult to maintain. In counseling a client, for exam-
ple, who is pregnant with a fetus with Tay-Sachs disease, a genetic counselor's
opinion about the severity and hopelessness of the disease might lead him or
her to counsel aborting the fetus.... [A] mandatory screening program is only
one step in the implementation of any eugenics program.
Adelman, supra note 411, at 908-09.
450. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
at 767-68 (invalidating abortion reporting statute which "raise[d] the specter of public ex-
posure and harassment of women who choose to exercise their personal, intensely
private, right, with their physician, to end a pregnancy").
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coming infected; and it cannot cure an infected child or currently
effectively treat the potentially-infected fetus or child so that the
suffering associated with HIV infection would be substantially alle-
viated. The promise of treatment to prevent newborns from develop-
ing PCP may change the parameters of the debate on this score.451 It
could be argued that the possibility of treating an HIV-infected child
would outweigh the post-partum woman's privacy interest in her
HIV status. Knowledge that an infant tested HIV-positive, while not
indicating that the child is infected, could alert its health care
providers to the potential that it is infected and any HIV-related
symptoms would be more likely to form the basis for prescribing the
pneumonia prophylaxis. However, even the availability of this
treatment is unlikely to justify override of informed consent
rights. 52 Such override would allow the state interest in treating the
child to outweigh the woman's fundamental constitutional right.
Even if the state does have a compelling interest in monitoring
the AIDS epidemic, and particularly in monitoring the incidence of
HIV infection among childbearing women and their children, these
interests can be served by conducting antibody tests on blood sam-
ples routinely given for prenatal or postnatal tests. The HIV test
results can be recorded so that they are not traceable to the mother
or child. Such statistical monitoring is all that is required to fulfill
the state's epidemiological purposes, and would least intrusively
encroach upon a woman's privacy interests.453 Moreover, monitoring
perinatal transmission is best accomplished by requiring reports of
diagnosed HIV infection among children, particularly infants; the
reports need not be traceable to the child. Thus, the state has no
health interest in knowing a particular childbearing woman's or
infant's status sufficient to outweigh the woman's fundamental right
to pursue childbearing unimpeded by state-imposed disclosure of
HIV status.4 Furthermore, forced testing does not comport with
451. See discussion supra note 282 and accompanying text.
452. See discussion part I.E-F.
453. See The Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988)). The Act curbs government infringement upon
individuals' privacy as to personal information but allows for disclosure of such
information for use in statistical research or reporting as long as the individual is not
identifiable. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(l)-(12) (1988 and Supp. 1989).
454. One of the criticisms of epidemiological surveys of HIV in childbearing women is
that because they are conducted without consent, and therefore, their results must be un-
linked, women who are HIV-infected do not learn that they are positive through the sur-
vey. Thus, despite the huge commitment of resources that national neonatal surveillance
entails, no direct health services are provided to a population which seriously needs them.
See Scott H. Isaacman, Neonatal Testing: Governmental Inspection of the Baby Factory,
24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 571, 595-96 (1991). It is important to note, however, that the
purposes of the surveillance project are good ones: to gather data by which to target re-
19931
422 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
standard medical procedure.455
The government also has a legitimate interest in ensuring in-
formed consent in medical care generally, and in medical services
concerning the decision to continue a pregnancy in particular.4516
However, forcing a woman to submit to a test or to receive informa-
tion about her HIV status does not in any way further these inter-
ests. Indeed, forced medical care is the antithesis of informed con-
sent.
457
Forced disclosure and reporting of names of pregnant HIV-
positive women serves no health purpose. The only purposes that
such disclosure and reporting would fulfill, even in the absence of
coercive counseling, would be to pressure a woman to abort the
pregnancy and to "punish" her for her decision to give birth by forc-
ing her to confront the potentially devastating knowledge of HIV
infection.43 Forcing a post-partum woman to know her HIV status
would likewise serve no health purpose and would only serve to
punish her for giving birth. The Supreme Court "consistently has
refused to allow government to chill the exercise of constitutional
rights."459
source allocations, to monitor the impact of existing programs and to convince politicians
and health officials to commit sufficient resources. Id. at 593.
455. None of the major medical policy bodies recommend mandatory testing of
women in regard to child-bearing. See supra note 245; A number of states participate in
the CDC monitoring of HIV incidence among childbearing women through freely-given
blood samples and double-blinded test results not traceable to the women. Isaacman, su-
pra note 454.
456. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24
(joint opinion) (holding that a state may require that truthful, nonmisleading information
about the abortion procedure, including its risks and alternatives, be made available to a
woman in order to ensure that her consent is informed and to preserve her physical and
psychological well being; other informed consent requirements may be justified by a
state's interest in preserving fetal life).
457. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. at
764; see discussion supra part III.
458. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
at 762.
459. Id. at 767 (stating that government is not permitted to "chill the exercise of
constitutional rights by requiring disclosure of protected, but sometimes unpopular activi-
ties").
Even if forced disclosure is viewed as only a de minimis burden on her right to bear a
child,- it is unlikely to survive constitutional review. Compelled knowledge of HIV status
might be viewed as leaving the woman with the same range of options she had prior to
the state's imposing knowledge upon her. Forced disclosure of HIV status would then be
required to be reasonably directed to further a legitimate state health objective. City of
Akron v. Akron Ctr. Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. at 430; see also Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2824 (joint opinion). However, no legitimate
health interest is served by forced knowledge. Thus, such measures should still be
invalidated.
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D. Summary
State-inflicted penalties on HIV-positive women's childbearing
rights, whether they be criminal punishment or civil measures im-
posing HIV-testing, contraception, abortion or sterilization, will not
survive Fourteenth Amendment review. They constitute significant
interference with procreative freedom and do not further a compel-
ling state interest.
While the majority of today's Supreme Court would not deem
measures requiring directive counseling (to discourage childbearing)
significant interference on their face,60 such counseling should not
survive constitutional review because it fails to further any legiti-
mate state interest.46' Such counseling, as well as compulsory test-
ing, contraception, abortion or sterilization, also runs afoul of equal
protection, and civil liberties protections of the disabled.6 2
Constitutional protections bear particular force in relation to
childbearing by HIV-positive women, both because they are disabled
and thus subject to the heightened civil rights protections accorded
that class and because HV childbearing is stigmatized and unpopu-
lar. The constitutional lessons of the eugenics era are instructive:
social ills are compounded, not cured by government attempts to
prevent a group from exercising this basic civil right. Fortunately,
constitutional protections for procreation have developed consider-
ably and should prevent a repetition of the national tragedy origi-
nally validated in Buck v. Bell.5 3
460. However, after such regulations have been in effect for a period of time, it might
be possible to mount a case to prove that such counseling has constituted a significant
burden to the childbearing right "as applied." In this regard, Justice Blackmun noted in
Casey:
The joint opinion makes clear that its specific holdings are based on the insuffi-
ciency of the record before it. I am confident that in the future evidence will be
produced to show that "in a large fraction of the cases in which [these regula-
tions are] relevant, [they] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion."
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2845 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations omitted):
461. While the rational basis test is considerably deferential to government interfer-
ence with individual rights, it is not always a "toothless" standard. Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977). State action regulating childbearing has been invalidated
pursuant to this test. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-50 (1974)
(considering mandatory maternity leave policy as penalty on fundamental choice to pro-
create and invalidating it under rational basis standard); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 447 n.7 (1972) (invalidating state restriction on distribution of contraception based
on rational relation test, and noting that because it failed this low level of scrutiny there
was no need to analyze statute under compelling interest test, which would apply to the
statute at issue because procreation is fundamental right).
462. See discussion supra part IV.B.
463. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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V. CONTROL OF CHILDBEARING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The "overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
[sltate."4 4 Specific individual rights are awarded varying degrees of
Fourth Amendment protection depending upon their perceived im-
portance. Among the most highly guarded of entitlements is the
right to bodily integrity. When the government seeks to inflict sur-
gery or other invasive medical procedures upon an individual, the
Fourth Amendment's command that government intrusions be
"reasonable" requires that the state demonstrate a need to conduct
the intrusion that is substantial enough to outweigh the individual's
"significantly heightened privacy in bodily integrity."45
Part V.A discusses the Fourth Amendment protections of bodily
integrity that prevent the government from imposing certain intru-
sions on its citizens when such intrusions are deemed unreasonable.
Part V.B argues that the bodily intrusions incurred by compulsory
sterilization, abortion, or contraception are significant, if not severe.
Such government intrusions will always be prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the purported justification, because the
privacy value attached to procreation potential is great. Further, the
methods which would be necessary to actually implement such poli-
cies would be unconstitutional because, as Part V.C then posits,
even if these severe intrusions are found to be tolerable when justi-
fied by a compelling need, no such compelling need exists. Part V.D
addresses unconsented HIV antibody testing relating to perinatal
transmission and revelation of the woman's identity after testing. It
464. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Most state constitutions contain parallel protections and often
have been interpreted as providing even greater protection from government intrusion
into an individual's life than does the federal constitution. See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pac.
Transp., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 631 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Horsemen's Benevolent and
Protective Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 532 N.E.2d 644, 650-52 (Mass. 1989), cited in
Charles D. Curran, Mandatory Testing of Public Employees for the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus: The Fourth Amendment and Medical Reasonableness, 90
COLUmi. L. REV. 720, 729 n.56 (1990); compare People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y.
1986) with Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); compare People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1986) with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See Justice William 0.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions And the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
465. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 767.
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argues that courts are likely to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits all such testing and reporting of identity.
Alternatively, Part V.E argues that courts might allow mandatory
lIV testing when there is a showing of probable cause that a law
has been violated. This section also concludes that unlinked HIV
antibody testing that is conducted on freely given blood samples
would be permitted by the Fourth Amendment. Such testing in-
fringes minimally upon a person's bodily integrity and privacy inter-
est in the information one's blood analysis reveals and furthers the
legitimate governmental purpose of monitoring the incidence of HV.
A. The Fourth Amendment Imposes Substantive Limits on Bodily
Intrusions
The prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment apply only to gov-
ernmental actions and not to the actions of private individuals. 466
466. In Skinner, a case involving mandatory blood and urine testing of employees,
the Rehnquist Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or
seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative." Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1990); see In re Noah, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the Fourth Amendment was not invoked
when a private hospital performed a toxicology screen on a newborn without the consent
of the mother to see if the newborn had been exposed to drugs). Consequently, the
determination of whether a compelled sterilization, abortion, contraceptive implant, or
HIV test violates the Fourth Amendment requires a threshold inquiry concerning the
level of state involvement in those practices. If any of these measures are mandated by
federal, state, or local law, then Fourth Amendment protections would attach even if the
actual person who conducts the surgery, implants the contraceptive device, or draws the
blood is a private person rather than a government employee. See Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 614-15; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment was incorporated through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to cover all actions attributable to state and local
governments). Similarly, if the coercive practice is carried out pursuant to the policy or
practice of a government health care provider (such as the Veteran's Administration or a
state or city health facility), sufficient state action would also be present. See discussion
supra note 348.
However, determinations of state action for Fourth Amendment violations by indi-
vidual state-employed physicians who are not following public hospital policy or state or
local law will ordinarily be made according to the same rules used for privately employed
health care providers. See Padilia v. dAvis, 580 F.Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see
also supra note 348. But see United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990) (finding that a doctor employed by the federal government was
a state actor but, because the blood test he administered was purely for the benefit of a
patient's medical treatment and was not to be divulged to law enforcement authorities,
the test did not constitute a search).
A private party's actions may still be limited by the Fourth Amendment depending
on "the degree of the Government's participation in the private party's activities." Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 614. The Supreme Court held that
government policy does not require a private entity to conduct a bodily intrusion, but
makes "plain not only [the Government's] strong preference for testing, but also its desire
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Once state action has been established, a state may justify bodily
intrusion only by presenting a substantial or compelling state inter-
est sufficient to overcome the individual's rights. Moreover, in some
situations privacy interests are so great that even weighty state
interests cannot thwart them. Our system of constitutional law
requires that government "respect certain decencies of civilized con-
duct."467 Consequently, conduct by the state which "shocks the con-
science"46 is not tolerated. For example, in Rochin v. California, the
Supreme Court held that the pumping of a criminal suspect's stom-
ach absent his or her consent violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, despite the existence of probable cause
that the suspect had committed a crime.469
In determining whether surgical intrusions violate an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has held that
"[t]he reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin de-
pends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interest
in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in
conducting the procedure."47 The Court has found that because
"surgical probing beneath the skin can be so severely and substan-
tially intrusive," a compelling state interest is necessary to justify
such action.471
Mere assertion of a compelling state interest is not sufficient to
justify an intrusion. Rather, the interest must be demonstrably
to share the fruits of such intrusions.... These are clear indices of the Government's en-
couragement, endorsement, and participation, and suffice to implicate the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 615-16. Thus, in states that require reporting of HIV test results or
patient identification, sufficient state action would be present regardless of whether the
tester was a private health care provider. However, in states that require reporting of
positive HIV test results for epidemiological purposes, without reporting information
identifying the patient, the Fourth Amendment would not apply. Were the private health
care provider to conduct mandatory HIV antibody tests of pregnant women on its own in-
itiative, and routinely submit the test results to the state for use in criminal prosecution
or for civil penalties, sufficient state action would also be present to invoke Fourth
Amendment protections.
467. Id. at 173.
468. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
469. Id. at 165.
470. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); see United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d
1193, 1197 (7th Cir. 1990).
471. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 766 (holding that surgery to remove bullet from
criminal suspect, while "apparently not extremely [risky]," was prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment because the government "failed to demonstrate a compelling need" to
perform the surgery); see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (holding
that "[tihe forcible injection of medicines into a nonconsenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty"); id. at 241 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "It]here is no doubt.., that a competent individ-
ual's right to refuse such medication is a fundamental liberty interest deserving the high-
est order of protection").
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fulfilled by the intrusion.472 Even when a compelling state interest is
fulfilled by a proposed surgical intervention, the state must show
that the compelling interest cannot be fulfilled in a less intrusive
manner. Thus, the Supreme Court has prohibited surgery to extract
a bullet from a criminal defendant's shoulder because the state had
other ways of proving he committed the crime. The intrusion was
not necessary to fulfill the compelling interest of enforcing criminal
law and therefore, the Court refused to permit the surgery despite
the fact that having the bullet as evidence might strengthen the
state's case.
Under the Fourth Amendment, the nature of the state's inter-
est must be weighed against the privacy right of the individual.
With respect to the area of bodily intrusions, a court must evaluate,
inter alia, the "extent to which the procedure may threaten the
safety or health of the individual"474 and whether the procedure
involves any "risks, trauma, or pain."4" Hence, the fact that blood
tests for blood alcohol content are "commonplace" and not experi-
mental or risky weighs in favor of permitting the procedure.47 6
A court must also weigh "the extent of the intrusion upon the
individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integ-
rity."477 For example, blood tests for drug or alcohol content are not
considered unduly intrusive when probable cause exists that a crime
involving alcohol or drug impairment was committed. However, as
472. For example, the Supreme Court has held that unconsented building inspec-
tions are allowed only when they are likely to lead to an effective government remedy for
the hazards they seek to reveal. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1967);
see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that warrants or evidence
of probable cause are not required for school authorities to search a child suspected of an
infraction of school rules because of the widely recognized need for school officials to
maintain swift and informal disciplinary procedures, and because of child's diminished
privacy expectations and protections in school context). The Court has also held that
urine tests are allowed only where they are demonstrated to effectuate the state's
asserted reasons for protecting the public health and welfare. National Treasury
Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676-77 (1989) (permitting testing of customs
employees guarding the nation's borders). In a highly instructive case, Glover v. Eastern
Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, the Eighth Circuit invalidated a public em-
ployer's mandatory HIV testing policy. 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
932 (1989). The circuit court affirmed the conclusion of the district court that the asserted
interest of promoting patient safety is not fulfilled where the risk of transmission was
"minuscule, trivial, extremely low, extraordinarily low, theoretical, and approaches zero."
686 F. Supp 243 (1988), af'd 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932
(1989).
473. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985).
474. Id. at 761.
475. Id. (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966)).
476. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771 n.13.
477. Id. at 761.
478. Id. at 772; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
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the Winston case demonstrates, even the existence of probable cause
of a criminal violation does not necessarily justify compelling an
individual to undergo surgery. 9
B. Forced Sterilization, Abortion, or Contraception Should Never
Pass Judicial Review
Assuming arguendo that a compelling state interest could be
demonstrated that would possibly justify the regulation of childbear-
ing, such an interest would most certainly be outweighed by the
rights of the individual because of the highly intrusive nature of the
procedures involved in curtailing or limiting the right to bear chil-
dren. State-mandated sterilizations and abortions are such severely
invasive surgical procedures that the highly protected privacy inter-
est in childbearing would outweigh any compelling interest that
could possibly be asserted.4 0 Consequently, such forced steriliza-
tions and abortions fall within the parameters of bodily integrity
protected under the Fourth Amendment, whether or not the state
has proof of individualized suspicion or guilt that a woman is HIV -
positive or that an HIV-positive woman is pregnant or intends to
become pregnant.
Likewise, the insertion of any IUD would be considered highly
invasive because' it involves a surgical intrusion into an otherwise
inaccessible body cavity.48' While IUD insertion is minor surgery
479. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); see also Doe v. Renfrew, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
prohibited a strip search of a 13-year-old in high school student after a dog sniffing raid
focused suspicion on her for possession of a controlled substance, despite the fact that the
search was conducted in the highly regulated high school environment where a student's
privacy expectations are somewhat diminished). But cf Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979) (holding that strip searches of convicted prisoners after visits with relatives or
friends were justified under the Fourth Amendment because of severely diminished
privacy rights of prisoners and the prison's legitimate and important security concerns).
480. See discussion infra part V.C.
481. In Rochin v. California, the Supreme Court held that the pumping of a criminal
suspect's stomach absent his consent violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, despite the existence of probable cause that the suspect had committed a
crime. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The stomach pumping was effectuated by the forced injection
of an endemic solution which induced vomiting. The Court noted that although the stom-
ach pumping did not require cutting into the body, the intrusiveness of the procedure was
not negated and that this was conduct by the state which "shocks the conscience." Id. at
172.
If conduct which only involves the temporary ingestion of a solution has been classi-
fied as conduct which "shocks the conscience," then surely the Court must find that the
insertion of an IUD against the woman's wishes is conduct that also "shocks the
conscience" and is highly invasive.
There are currently two IlUDs on the U.S. market: Lippes Loop and Paragard. Each
one requires a physician to insert and remove it. PDR, supra note 293, at 1076.
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which does not normally present high risks to the patient,482 IUD
use is contraindicated for many women.4 s In addition, IUDs pose
serious health risks to a small percentage of all women using
them.48 Moreover, removal of an IUD must be performed by a clini-
cal practitioner and can sometimes be difficult and painful. The
Fourth Amendment does not permit the government to impose such
health risks upon its people.48
In determining the intrusiveness of mandatory IUD insertion,
courts should consider that each of the manufacturers of IUDs cur-
rently marketed in the United States prohibits the use of their
products absent elaborate informed consent procedures, including
distribution of a federally required informed consent pamphlet.486
Clearly, neither the manufacturers nor the FDA would sanction the
compulsory use of IUDs-nor should courts.
The bodily intrusion and health risks involved in IUD insertion
are obviously significant. More importantly, the privacy interest at
stake-childbearing-is crucial. Mandatory IUD insertion, similar
to the stomach pumping in Rochin,4 7 is conduct which arguably
482. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 n.8 (holding that Fourth Amendment
protection is not controlled by "[t]he question whether the surgery is to be characterized
in medical terms as 'major' or 'minor'... no specific medical categorization can control
the multifaceted legal inquiry that the court must undertake").
483. The Food and Drug Administration and the manufacturers of Ms in this
country restrict use of IUDs so that a large percentage of all HIV-positive women are in-
eligible. The manufacturer of Paragard, GynoPharma Inc., explicitly states that it is con-
traindicated for women with "conditions associated with increased susceptibility to infec-
tions with microorganisms. Such conditions include, but are not limited to... acquired
immune deficiency syndrome." PDR, supra note 293, at 1074. Additionally, GynoPharma
specifies that Paragard should not be inserted in women who are not in a stable, mutually
monogamous relationship, or who have one of several conditions including- a history of
pelvic inflammatory disease, an abnormal Pap smear, an abnormal uterus, or cervicitis.
Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 310.502 (1991) (regarding Lippes Loop contraindications).
Given the association of HIV infection in women with pelvic inflammatory disease,
venereal disease, cervical cancer and abnormal Pap smears, and other chronic infections
of the reproductive tract, the Lippes Loop is contraindicated for large numbers of HIV-
positive women. Even for those women for whom the Lippes Loop is not contraindicated,
insertion and adjustment to implantation of the device can be quite painful. 21 C.F.R. §
310.502 (1991); PDR, supra note 293, at 1076.
484. The Lippes Loop presents significant risks.to all women who use it, including
perforation of the uterus, tubal infertility, and pelvic infection. PDR, supra note 293, at
1590. See also 21 C.F.R. § 310.502 (listing adverse reactions reported by women
subsequent to IUD insertion).
485. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 761.
486. PDR, supra note 293, at 1655 (articulating a patient brochure requirement and
detailed procedures for the insertion of the Lippes Loop); id. at 1074, 1076 (stating that
patients receiving the Paragard IUD must receive an informed decision brochure,
detailing the insertion process).
487. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. at 172.
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"shocks the conscience. " 41s Even the most compelling state interest
should not justify such intrusions.
The Fourth Amendment should likewise prohibit compulsory
insertion of Norplant, the new contraceptive device which is inserted
under the skin of a woman's arm. Norplant insertion is a bodily
intrusion of high magnitude. Insertion requires repeated "probing
beneath the skin" in order to insert and remove the device.
489
Additionally, compulsory insertion of Norplant is the eqtuivalent of
the forcible ingestion of drugs because the contraceptive capsules
release hormones into the blood stream of the recipient steadily for
up to five years. 9 Norplant also invokes the weighty privacy right to
bear children because it prevents conception. Such highly intrusive
bodily and privacy interventions should be found to be unreasonable
and thus prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
491
Compulsory Norplant insertion will also fail Fourth Amend-
ment analysis because Norplant is not a "routine" or "commonplace"
part of "everyday life."4 92 Norplant is a new device with relatively
488. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 759, 767. Prisoners are afforded diminished Fourth
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557-58 (1979) (stating that
"given the realities of institutional confinement, any reasonable expectation of privacy
that a detainee retained necessarily would be of a diminished scope"). Therefore,
mandatory insertion of IUDs with respect to prisoners might seem to present a stronger
case. However, because prisoners retain their fundamental right to procreation, the
Fourth Amendment balance of the individual's privacy interest against the state's
interest still weighs toward protection of the individual. When matched against the indi-
vidual's fundamental privacy interest, the state cannot prove that forced contraception
fulfills any asserted compelling need, including the protection of children, the protection
of prison security, and the imposition of a permissible punishment for having committed a
crime. See discussion infra note 504.
489. To function as a contraceptive, six match-stick-sized Norplant silicon tubes
must be inserted under the skin of a woman's upper arm. PDR, supra note 293, at 2484-
88. Insertion can only be performed by a clinical practitioner, trained in its technique,
and utilizing local anesthetic. Id. at 2486. Removal of Norplant is somewhat more
complicated than the initial insertion and may require more than one session on different
days utilizing local anesthetic, in order to remove all six capsules. Id. at 2486. Moreover,
because Norplant remains effective for only five years, id. at 2484, and because many
HIV-positive individuals live for ten years or more after becoming HIV-positive, insertion
and removal would have to be performed repeatedly for some women.
490. Norplant prevents conception by suppressing ovulation and by preventing
sperm from entering the cervical canal through the slow release of minute amounts of the
synthetic hormone levonorgestral into the woman's bloodstream. Hatcher et al., Implants,
Injections & Other Progestin-Only Contraceptives, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY at
303-04; PDR, supra note 292, at 2484.
491. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767-68 (1966).
492. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771 (reasoning that blood tests are
commonplace and therefore the bodily intrusion is not great); see also Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. at 766 (stating that "the very uncertainty" of medical risks "militates against finding
the operation to be 'reasonable'").
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unknown risks.493 In addition to the unknown risks which could
affect all women, Norplant is known to present serious risks to
health and life for women with many different health conditions. 4
Imposing these health risks upon a woman is constitutionally im-
permissible.495
Compelling an HIV-positive woman to comply with laws man-
dating contraception,496 abortion, or sterilization would also have
493. The Food and Drug Administration has approved Norplant. However, many of
the potential risks identified by the manufacturer are couched in the unknown. E.g.,
PDR, supra note 293, at 2485 (stating that the risk of cigarette smoking, risk for inter
alia thromboembolic disorders, cerebrovascular disorders, and cardiovascular disease are
all "unknown").
The human suffering caused by unforeseen risks can be great. Over four million
Dalkon Shields were distributed between 1971 and 1975 resulting in a world-wide rash of
pelvic inflammatory infections, miscarriages, congenital birth defects, and maternal
deaths before they were banned and withdrawn from the market. ANGUS MCLAREN, A
HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION 252 (1990) (citing MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE
GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985)); see also KATHLEEN MCDONNELL,
ADVERSE EFFECTS: WOMEN AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 170-71 (1986).
Silicon breast implants were widely assumed to be safe and were surgically im-
planted into an estimated one to two million American women, beginning in 1976. In
January 1992, it was revealed that safety studies indicating risks of the devices had been
suppressed and other critical studies were not conducted by the manufacturer of the im-
plants, Dow Coming, for fear of profit loss. Philip J. Hilts, Maker of Implants Balked at
Testing, Its Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at Al, B10.
494. Presently Norplant is recognized as unsafe and contraindicated for women with
a history of thromboembolie disorders, undiagnosed abnormal genital bleeding, known or
suspected pregnancy, acute liver disease, benign or malignant liver tumors, and known or
suspected carcinoma of the breast, liver disease, heart disease, blood clots, or high blood
pressure. PDR, supra note 293, at 2484; Hatcher et al., supra note 490, at 307-08. In
addition, women who use Norplant are advised by the manufacturer that they should not
smoke cigarettes, and that Norplant "could mask the symptoms of cervical or endometrial
cancer." PDR, supra note 293, at 2484. Norplant may also be inadvisable for women with
breast nodules, fibrocystic disease of the breast, or an abnormal breast x-ray or mammo-
gram, or for women with diabetes, elevated cholesterol or triglycerides, migraine or other
headaches, epilepsy, mental depression, or gall bladder or kidney disease. Hatcher et al.,
supra note 490, at 308.
495. See supra notes 483-85.
496. While contraceptive implants present the most reliable mechanism, other than
sterilization, for the state to prevent conception, any method of contraception could be
forced upon an HIV-positive woman. See supra note 486.
Requiring the ingestion of contraceptive pills would be analogous to forcing an
emetic solution into someone's stomach and would clearly be prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment, See discussion supra notes 487488 and accompanying text. Moreover, con-
traceptive pills carry with them potentially serious health risks and would be prohibited
for that reason. PDR, supra 293, at 2190.
Condoms and diaphragms used with cream or jelly present substantially fewer
health risks and state actors are unlikely to physically place these barriers inside a
woman, or in the case of a condom, onto her partner. However, a court or a health
department could order an HIV-positive woman to use such methods and penalize her
upon proof that she refused to comply. E.g., State v. McLellan, No. 92 CR 05684 (Gen. Ct.
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constitutionally impermissible "practical consequences."497 To en-
force contraception, a noncompliant woman would have to be im-
prisoned for life or subjected to extreme physical force. She "would
have to be fastened with restraints to the operating table, or per-
haps involuntarily rendered unconscious by forcibly injecting her
with an anesthetic" 45 in order to permit the abortion, sterilization,
or implantation of a contraceptive device. "Such actions would surely
give one pause in a civilized society."499 This type of forcible govern-
ment conduct would be more shocking than stomach pumping or
surgery to remove a bullet. "[To sanction [such] brutal conduct...
would be to afford brutality the cloak of law."500
C. No State Interest Outweighs Severe Intrusions
In addition to being severely intrusive, forced sterilization,
abortion, or contraceptive implantation cannot be justified by the
state interest required in the Fourth Amendment inquiry.501
"Determination of the standard of reasonableness... requires
'balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
government interests alleged to justify the intrusion.'"502 While the
Justice Cumberland County, N.C. Mar. 25, 1992), affd, No. 92 CR 05684 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 17, 1993) (convicting an HIV-positive woman for failing to comply with a health
department order to use condoms) (transcript of bench trial, judge's order of conviction
and sentencing, and oral notice of appeal on file with the Buffalo Law Review); see also
supra note 382. However, Fourth Amendment protections are arguably invoked equally
when the state compels a person to violate her own bodily integrity and when state actors
impose the bodily intrusion. Clearly, the result in Winston v. Lee would not have been dif-
ferent if government officials had required Mr. Winston to cut open his own chest in order
to extract the bullet. 470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985) (balancing the respondent's interest in
control over his body against the Commonwealth's need to intrude). Thus, even state
ordered or compelled contraception which does not physically involve a state actor will be
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The fact that all of these methods invoke the
weighty privacy interest in childbearing, requiring a correspondingly weighty government
interest to justify them, will result in their prohibition.
497. In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 n.8 (D.C. 1990).
498. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 n.9 (1985) (citing State v. Lawson, 453 A.2d
556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)) (stating that a fundamental liberty interest is
invoked when general anesthesia, although not medically necessary, is used to subdue an
uncooperative patient in order to perform a medical procedure); see, e.g., Gallagher,
Prenatal Invasions, supra note 61, at 10 (describing the case of a woman who refused to
consent to a Cesarean section when her physician decided it was necessary for the health
of the fetus; she was physically strapped to a surgical table and cut open to deliver her
baby).
499. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 144 n.8.
500. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1951) (referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment and its relation to the forced ingestion of an endemic solution).
501. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 766 (1985).
502. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (citations omitted).
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interest of punishing criminal behavior is certainly compelling,
forced abortions, sterilization, or contraception are not permissible
punishments. The Eighth Amendment prohibits compulsory medical
procedures as a form of punishment.0 3 Just as the state cannot deny
inmates necessary medical treatment, it cannot impose unnecessary
medical treatment.0 4 Moreover, while the law enforcement interest
503. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
504. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that "deliberate indifference
to inmates' serious medical needs constitutes unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 243 (1990)
(holding that administration of psychotropic drugs to inmate must be medically necessary
to survive constitutional scrutiny); Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129-30
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that administration of unnecessary or excessive medication
gives rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, just as deprivation of needed medications
does). The Eighth Amendment proscribes punishments pursuant to the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. at 102 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). It is also important to note
that medical experimentation on human subjects without their consent has been
universally condemned since the promulgation of the Nuremberg Principles in 1949. 2
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNEMBERG MIiTARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949); see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 709-10 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Moreover, because those convicted of crimes retain their fundamental right to pri-
vacy in childbearing decisions, Monmouth County Correctional Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro,
834 F.2d 262, 333-44 (D.N.J. 1987), the state cannot infringe upon exercise of those rights
unless the state action is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner
v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349
(1987). Legitimate penological interests include internal prison security and public safety,
but have never been held to include the prevention of births of babies to prisoners,
whether or not the babies are potentially infirmed. See Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 15
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that allegation that miscarriage was caused by prison officials' de-
lay in granting pregnant inmate access to medical treatment could sufficiently state a
cause of action under the Eighth Amendment); see also Jordan v. Gardner, No. 90-35307,
1993 WL 46630 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 1993) (finding prison policy of cross-gender clothed
searches of female prisoners violative of the Eighth Amendment because the search de-
liberately inflicted wanton pain and suffering).
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against "punishments grossly [disproportion-
ate] to the severity of the crime," Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910), and "it[s] ... substantive limits on what can be
made criminal and punished," Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103 n.7 (citing Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)), also provide potential challenges. Surgical sterilization,
abortion, and mandatory contraception might be deemed punishments grossly dispropor-
tionate to the "crime" of imposing a 30% risk of giving birth to a sick child. See Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that surgical sterilization could not be imposed
upon an inmate as punishment for theft because it was a violation of equal protection).
Just as in Robinson a person could not be punished for being addicted to drugs, so too a
person cannot be punished for engaging in the ordinarily lawful activity of giving birth to
a child, simply because of her status as HIV-positive.
An additional Eighth Amendment approach to challenging these measures derives
from the Amendment's prohibition against "unusual" punishments. When punishments
have been previously unknown as penalties for a given offense, they may be constitution-
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will sometimes justify bodily intrusions to obtain evidence that a
person has committed a crime in the past,5 ' it is unlikely to justify
physically incapacitating someone whom law enforcement officials
suspect might violate a criminal transmission statute in the fu-
ture.0 6 Thus, the interest of enforcing HIV criminal transmission
statutes could never justify forced sterilization, abortion, or contra-
ception.
The Supreme Court has recently held that the state has a sub-
stantial interest in safeguarding the potential life of the fetus
throughout a pregnancy. 1 7 However, even if preventing perinatal
transmission is a legitimate state interest, the Court did not find it
to be a compelling one.50 " Certainly, this "substantial interest" is by
no means strong enough to outweigh the individual right to be free
from invasive bodily intrusions. In any event, this interest is not
fulfilled by measures denying the fetuses all possibility of life. The
state cannot legitimately make the judgment that it is better not to
live at all, than to be born with a thirty percent chance of being
infected by HIV.09 As a result, this interest should not justify com-
pulsory sterilization, abortion or contraception. Similarly, while the
ally impermissible unless they are shown to fulfill a "humane purpose" and are no more
cruel than the permissible form of punishment which preceded it. Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 331 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring). Since 1942, government has not been
permitted to punish people for bearing children which it considers socially undesirable.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Thus, it would be highly "unusual" to permit
punishment for bearing a child at risk for HIV infection.
505. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (holding that a blood
alcohol test is permissible when likely to produce evidence of a past crime); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(e) (2d. ed. 1986).
506. The Supreme Court has permitted the detention of known organized crime
figures likely to continue their criminal enterprises while awaiting prosecution. See
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749, 751 (1987) (noting general rule that govern-
ment cannot detain a person prior to adjudication of guilt in a criminal trial and
discussing certain special circumstances including proof by clear and convincing evidence
that arrestee cannot be released without endangering any person or the community).
However, HIV-positive women do not present risks to the community comparable to
organized crime figures. First, as to pregnant HIV-positive women, they do not endanger
fetuses or future children by bringing them to life. Secohid, potential sex partners are not
endangered in the way that victims of organized crime are because they have assumed
risk by agreeing to engage in sex, whether or not for money. Moreover, if they decline to
use condoms and spermicides, as is recommended for safer sex with all sex partners, they
have further assumed risk of transmission. Whether the HIV-positive woman is likely to
inform her sex partners of her HIV status is not dispositive. Safe sex educators stress
that universal precautions must be followed. Many people are unaware of their HIV
status, some lie about it, and some are in the approximately six-month long window
period when they are HIV infected but test negatively for HIV antibodies.
507. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992)
(joint opinion).
508. See discussion supra note 378 and accompanying text.
509. See discussion supra note 381 and accompanying text.
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state's interest in fiscal restraint is legitimate, it is not compelling
and has never been held to outweigh fundamental rights.51 0 Thus,
these measures cannot be justified by the state's desire to avoid the
expense of caring for the children of HIV-positive mothers.
D. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Mandatory HIV-Testing
HIV antibody testing coerced or compelled by the state would
invoke the Fourth Amendment's protections. Compulsory HIV test-
ing invokes substantial privacy interests which are not outweighed
by the government's interest in testing, even though the bodily in-
trusion is less severe than contraception, abortion, and sterilization.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently reiterated its long-standing recog-
nition "that a 'compelled intrusio[n] [sic] into the body for blood to be
analyzed' for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment
search.""'- Accordingly, mandatory HIV antibody testing conducted
with state imprimatur would be required to comply with Fourth
Amendment standards of reasonableness as well.5 12
Two separate searches subject to the Fourth Amendment are
involved when the government conducts or compels a blood test for
use in enforcing or investigating breaches of criminal laws or other
statutory or regulatory standards.1 3 First is the physical intrusion
of the needle penetrating the skin; second is the subsequent labora-
tory analysis of the physiological data which that blood sample con-
tains.514 Thus, the fact that a pregnant woman consented to a series
of prenatal tests, or consented to having a blood sample taken from
her umbilical cord or from her newborn child, would not end the
Fourth Amendment inquiry. Fourth Amendment rights would also
be implicated by the type of laboratory analysis performed on the
blood. Absent specific or implied" consent to an HIV antibody test,
an HIV analysis of a lawfully-extracted blood sample would itself
510. Supra note 385.
511. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (quoting
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 760 (1985) (holding that physical penetration 6f one's body touches the "most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy").
512. E.g., Glover v. Eastern Neb. Community Off. of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243,
250-51 (D. Neb. 1988), affd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932
(1989); see also Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir.
1990); Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988);
Local 1812, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F.
Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 580 (111. 1992) (holding that the
intrusion must be reasonable when measured against the Fourth Amendment standards).
513. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 616 (citing Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987)).
514. Id.
515. See supra part Il.B.
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invoke Fourth Amendment protections.
Mandatory blood testing for the purpose of prohibiting an HIV-
positive woman from childbearing, or punishing her for doing so, is
arguably the type of government intrusion that "shocks the con-
science."516 Such outrageous government conduct and infringement
upon an individual's rights should outweigh any governmental in-
terest, no matter how compelling. Thus, such conduct should never
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. HIV testing reveals
HIV antibody status which carries with it potentially serious psy-
chological and social impacts. 17 Arguably, HIV testing of a consen-
sually given blood sample is substantially intrusive because of the
potentially serious impact revelation of HIV status could have on
the woman and her ability to bear children. No court has yet found
blood testing to be prohibited outright by the Fourth Amendment,
although no court has addressed blood testing in the context of
childbearing."
Assuming arguendo that compulsory HIV antibody testing is
not an intrusion which "shocks the conscience," the privacy interests
regarding childbearing and BIV status which are at stake should
require fulfillment of a substantial, if not compelling, government
interest to justify such testing. One governmental interest which
could be asserted to justify unconsented testing would be the state's
interest in enforcing the criminal law. Information derived from HIV
tests would be utilized in the investigation and prosecution of viola-
tions of criminal transmission statutes. However, the state's interest
in enforcing a valid criminal law is arguably insufficient to justify
imperilling the suspect's psychological health58 through forced dis-
closure of HIV status.52 Furthermore, if, as this Article predicts,
516. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952).
517. Government of V.I. v. Roberts, 756 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. V.I., 1991) (noting that
revelation of HIV status can have "devastating consequences"); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F.
Supp. 671, 679-80 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (stating that "to conclude that persons with AIDS are
stigmatized is an understatement"). RENNERT ET AL., supra note 220, at 43-45; Michael J.
Barry et al., Screening for HIV Infection: Risks, Benefits, and the Burden of Proof, 14 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 259, 265 (1986) (asserting that "the [HIV antibody] test can cause
enormous harm, and the potential benefits are uncertain"). But see, Local 1812, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 50, 53 (D.D.C. 1987) (rejecting
claim that mandatory HIV testing of public employees violated substantive due process
right to privacy- "[psychological] concerns do not themselves raise constitutional privacy
issues, especially as other serious diseases-notably cancer-that may be revealed by
blood tests undoubtedly present similar concerns").
518. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 n.13 (referring to the low-risk
everyday nature of blood alcohol test).
519. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992)
(joint opinion) (recognizing that psychological well-being is an aspect of health).
520. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. at 763-64 (stating that although the risk of surgery
to remove a bullet was not extremely great, the outcome was uncertain and thus,
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applications of such statutes to perinatal transmission are invali-
dated,52' this government interest will be nullified.
Moreover, the fact that only a small percentage of women are
infected attenuates the practice of HIV testing all childbearing
women from fulfilling any potential government interests. Even if
unconsented testing were conducted only in geographic areas with a
high prevalence of HIV, the incidence of HIV infection in women
giving birth is approximately one in thirty-two .births.2 2 Addition-
ally, only one third of children born to those mothers infected with
KIV will ultimately develop HIV infection.
When an accurate test becomes available to detect actual new-
born infection immediately after birth," the connection between the
state's interest in safeguarding children's health and compulsory
HIV testing of infants will be more direct. The state could then seek
to test a newborn who manifests symptoms that indicate possible
HIV infection. However, the required Fourth Amendment balancing
will still weigh against allowing such testing. The state's interest in
safeguarding children's health will always be high. However, its
ability to cure childhood AIDS will remain weak until discovery of a
cure for HIV or low risk treatments which greatly alleviate the ef-
fects of the disease. The mother's interest in freedom from uncon-
sented testing of either herself or her child is correspondingly
strong. Courts presented with analogous situations in the informed
consent context have refused to allow compulsory medical care. 24
The government's legitimate interest in monitoring the inci-
dence of HIV infection among childbearing women can be fulfilled by
a far less intrusive measure-unlinked testing of freely-given blood
samples. Unlinked testing would neither be a search nor a bodily
intrusion for Fourth Amendment purposes. Such testing involves
neither the compulsory extraction of blood, nor the compulsory reve-
lation of a woman's HIV status to herself or to others. Because the
far less intrusive method of unlinked consensual testing meets the
needs of the state, there is no reason to allow more intrusive
schemes of.testing.
weighing heavily against allowing the government to impose the risk on a criminal
defendant); see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 771 (indicating that a crucial factor
in determining whether an intrusion is permissible is the level of "risk, trauma or pain"
involved).
521. See discussion supra parts I.C, IVA, IV.B, V.A-C.
522. Dugger, supra note 11.
523. Such an accurate test is apparently on the horizon. See discussion supra note
290 and accompanying text.
524. See supra part II.E.
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E. Forced Testing and Probable Cause
The Fourth Amendment would impose several restrictions on man-
datory HIV testing of childbearing women even if a weighty gov-
ernment interest is found to justify such testing. The Supreme Court
recently reiterated that "as a general matter,... a search must be
supported by a warrant upon probable cause." 25 When the fruits of
searches are used in criminal prosecutions, the warrant requirement
may be waived only where recognized exigent circumstances exist.
In addition, individuals effectuating a search must possess sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause to believe that the person being
searched committed a crime.526 Under these principles, use of HIV
antibody results to prosecute a woman for criminal transmission of
HIV requires a warrant, issued upon probable cause, prior to com-
pelling her to give a blood sample and prior to the analysis of her
blood sample. The HIV antibody will not fade and become undetect-
able with time, unlike blood alcohol or drug content. Therefore, it is
difficult to imagine any exigent circumstances which would vitiate
the warrant requirement.527
The requirement of probable cause may be less stringent when
the fruits of a search are not used for criminal prosecution, but to
further some other governmental interest. This will depend upon the
government interest served, the extent of the search's intrusion, and
the privacy interest compromised. 28 As the Supreme Court observed
in National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab:
[W]here a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to bal-
525. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
526. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (holding that the warrant
requirement is waived only when officer reasonably believes she "is confronted with an
emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened 'the destruction of evidence'"); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93
(1978) (observing exceptions to warrant requirement as encompassing reasonable belief
on the part of the police officer that a person is in need of immediate aid, reasonable sus-
picion by officer at homicide scene that other victims or the killer is still on premises, or
reasonable belief that action is necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious in-
jury); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978) (permitting seizure of plain view
evidence of arson upon warrantless entry by fire fighter to extinguish blaze); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that warrant is not necessary if delay would
gravely endanger lives of officers or others); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948)
(finding that the threat of flight by a suspect or destruction or removal of contraband constitute
exceptional circumstances which would dispense with the need for a warrant).
527. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (holding that exigent circum-
stances existed because blood alcohol level would quickly diminish shortly after alcohol
consumption ceased).
528. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989).
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ance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's inter-
ests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context. 2 .9
Individualized suspicion or a warrant are unnecessary in certain ex-
ceptional employment contexts where employees are highly-regu-
lated and supervised, and thus have a diminished expectation of
privacy.530 Thus, the Court found that warrantless urine testing of
railway workers is justified because it is a low level intrusion which
fulfills the government's interest in protecting public safety. 53 In
dramatic contrast, HIV testing of women based oh childbearing
status would always require a warrant. The level of intrusion would
be great because privacy interests in childbearing decisions, repro-
ductive autonomy, and parenting are protected as fundamental
rights,3 2 and because HIV positivity is an immutable characteristic.
Moreover, no compelling government interest is demonstrably
served by such testing. 3 Hence, the warrant requirement should
not be waived even for non-criminal uses of HIV antibody test re-
sults.
The Fourth Amendment effectively prohibits routine HIV anti-
body testing because, prior to testing, there must be a determination
529. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (1989)
(citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20); see, e.g.,
Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 319-21 (1978) (holding that a statute allowing
warrantless OSHA inspections was unconstitutional where efficient administration of
OSHA was not endangered by requirement of a warrant).
530. National Treasury Employees' Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66. Thus
compulsory urine tests are permissible when the Government has a compelling interest
"in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the
integrity of our Nation's borders or the life of the citizenry, [which] outweigh[s] the pri-
vacy interests of those [customs service employees] who seek promotion to [specific posi-
tions in which these dangers are present], who enjoy diminished expectation of privacy by
virtue of the special, obvious, physical and ethical demands of those positions." Id. at 679.
However, because the Government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest as to em-
ployees seeking promotions to positions where they would handle "classified" material,
the Court refused to validate that portion of the urine test policy. Id. at 679; see also, New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703 (1987) (holding that warrantless searches of junkyards
for stolen automobile parts acceptable because junkyards are closely-regulated
businesses).
531. Compulsory warrantless testing of railway workers' urine for alcohol or con-
trolled substances is permissible when the employees may urinate in private, unobserved,
because the regulation of railroad employees' conduct to ensure safety is a significant gov-
ernmental interest. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 626-27. A
routine periodic building inspection for code violations has been found justified by the
government's interest in preventing the development of hazardous conditions, even
though there was no individualized suspicion. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
537(1967).
532. See discussion supra part IV.A.
533. See supra notes 528-531 and accompanying text.
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that the requirement of probable cause exists in the criminal context
or a finding of individualized suspicion in the civil context.
Mandatory testing laws" not requiring probable cause before test-
ing should also be invalidated.
A prosecutor may attempt to apply a criminal transmission
statute to perinatal transmission and seek to compel a pregnant or
post-partum woman to undergo an HIV test. The prosecution would
have to establish probable cause that a woman committed the crime
of risking transmission of BlV to another. The prosecutor could
attempt to do so by assembling evidence that a woman is known to
be HV-infected and that she is pregnant or gave birth. Alterna-
tively, probable cause of actual transmission could be demonstrated
by gathering evidence that an infant exhibits symptoms of HIV
infection.535 Because eighty percent of children with AIDS were
infected perinatally, evidence of HIV symptoms in an infant may
very well establish probable cause. Similarly, a health authority
seeking to impose HIV testing on a woman pursuant to public health
law could attempt to demonstrate individualized suspicion in the
same ways. If such probable cause or individualized suspicion were
established, then compelled HIV testing subject to a valid warrant
should not be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
F. Summary
Clearly, compelled contraception, abortion, and sterilization are
government intrusions which "shock the conscience" and, therefore,
are violative of Fourth Amendment norms. Even if held to not "shock
the conscience," such intrusions will not be permitted because they
do not fulfill a compelling state interest. They serve only to destroy
fetal life or prevent conception. Additionally, compulsory HIV test-
ing is arguably a government intrusion which "shocks the con-
science" and, therefore, is intolerable to Fourth Amendment norms
because of the profound and pervasive social and psychological re-
percussions of positive HIV antibody test results. Should courts find
that mandatory HIV testing of pregnant or post-partum women does
not shock the conscience, the Fourth Amendment would permit test-
ing only when state interests clearly outweigh the privacy interests
of the individual. In the civil context, testing is likely to be invali-
dated because such testing fails to fulfill the asserted government
534. See supra part I.D.
535. In most states, the doctor-patient privilege and confidentiality of medical
records would prevent medical professionals from divulging evidence of a child's
symptoms or diagnosis to law enforcement authorities. However, several states permit
discovery of AIDS-related health records for a "compelling need" such as enforcing HIV
containment law.
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interests of preventing perinatal transmission or safeguarding the
health of children. In the event that the application of criminal
transmission statutes to perinatal transmission withstands judicial
scrutiny, enforcement of these laws could provide a basis for com-
pulsory HIV-testing.
If forced testing -is not categorically invalidated either because
it shocks the conscience or because it does not fulfill a government
interest, the Fourth Amendment would require probable cause or
individualized suspicion that a criminal or civil law, respectively,
has been violated to justify compelled testing. Thus, routine HIV
antibody testing should never be permitted under the Fourth
Amendment. In some specific cases, however, it may be possible to
establish the requisite probable cause or individualized suspicion in
order to secure a warrant for an unconsented HIV antibody test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fetus and woman and mother and child should not be adver-
saries. The dependency of the fetus upon the woman, and the ulti-
mate dependency of a child upon its parents, predominantly its
mother, calls for a harmonious relationship. Yet an adversarial ap-
proach is now lauded as a means for preventing perinatal transmis-
sion of HIV. While all agree that pediatric AIDS must be eliminated
as soon as possible, this end will not be furthered by circumventing
the basic human rights of HIV-positive women.
Members of the lay public tend to sympathize with infants
while blaming their mothers."6 There is evidence that a large seg-
ment of the medical community also perceives drug-dependent
women as adversaries.3 However, as one commentator has stated:
"The exclusive focus on the fetus, or even on babies, is a cheap emo-
tional distraction from the more difficult and complicated tasks at
hand. We cannot effectively love babies and treat their mothers
badly."538
Several authors predict that attempts to compel HIV-positive
women not to have children will discourage them from contact with
health providers.3 9 For pregnant women, this will mean avoidance
536. One woman voiced her opposition to a neighborhood home for babies, many of
them HWV-infected, waiting for foster care placement: "We love babies. We just hate drug
addicts." Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, supra note 61, at 216.
537. See supra part II.A.
538. Gallagher, Fetus as Patient, supra note 61, at 216.
539. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 97, at 21; Kass, supra note 5, at 317; Ann Kurth &
Margaret Hutchison, A Context for HIV Testing in Pregnancy, 34 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY
259, 261 (1989); Nolan, supra note 14, at 62-63. Compulsory HIV testing of the gay
community discouraged gay men from contact with health providers. Susan M. Kegeles,
et al., Letter to the Editor, Mandatory Reporting of HIV Testing Would Deter Men from
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of prenatal care and an increase in non-hospital births. Such behav-
ior is undesirable, as it would present acute problems in a popula-
tion at high risk for complications. These women will gestate absent
prenatal care and will give birth without the medical attention
provided by a hospital. As a result, they will incur great risk to
themselves and their potential offspring. Attempts to coerce HIV-
positive women not to have children will prevent few pregnancies,
but will likely drive great numbers of medically underprivileged
women away from prenatal care and hospitals.
Only thirty percent of all offspring of HIV-positive women will
become infected themselves. Thus, the seventy percent of uninfected
babies of HIV-positive women are jeopardized by a climate of coer-
cion which diminishes their survival chances by exposing them to
the diseases, disabilities, and death associated with inadequate pre-
natal, childbirth, and postnatal medical care. If HIV-positive women
choose not to use the health care system during pregnancy, their
rates of premature and low weight births will dramatically increase.
If they avoid hospitals altogether when giving birth to these prema-
ture babies, infant mortality and complication rates are likely to
increase. Thus, even according to an exclusive fetal focus, reproduc-
tive coercion remains unjustifiable because no asserted compelling
state interest will be fulfilled by these methods.
Perhaps the issue of preventing perinatal transmission has
been misframed. Rather than debating whether HIV-positive women
should have babies, the question should be posed: "Why do they?"
Based on the answers to that question, the further question, "what
do women need?" should be addressed. These questions will produce
real answers to question of how to prevent perinatal transmission.
As the gay male response to the AIDS epidemic has proven, the most
accurate and productive answers to such questions come from the
affected population itself.140
The structure of the U.S. health care system-the system
where women of means patronize private physicians and poor
women receive care in hurried, overcrowded clinics"---dictates that
Being Tested," 261 JAMA 1275 (1989); E. James Fordyce, et al., Letter to the Editor:
Mandatory Reporting of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Testing Would Deter Blacks and
Hispanics From Being Tested, 262 JAMA 349 (1989). See Carol Levine & Ronald Bayer,
The Ethics of Screening for Early Intervention in H1V Disease," 79 Ahl. J. PUB. HEALTH
1661, 1665 (1989).
540. Dalton, supra note 88, at 205-07; see also Maria L. Ekstrand, Safer Sex
Maintenance Among Gay Men: Are We Making Any Progress?, 6 AIDS 875, 875-76 (1992)
(documenting "drastic risk reduction" following prevention programs "delivered in cultur-
ally sensitive fashion that responds to the needs of the target population").
541. See PETCHESKY, supra note 28, at 82 (stating that upper and middle class
married women are the principle clientele of the medical profession); see also Repke &
Johnson, supra note 93, at 98.
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poor women are unlikely to obtain the careful, culturally appropri-
ate counseling which will assist them to make informed choices tai-
lored to their life circumstances .542 Though some. HIV-positive
women may have limited choices concerning their pregnancies be-
cause they have no access to contraception, abortion, or prenatal
care, 5 43 others may have limited choices because of inadequate coun-
seling.
Inquiry may also reveal that for some women, particularly mi-
nority women, the one in three odds of losing a child to HIV infection
are reasonably and rationally evaluated as an acceptable risk. Often
these women have few avenues for personal fulfillment and treasure
their ability to have children. Additionally, they face terrifying odds
of losing offspring. Lead poisoning,' accidents,54 5 violent crime,
disease and inadequate health care,547 drug addiction, and incar-
Prenatal care affords important opportunities to educate women about how they
can protect themselves from contracting HIV, and about the relationship be-
tween HIV infection in women and HIV infection and infants. However, educa-
tion and counseling require resources that are often in short supply in obstetric
settings, particularly those that serve disadvantaged women. These resource
constraints include inadequate access to experts and materials for training of
staff, insufficient staff time and inadequate space for counseling, and the ab-
sence of financial reimbursement for counseling.
Id.
542. See, e.g., Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low
Income Women, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990'S, supra note 23, at 23-67; Amaro,
supra note 87, at 250-51.
543. Nationally only 74% of women receive adequate prenatal care. Inadequate care
is often associated with being poor, uninsured, Black, Hispanic, or Native American,
and/or under the age of 18. Martha B. Witwer, Prenatal Care in the United States:
Reports Call for Improvements in Quality and Accessibility, 22 FAM. PLAN. PEESP. 31
(1990).
544. Herbert L. Needleman, The Persistant Threat of Lead: A Singular Opportunity
79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 643, 644 (1989) (stating that while 17% of white children above
poverty level have dangerous blood lead levels, 55% of poor black children exhibit such
levels).
545. Rates of death due to accidental injury for black children are 55% higher than
injury death rates for white children. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES 13 (1990).
546. Nationally, although African-Americans represent only 12% of the population,
they constituted 49% of all victims of murders. FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 9 (1990). In 1988, homicide was the second leading cause of death among
African-American children ages 1 to 14. The homicide rate for these children is three or
four times greater than that of any other racial group. Id. at 13.
547. Report Cites Racial Discrepancies in Medical Care, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1990, at
A21; Children, Especially Minority Children, Threatened by Immunization Slump,
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND REPORTS, Jan. 1988 at 1, 2 (stating that 15% of nonwhite
children are not vaccinated for polio, while 4% of all races do not receive such vaccines;
35% of nonwhite children have inadequate diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine,
while 17% of all races receive inadequate vaccines for these diseases; 33% of nonwhite
children are not vaccinated for mumps, while 23% of all races do not receive mumps vac-
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ceration 4 all contribute to infant mortality and morbidity rates
rivaling those of underdeveloped countries.549 Thus, it is under-
standable why they would attempt to have a baby despite the threat
of HIV infection.
Other HIV-infected women may indeed bear children with such
complete moral oblivion that no understanding of the context can
explain it. However, even these cases cannot justify eviscerating the
constitutional rights to procreation, privacy, equality, and bodily
integrity, and the common law right to medical consent, which are
so vitally fundamental to our democracy. This is especially impor-
tant because the government has failed to take even some of the
most obvious steps such as providing accessible prenatal care,5 0
cines; 34% of nonwhite children are not vaccinated for measles and rubella, while 25% of
all races fail to receive such vaccines; there is a corresponding rise in the numbers of
cases of each of these diseases). See generally PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 545;
NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMiAN SERVS.,
ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 80-96 (Joan Hurley & Janet Horowitz eds., 1990); William J.
Mayer and William P. McWhorter, Black/White Differences in Non-Treatment of Bladder
Cancer Patients and Implications for Survival, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 772, 774 (1989)
(stating that black bladder cancer patients were almost twice as likely to go untreated
after cancer diagnosis, adversely affecting survival rate).
548. While Blacks constituted only 12% of the total U.S. population, they comprised
nearly half of the prison population in 1986. Walter Stafford, Economy Offers Few Exits
from Poverty, GUARDIAN, Feb. 20, 1991, at 8; While African-Americans and Latin-
Americans comprised 23% of New York State population, they comprised 82% of New
York State prison population in 1989. Sixty to 70% of inmates have a history of drug
abuse. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N OF NEW YORK, PRISONER PROFILE, Sept. 1992 (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review).
549. Levine & Dubler, supra note 172; see Mitchell, supra note 123; see M. Klitsch,
Women Who Lack Health Insurance Coverage Are More Likely to Bear Seriously Ill
Newborns, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 41 (1990) (finding that uninsured African-American
women are twice as likely as insured African-American women, and four times as likely
as insured Caucasian women, to give birth to infants who die or are seriously ill). The
study concludes that this is due to the reduction in access to publicly-funded services dur-
ing the 1980's. Id.
Low-birth-weight babies experience elevated risks of morbidity and mortality.
African-American babies have three times the incidence of very low-birth-weight, and
Puerto Rican infants have 1.8 times the incidence as that of Caucasian newborns. PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 545, at 10. Close to 20 African-American babies die per
1,000 births, whereas fewer than 10 Caucasian babies die per 1,000 births. Id. at 11;
Robert Pear, Study Says U.S. Needs to Attack Infant Mortality, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990,
at Al, B9 (reporting infant mortality rate for U.S. African-Americans is twice that for
U.S. Caucasians; 40,000 African-American babies die each year, one quarter of them from
readily preventible causes).
550. Roberts, supra note 24, at 1446-47 ("The main reason for.., high [African-
American infant mortality] rates is inadequate prenatal care. Most poor Black women
face financial and other barriers to receiving proper care during pregnancy."); Nadine
Brozan, Poor Are Rocked by Closing of Gynecological Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991,
at B1 ("Providers [of prenatal care and birth control services] have been tightening their
belts and trying to combine services rather than totally close them off, because they must
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drug treatment,55' and general health care. Such measures could
voluntarily and substantially reduce the number of IV-positive
women who become pregnant, increase the number who choose to
discontinue pregnancies, and increase the number of women who
obtain prenatal medical care. Such programs would also greatly re-
duce the number of women who become infected by HIV. Keeping
women free from HIV infection would not only prevent the suffering
and death of women, but it is now the "only effective approach to
preventing HIV infection in future generations of children and
stemming the tide of this terrible epidemic."552
The belief that babies born into lives of poverty and disease are
worthy of protection, whereas women born into lives of poverty and
dislocation-some of whom go on to become HIV-infected, drug-ad-
dicted, and/or pregnant-are not worthy of public help, is a strange
and illogical ordering of priorities and blame. Allocating such blame
only serves to obscure the fact that socio-economic structures deter-
mine that women born into poverty are likely to also die in poverty.
Heightened control of women who succumb to the symptoms of pov-
erty--drug abuse, disease, lack of adequate prenatal care, and IV
infection-merely perpetuates their dehumanization and contrib-
utes to the cycle of despair. Our democracy can deliver better an-
swers to the problem of perinatal transmission. Our laws command
that we do so.
operate with less money than they had in 1980, when Ronald Reagan took office.").
551. "Treatment on demand" for intravenous drug users, with special accommoda-
tions made for "addicted women, addicted pregnant women and their children" was
recommended by the Presidential Comm'n on the Human Immunodeficiency Epidemic in
1988. The Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Epidemic, Drug
Abuse and the HIV Epidemic, in AIDS: THE IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(Mark Blumberg bd., 1990). Despite the passage of nearly five years, this goal has not
been fulfilled. Rogers, supra note 10, at 528. Indeed, the Bush Administration became
increasingly committed to a law enforcement response to drug addiction. Philip J. Hilts,
Experts Call for U.S. to Expand Drug Treatment; Bush Aides Are Receptive, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1990, at B5 (noting that "[i]n 1989, about one in seven federal dollars spent on
anti-drug programs was spent on treatment, down from one in two dollars for treatment
in 1976"); cf Kathleen Teltsch, In Detroit a Drug Recovery Center That Welcomes the
Pregnant Addict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A14 (noting that the center looked beyond
the drug issue "to women and children facing life stresses, medical, financial and social
needs, and... shape[d] a holistic approach toward helping. 'rhe therapy works as well as
it does... because women are treated in a program designed for women.'"(citation
omitted)).
552. Modlin & Saah, supra note 93, at 50.
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TABLE I
STATUTES ALLOWING CERTAIN MINORS To CONSENT TO HIV TESTING
Cal. Health Safety § 199.27(a)(1) (West 1990)
Conn. Pub. Acts 92-119 (to be codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 19a-582)
Del. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 1202(f) (Supp. 1990)
Ind. Code § 16-8-12-2(B) (1990)
Iowa Code § 141.22(6) (1989)
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-2892-2892(a) (1985)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5127, § 333.9132 (West 1991)
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-3(g)(h)(i) (Supp. 1991)
Mont. Code Ann. § 41-1-402, § 50-16-1007(8) (1991)
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:17A-1, -4 (Supp. 1991)
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-2B-3 (Michie 1991)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.242(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1990)
Or. Rev. Stat. § 109.610, § 433.045(5) (1991)
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 24, § 577 (Supp. 1989)
R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-8-1.1 (Supp. 1991)
Utah § 26-6-18 (1981)
Wash. Laws § 70.24.110 (1990)
W. Va. Code § 16-4-10 (1991)
Wyo. Stat. § 35-4-130(b), § 35-4-131(a) (Supp. 1992)
TABLE H
STATUTES REQUIRING INFORMED CONSENT PRIOR TO
CONDUCTING HIV ANTIBODY TESTS*
Ala. Code § 22-11A-51 (Supp. 1991)
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-663 (Supp. 1992-1993)
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 199.22 (West 1990)
Conn. Ge. Stat. Ann. § 19a-582 (West Supp. 1993)
Del. Code Ann. tit 16, § 1202 (Supp. 1992)
D.C. Code Ann. § 35-226 (Supp. 1991)
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 381.004 (West Supp. 1993)
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111 1/2 para. 7304 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991)
Ind. Code Ann. § 16-1-9.5-2.5 (Burns 1990)
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1300.13 (West Supp. 1992)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ani. tit. 5, § 19203-A (West 1990 & Supp. 1992)
Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. § 18-336(b)(1) (1989)
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 70F (West 1992)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.5133(2) (West Supp. 1991)
446 [Vol. 41
CONTROL OF HIV-POSITIVE WOMEN
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 144.765 (West Supp. 1993)
Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-16 (Supp. 1991)
Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-1007 (1991)
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 141-F:5 (1990)
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-2B-2 (Michie 1991)
N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2781 (McKinney Supp. 1992)
N.D. Cent. Code 23-07.5-01, -02 (1991)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3701.242 (Baldwin Supp. 1990)
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 433.045, 433.075, 433.080 (1991)
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 7605(a), § 7606, § 7608 (Supp. 1991)
R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-6-12 (1989)
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 81.105 (West 1992)
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1128(a) (Supp. 1991)
Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-37.2 (Michie 1992)
W. Va. Code § 16-3C-2 (1991)
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 146.025(2) (West Supp. 1991)
* Many of the above statutes provide exceptions to the informed
consent requirement when, in the judgment of the physician, HIV
testing is medically indicated to provide appropriate diagnosis and
treatment and/or for the purpose of research. Also, many statutes re-
quire that consent be written or if oral, that written documentation
be made in the patient's record. Finally, Kentucky requires only
general consent to HIV testing when testing is medically indicated
for diagnosis and treatment. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 214.181
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
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TABLE III
STATES WITH CRIMINAL STATUTES APPLYING TO ACTIONS
BY AN HIV-PosrrVE PERSON
Intentionally
Donating Inflicting a
Bodily Engaging in Risk of HIV
Fluids or Risky Sexual Sharing Transmission
Organs Contact Needles on Others
Arkansas X X
Delaware X
Florida X X
Georgia X X X
Idaho X X X X
Illinois X X
Indiana X
Kansas X X X
Kentucky X
Louisiana X
Maryland X X
Michigan X
Mississippi X
Missouri X X X
North Dakota X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X
South Carolina X X X
Tennessee X
Texas X
Virginia X
Washington X
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TABLE IV
DISEASE AND DISORDER TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN
Mandatory Permissive Sickle Cell
Syphilis Test Syphilis Test Anemia
Alabama X
California X
Delaware X
Florida
Guam X
Idaho X
Indiana X
Kansas X
New York'
North Dakota X
Oregon X
Pennsylvania X
Rhode Island X
South Carolina X
Tennessee X
Texas X
Utah X
Vermont X
Virginia2  X
Virgin Islands X
Washington X
West Virginia X
Wyoming X
1. New York requires testing for Hepatitis B
2. Virginia requires testing for PKU.

